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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE, MINORITY FAITHS,
AND THE POSSIBILITY OF RELIGIOUS INDEPENDENCE
AFTER RAWLSIAN LIBERALISM
The conversation to which my dissertation belongs is that which preoccupied John
Rawls in Political Liberalism, namely: (1) how it is possible that a religiously and morally
pluralistic culture like ours lives cooperatively from one generation to the next, and (2) The
extent to which religious or moral convictions are appropriate bases for political action. My
three-essay dissertation is about aspects of this investigation that affect minority or nonmainstream religious and cultural groups, since legal institutions, and theoretical models of
them (such as Rawls’s and Ronald Dworkin’s) are in many ways ill-suited to accommodate their
ways of life. In the first essay, I consider Rawlsian obstacles to developing a religiously impartial
conception of “substantial burdens” on religious free exercise within First Amendment
jurisprudence. I apply this question to federal cases in which Native American tribes sought to
prevent government uses of land that would be, they claimed, catastrophic to their cultural
survival and all citizens’ safety. I propose a jurisprudential model that places a heavier burden
on judges to listen and perhaps translate such views, counting non-mainstream forms of
reasoning as legally cognizable and sufficient to create a prima facie constitutional case, where
current models would not. In the second essay, because few conceptions of justice require that
law be cognizable and justifiable to everyone, I review liberal conceptions of what makes a
cultural group or person “irrational” or “unreasonable.” With a focus on public education, and
cases like Wisconsin v. Yoder and Mozert v. Hawkins in mind, I argue that approaches to
“unreasonableness” from the likes of Rawls, Charles Larmore, Jonathan Quong, and Stephen
Macedo are well-intentioned but unduly restrictive, insofar as they tend to, by definitional fiat,
exclude citizens who embody widely recognized civic virtues, or who at least pose no threat to a
stable democracy. In doing so, I argue that they instantiate the sort of social circumstance that
Herbert Marcuse calls one-dimensionality. In the third essay, I consider whether a meaningful
and practical model for “group rights,” which would include the right of peoples to preserve
their cultures, can be developed within American jurisprudence. This argument is largely
inspired by a paper from political scientist Vernon van Dyke, and considers overcoming
challenges to this notion wrought by contemporary forms of liberalism and vehement public
disagreement over recent, pertinent Supreme Court decisions involving associational rights, like
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby and Citizens United v. FEC.
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I.
Adjudicating Sacred Lands From Somewhere:
The Original Position and Substantial Burdens to Free Exercise
In upholding the conviction of a Mormon man for violating a federal law prohibiting
polygamy, Chief Justice Morrison Waite famously remarked in Reynolds v. United States that to
rule otherwise would open the door for free exercise arguments in favor of human sacrifice and
that "to permit this would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the
law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself." 1 Since the
Supreme Court’s first major Free Exercise decision more than a century and a half ago, such
slippery slopes are common, even formative, ingredients of Religion Clause jurisprudence, such
as in the widely-maligned Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 and, in the cases that are
central to my discussion to follow, Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association,
485 U.S. 439 (1988) and Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2009). Similar conflicts have
arisen in the past year, such as in the Dakota Access Pipeline protests near the Standing Rock
Indian Reservation and President Trump’s decision to dial back land protection for two Utah
national monuments that various Native American tribes consider sacred. The common judicial
response to such challenges from minority faith communities has shown little signs of abating
resulting controversies, making the conversation regarding how differently committed moral
and religious communities can respectfully share living space with one another, while pursuing
their deepest normative commitments, increasingly urgent.
Claimants in such cases are generally members of faiths for whom regimes of property
and other rights, epistemological practices, ethical principles, or numerous other grammars and
vocabularies are foreign to mainstream democratic society and its institutions. The grammars

1

98 U.S. 145

1

and vocabularies of those institutions are in many, similar respects foreign to some of the
claimants. In Smith, the court was unable to consider, against the claimants’ protestations, the
import of ingesting peyote (as a ritual tribal practice) in deciding whether to mandate a religious
exemption to generally applicable criminal laws criminalizing hallucinogens. In Lyng, the
perceived sanctity and godhood of the forest could not allow a minority faith community to coopt the federal government’s use of “what was after all, its land.” 2 The tribal claimants in
recently-filed lawsuits regarding the Utah monuments will likely have difficulty translating
certain of their concerns over land protection into judicially cognizable terms. These religious
practitioners are inclined to offer reasons supporting their positions that judges or the public
could not be reasonably expected to understand or, even if they did, reasons that they could not
or would not accept. These are what John Rawls calls “nonpublic reasons,” whereas the
appropriate lawmaking language of the court and the citizenry exclusively involves, so say Rawls
and numerous others, “public reasons.” My central concern in this essay will be the tension that
exists in legal, democratic theory between specifying the contours of this lawmaking language
and the special interests of religious and cultural minorities like the Lyng claimants, viz. those
who lay special claim to sacred lands.
One of the central questions that occupied Rawls, covered most comprehensively in
Political Liberalism, was how it is “possible for there to exist over time a just and stable society
of free and equal citizens, who remain profoundly divided by reasonable religious, philosophical
and moral doctrines.” 3 What Rawls assumes out of the gate is that (a) the survival of our social
and political system is of paramount or nearly paramount importance to us (at least insofar as
we are political beings); and (b) the terms of social cooperation by which this stability is secured

2
3

Lyng, 453.
John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 4.
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must be determined through a lens that views all reasonable citizens as free and equal. The
greater the degree of pluralism in a politically liberal society, the more intractable
simultaneously maintaining this stability and equality is. The terms of social cooperation must
be sufficiently inclusive and non-hostile towards a religious or cultural minority group to
meaningfully count its members as free and equal, but not so accommodating that the concerns
of this group carry weight at the great expense of the government, public or other groups, at
least not to the extent that essential government functions or others’ legal or moral rights
would be inhibited.
What the above difficulty demands are fair terms of social cooperation among all
reasonable persons and worldviews, terms which in turn require a dialogical home: a language
of political deliberation that is neutral among citizens regardless of their beliefs and social
circumstances. “Public reason” is Rawls’s name for the language of political action and
deliberation that is to fulfill just this role, at least as to constitutional essentials and matters of
basic justice. An influential line of public reason liberals like Rawls, Stephen Macedo, Robert
Audi 4 and Charles Larmore 5 all argue, more or less, that citizens and (even more so) public
officials should refrain from basing political action, advocacy or deliberation on the truth of any
specific comprehensive doctrine, be it religious or secular. Christopher Eberle refers to this view
that public reason (or “justificatory”) liberals have in common as the “doctrine of restraint.” 6
According to this doctrine, any instance of political action or advocacy should depend only on

For an exemplar of both Audi’s thought and dialogue with someone who occupies a contrary position on
the place of religious reasons in politics, Nicholas Wolterstorff, see: Robert Audi and Nicholas
Wolterstorff, Religion in the Public Square (Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997).
5
See Charles Larmore, Patterns of Moral Complexity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987);
Charles Larmore, “The Moral Basis of Political Liberalism,” The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 96, no. 12 (Dec.
1999): 599-625.
6
Religious Convictions in Liberal Politics (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2002), 68-71. Much of
Eberle’s book is devoted to refuting the doctrine of restraint that he identifies as common to various
iterations of justificatory liberalism, including that in Political Liberalism.
4
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the citizenry’s shared conception of justice, or on some other impartial or shared set of facts or
principles, and not on the whole truth or other virtue of any particular worldview.
The stories about why nonpublic reasons – justifications that depend on the whole truth
of a comprehensive doctrine – are inappropriate in political action come in two significant
strands. First, some justificatory liberals argue that political advocacy or government actions
justified by nonpublic reasons are irreconcilable with sincere respect that one owes one’s fellow
citizen. The insistence on public action based on one’s privately-held convictions, that (perhaps
many) other citizens might not themselves accept, as Gerald Gaus puts it, is “browbeating.” 7
Rawls agrees with this charge, even if his account is not predicated on a thick, moralized notion
of respect: “Since many doctrines are seen to be reasonable, those who insist, when
fundamental political questions are at stake, on what they take as true but others do not, seem
to others simply to insist on their own beliefs when they have the political power to do so.” 8
Civic respect includes the recognition of our compatriots’ categorically valuable and
independent noetic endowments, and the consequent desire to advocate for laws we favor by
having them come around to our way of seeing things. 9 Having our compatriots governed by
laws that bear no relation to their intellectual endorsement, by contrast, does not so value
them.

For one among several instances in which Gaus employs this term, see Justificatory Liberalism (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 123.
8
Rawls, Political Liberalism, 61.
9
Or consider Larmore’s formulation of this disrespect in familiar Kantian terms. If we cannot present
reasons that are intelligible to our compatriot in terms of rational discourse, then we appear to her to give
her no more reason to comply with our advocated laws than the threat of force. Larmore further explains
the disrespect that follows in this event: “Forcing people to comply with principles of conduct is to treat
them as means: their compliance is seen as conducive to public order or perhaps to their own
reformation. In itself the use or threat of force cannot be wrong, for otherwise political association would
be impossible. What is prohibited by the norm of respect is resting compliance only on force. For the
distinctive feature of persons is that they are beings capable of thinking and acting on the basis of
reasons. If we try to bring about conformity to some political principle simply by threat, we will be
treating people solely as means, as objects of coercion. We will not be treating them as ends, engaging
directly their distinctive capacity as persons.” (Qtd. in Eberle, Religious Conviction, 120-1).
7
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Rawls argues that basing political action on contestable doctrines can, at best,
instantiate a fragile and temporary social stability, where our social and political goals should
instead involve a social consensus that exists in perpetuity. Thus, while his argument is focused
less on what respect requires for the sake of a foundational account of human dignity, and more
on what sort of respect social stability requires (a narrative in support of political, not
comprehensive, liberalism), 10 the admonition against browbeating is much the same in effect. In
short, there is plenty from Rawls, and not just the lay citizens’ most cherished political values, to
recommend the judicial line of thinking in the majority opinions of Reynolds, Smith and Lyng,
even to those who might initially object to these decisions. We ought to remain vigilant against
losing all the undeniable benefits that stable society affords us, argue Rawlsians and Supreme
Court justices alike, and the publicly communicated preference for parochial reasons over
political values and the political system itself will erode this stability.
Many of Political Liberalism’s critics are concerned that the exclusion of nonpublic
reasons from the public sphere presents the same dangers that Rawlsians believe they avoid:
instability and disrespect. Michael Sandel, 11 Jeffrey Stout, 12 and others believe that the
relegation of such reasons to the “background culture” 13 will motivate mass retreat from public

The distinction between “political” and “comprehensive” is that the former involves some deep theory
of value or truth that Rawls wishes to avoid, partly in response to some criticisms of Theory of Justice,
which argued that Rawls’s notion of justice relied on such a deep theory without fessing up to one. What
a political liberalism is after is a conception of justice that reflects settled convictions that are the product
of an overlapping social consensus. For a relatively concise and complete summary of this distinction, see
especially Rawls, Political Liberalism, 8-11. For an excellent summary of the criticisms of Theory that
motivated Rawls’s later emphasis on a merely political liberalism, see Robert Talisse, On Rawls (Belmont,
CA: Cengage Learning, 2001).
11
See, for example, Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (2d ed.) (Cambridge, U.K.:
Cambridge University Press, 1998).
12
Jeffrey Stout, Democracy and Tradition, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004).
13
In Rawlsian parlance, the “background” refers to those social and cultural spheres other than the
political. Comprehensive doctrines, and consequently religious reasons, may be freely invoked here.
Examples of “background” conversations are those that take place in “the culture of daily life, of its many
associations: churches and universities, learned and scientific societies, and clubs and teams, to mention a
few” (Rawls, Political Liberalism, 114).
10

5

dialogue into dialogically closed-off enclaves. Such alienation from public discourse and action
among cultural and faith communities will breed distrust in the government and other
communities, which is an obvious threat to political stability. Eberle and Robert Talisse, 14 in
addition to their recognition of the above risk, suggest that refusing to hear certain reasons in
public discourse or political action might be undemocratic or disrespectful in its own way.
Paralleling Hegel’s critique of Kantian public reason, 15 certain others find political liberalism
undemocratic because of its static nature, insofar as it is unable to truly accommodate novel or
radically different practices over time. Some more damning critics claim that the very notion of
public liberalism is a sham, not a system of fair and neutral rules, but surreptitious browbeating
from a specific set of ethical and metaphysical values that have an easier time, as Nicholas
Wolterstorff observes, disguising themselves in public verbiage than do religious ones. 16
Rawls did not deny that his critics had legitimate concerns. Rawls insistently asks them:
“What’s the alternative [to political liberalism]? How [else] are you going to get along in a
constitutional regime with all these other comprehensive doctrines?” 17 Rawls’s apparently
simple question echoes Jacques Derrida’s important insight that actual political and legal
systems are (regrettably) necessarily exclusionary at times, and are therefore always and
everywhere “not-yet” democracies. 18 That some citizens or subsets of the citizenry will bear a
greater dialogical burden than some others by virtue of their (reasonable) comprehensive
doctrines, while unfortunate and short of the democratic ideal, is an outcome to be minimized
even if it is inevitable that it persists. Rawls laments, but accepts as inevitable, the fact that not

Robert Talisse, Democracy and Moral Conflict (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
For a summary of this critique, see Jeffrey Stout, Democracy and Tradition (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press 2004), 77-85.
16
Audi and Wolterstorff, Religion in the Public Square (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield 1997), 105-6.
17
John Rawls, “Commonweal Interview with John Rawls,” in John Rawls: Collected Papers, ed. Samuel
Freeman (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999): 620.
18
Jacques Derrida, Rogues (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2005).
14
15
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all comprehensive doctrines will fare equally well in political liberalism. Some might demand, for
instance, a greater share of public resources, more burdensome accommodations or more
difficult-to-publicly-translate interests than others. In this vein, a compassionate Rawlsian judge
might well find results like Lyng’s unfortunate, particularly in view of the historical oppression
and ongoing marginalization of Native American tribes, but necessary in view of our essential
civic commitments to equality and freedom. What judicial doctrine presents a politically and
ethically acceptable alternative, since there must be some system of rules by which all
reasonable citizens willingly play if they wish to be social participants? How can minority
interests like the Lyng claimants’ interests be accorded substantial weight without thereby
marginalizing the interests of another group or the public?
The purpose of this essay will not be to ultimately settle any score between the
aforementioned public reason liberals and critics regarding whether cases like Lyng expose the
public reason concept as faulty or vindicate it. My immediate aim is to consider some central
features of veiled rulemaking (i.e., in the original position) as an internal critique of those
justificatory liberals who support the currently predominant judicial approach to determining
just what constitutes an impermissible burden on the free exercise of religion. I will employ this
device to demonstrate that (a) no representative in the original position could approve a set of
rules like those this judicial line of thinking embraces, and (b) this device ostensibly leave room
for a cognizable, prima facie argument in favor of the Lyng claimants even if a more detailed,
complete picture of Rawls’s doctrine of public reason within political liberalism would not. That
it might leave such room does not, of course, render the Rawlsian’s hands bloodless – far from
it. In a later essay, I will demonstrate that public reason doctrines like Rawls’s, if they are not
careful, risk imposing a condition much like what Herbert Marcuse calls one-dimensionality. 19

19

Herbert Marcuse, 2nd ed., One-Dimensional Man (Boston: Beacon Press, 1991).

7

Here, however, I am content to demonstrate how the original position (like other impartial
rulemaking doctrines within political philosophy) reveals an asymmetry in First Amendment
jurisprudence between those threats to one’s faith or safety that are cognizable and those that
are not.
If Rawlsian public reason is a helpful guideline in fashioning legal rules in a modern
democracy, greater emphasis on the background conditions of the various parties engaged in
reason-giving is needed to remind us that we are always adjudicating cases of paramount
concern to the affected parties from somewhere. In this vein, Rawlsian public reason can be
construed in such a way to adequately incorporate Thomas Nagel’s urging of epistemic
humility 20 that inspired this essay’s title. One might well conclude something like the following:
“We need some fair system of rules to peaceably coexist, and these rules are made fair as
possible. If a religion can’t survive in such an environment or fades away with time, then so
much the worse for such religions.” Indeed, Rawls arrives at similar conclusions, claiming that
political liberalism will have the effect of exposing and rooting out unreasonable comprehensive
doctrines, or even that some religions (reasonable or not) simply might fare better than others
in specific instantiations of political liberalism. The question that this invites, however, is how
cavalierly we can extend this pronouncement to justify certain discursive practices while still
living up to the democratic standards on which our legal system is purportedly based, including
the rights it purports to guarantee. After all, those most easily painted unreasonable are
minority faiths and cultural groups, which is just the sort of result Rawls wished to avoid.
Whether the tribes in the following cases are unreasonable is an important investigation for
another day.

20

Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986).
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A. Incidental Harms to Sacred Lands and Substantial Burdens on Free Exercise
Before offering a prima facie public reason argument in favor of the Native American
plaintiffs in the two sacred land cases that concern me, I will describe the currently predominant
judicial approach to incidental harms to sacred lands, summarizing both courts’ rationales in
Lyng and Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2009), as well as precisely what was at stake for
the religious claimants. Next, I will describe the criteria of justice as fairness arising from the
original position, which will be used to evaluate these decisions’ democratic (de)merits. The
most important feature of both decisions for my purposes is that the relative importance of the
belief or practice at issue (to the tribe members) did not factor into the court’s reasoning. I will
assume that federal courts following Lyng each regard themselves as good political liberals by:
(a) being neutral among comprehensive doctrines; (b) employing only public reason in issuing
their decisions; and (c) basing their decisions on a conception of justice that is publicly shared
and freestanding. 21
The Free Exercise clause of the First Amendment expressly forbids Congress from
making any law prohibiting the free exercise of religion. This would obviously invalidate any laws
that prohibit a certain religious status or a certain pronouncement of belief. “Prohibition”
historically been construed to constitutionally invalidate laws that punished the practices of
certain religions, but only where such laws were designed to target those specific religions.
There also appears to be a significant consensus that government actions which either penalize
a religious adherent for her religious beliefs or coerce an adherent to violate her beliefs
constitute impermissible burdens or prohibitions on free exercise. Beyond these strictures,
there is both division and confusion over what types of additional burdens on religious

This assumes, of course, that similarly situated claimants to those in Lyng have representatives in the
original position in the first place, which in turn requires the assumption that these claimants and their
comprehensive doctrines are “reasonable.”
21

9

expression, under parallel statutory and constitutional tests, are legally impermissible, if any. In
some cases, such as those involving imprisoned convicts who need certain accommodations for
their religious observances, the Clause has been construed to require affirmative acts of
accommodation on the government’s part, though even these often are decided on statutory
grounds (like the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. §§
2000cc, et seq.). On the other hand, various incidental effects on religious conduct resulting
from generally applicable laws have passed constitutional muster, most famously in Smith.
Some of this confusion is attributable to the coexistence of the Free Exercise Clause and
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993, the latter of which was a legislative
attempt to restore, in the wake of Employment Division v. Smith, what were purportedly the
greater religious protections afforded by Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin
v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 22 In Smith, the Court held that generally applicable laws that have
an incidental, harmful effect on religious conduct are permissible without any required showing
of a compelling need from the government to justify such an incidental effect. What is also
important here is that the Smith Court drew a stark line between religious speech or conviction
on the one hand and conduct on the other, claiming that only the former enjoys nearly absolute
protection and the latter much more limited protection. Academics, legislators, religious
advocacy groups and myriad others who protested the decision instead demanded what they
saw as the appropriate test from Sherbert and Yoder, whereby any incidental burden on
religious free exercise must be justified by a compelling governmental interest. Recognizing that
generally applicable and religiously neutral laws can interfere with religion just as much as (or

The constitutionality of RFRA is a matter of significant controversy, but has only been invalidated, in City
of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), where the federal government has attempted to impose its more
restrictive rulemaking standard on state governments. Nearly half the states have since adopted RFRA
statutes (mirroring the federal law that had been invalidated as applied to them) of their own since it was
passed.
22
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sometimes, more than) those that target religion or a religion, RFRA’s general pronouncement is
that the government “shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the
burden results from a rule of general applicability.” Thus, post-RFRA, once a plaintiff-religious
practitioner demonstrates that a government action “substantially burdens” her exercise of
religion, the onus is on the government to prove that the action is (a) necessary to further a
compelling government interest, and (b) the least restrictive means of furthering that interest. 23
I am focusing on a seminal pre-RFRA case (Lyng) and a relatively recent post-RFRA case
(Navajo Nation) because they are consistent in their factual background and reasoning even
though they purportedly arise under distinct sources of law. RFRA appears to have made little
difference in courts’ treatment of sacred land controversies: commentators have observed a
tendency to simply construe the category “substantial burden” narrowly in cases involving
Native American plaintiffs, such that the evidentiary burden to demonstrate necessity to further
a compelling government interest never shifts to the government. I will therefore, for
simplicity’s sake, use “incidental harms” or “substantial burdens” interchangeably, and treat
both decisions as Free Exercise cases.
Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association
At issue in Lyng was a government road construction project and a timber collecting
endeavor, each of which would require the destruction (or disturbance) of a part of the Chimney
Rock area of the Six Rivers National Forest. Parts of the Chimney Rock area were considered
sacred by the Yurok, Karok and Tolowa tribes. “Specific sites [were] used for certain rituals,”
Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion stated, “and successful use of the area is dependent upon

This verbiage is familiar elsewhere in constitutional jurisprudence, and is a demanding standard on
government action known as “strict scrutiny.” For just two among myriad well-known examples
elaborating on or applying this standard, see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) and Fisher v. University of
Texas, 579 U.S. ____ (2016).
23
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and facilitated by certain qualities of the physical environment the most important of which are
privacy, silence and an undisturbed natural setting.” 24 The Forest Service decided to disregard a
report it had commissioned that recommended the road not be built, though in doing so it did
take care to avoid significant religious and cultural sites, and even provided a “safe zone” within
a half mile of each of them. As Brennan’s dissent emphasized, the significance of the site to the
tribes could not be overstated:
While traditional Western religions view creation as the work of a deity "who institutes
natural laws which then govern the operation of physical nature," tribal religions regard
creation as an ongoing process in which they are morally and religiously obligated to
participate. Native Americans fulfill this duty through ceremonies and rituals designed
to preserve and stabilize the earth and to protect humankind from disease and other
catastrophes. Failure to conduct these ceremonies in the manner and place specified,
adherents believe, will result in great harm to the earth and to the people whose
welfare depends upon it. 25
The majority opinion and dissent similarly described the extent to which the road would
traverse ritualistic or sacred areas, but it will suffice for my purposes that the majority found it
to be “undisputed [arguendo] that the Indian respondents’ beliefs are sincere and that the
Government’s proposed actions will have severe adverse effects on the practice of their
religion.” 26 The majority recognized that the tribes have used the area for a very long time, that
the rituals at issue are often aimed at results no less important than the welfare of the whole
tribe and all of mankind, and that (according to the tribe’s beliefs) “the rituals would not be
efficacious if conducted at other sites than the ones traditionally used, and too much
disturbance of the area’s natural state would clearly render any meaningful continuation of
traditional practices impossible.” 27 Additionally, the majority did not contend that either the
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road or the timber operations were particularly weighty government interests, satisfied that
they were simply legitimate government activities on governmental property.
In ruling against the tribes, the Court found that the tribe members’ Free Exercise rights
were not violated because the government, in constructing the G-O road and collecting timber,
neither (a) coerced the tribe members to violate their religious beliefs, nor (b) penalized them
for continuing their religious practices. 28 What was happening, as the majority did not deny, is
that the proposed land uses would destroy a necessary condition for the tribes’ religious
practices, at least from the tribes’ perspectives. The tribes had nonetheless failed to
demonstrate the requisite sort of burden (i.e., being penalized or coerced) for the court to find a
free exercise violation. The following excerpt from the opinion’s syllabus best summarizes the
majority opinion’s holding and rationale:
Incidental effects of government programs, which may interfere with the practice of
certain religions, but which have no tendency to coerce individuals into acting contrary
to their religious beliefs, do not require the government to bring forward a compelling
justification for its otherwise lawful actions. The Free Exercise Clause is written in terms
of what the government cannot do to the individual, not in terms of what the individual
can exact from the government. Even assuming that the Government’s actions here will
virtually destroy the Indians’ ability to practice their religion, the Constitution simply
does not provide a principle that could justify upholding respondents’ legal claims. 29
While it seems that the government took some degree of care to honor the Native American
cultural and religious practices at issue, I call attention to the Court’s willingness to assume that
the road would virtually destroy the Indians’ ability to practice their religion, which is the crux of
what I will criticize.
In allowing this assumption, the Court was vehemently disagreeing with Justice William
Brennan, rejecting his proposal that the Court employ a balancing test that considered the
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29

Id. at 449-50
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relative centrality of the religious practice at issue in a Free Exercise case. Justice O’Connor
stated that in doing so, the Court would risk excessively entangling itself in religious affairs
(which the Establishment Clause, according to many jurists, forbids) and, what is worse, finding
itself confronted with situations where the Court claimed to know better than the religious
adherents themselves what practices or beliefs were “central” to their faith. Moreover, the
Court found the government’s property interest determinative: “Whatever rights the Indians
may have to the use of the area, however, those rights do not divest the Government of its right
to use what is, after all, its land.” 30 It is also worth noting that the majority opinion drew
significantly from Bowen v. Roy, which ostensibly stood for the principle that one’s religious
freedom provides one no stake in directing, objecting to, or interfering with internal
governmental functions. What was at issue in Bowen was the government’s own business of
assigning citizens social security numbers, and what was at issue here was the government’s
own business of managing its land. As an exemplar of the influence of the Lyng Court’s
reasoning on the following decades of jurisprudence, I now turn to Navajo Nation, a Ninth
Circuit decision with substantial (and in my view, troubling and undemocratic) implications for
the judicial trend going forward.
Navajo Nation v. United States Forest Service 31
Navajo Nation involved a government-owned ski area called the Snowbowl, located on
the San Francisco Peaks near Flagstaff, Arizona. Importantly, to the Court at least, the Snowbowl
covers less than 1% of the San Francisco Peaks. Because the snowfall at this ski area was highly
variable, its operators claimed that the use of recycled wastewater to make artificial snow was
required to keep this public recreation facility profitable and viable. Several Native American
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tribes, including the Navajo Nation, had historically performed religious rituals at sites
throughout the San Francisco Peaks. The tribe members believed that the use of recycled
wastewater at the Snowbowl desecrated the entire mountain, rendered the religious rituals
performed there inefficacious, and had consequently been responsible for global disasters such
as the 9/11 terrorist attacks, numerous natural disasters and the Columbine massacre. Like the
tribes in Lyng, the plaintiffs in Navajo Nation regarded themselves as stewards of their people
and of humanity generally, a role that was threatened if not destroyed by the desecration of the
ritual sites. I do not believe there is any risk of melodrama in claiming that, for them, nothing
short of the death of themselves (or others) and, at least potentially, the world, was at stake.
Beyond the Navajo Nation court’s reliance on Lyng, there are two significant (and, I
argue, troublesome) features of the decision that are well worth mentioning for the purpose of
my subsequent critique. First, because the use of recycled wastewater would leave the ritual
sites and the surrounding mountainside physically intact, what apparently weighed heavily on
the judges’ minds is how little was at stake for the tribes:
The district court also found, however, that there are no plants, springs, natural
resources, shrines with religious significance, or religious ceremonies that would be
physically affected by the use of such artificial snow. No plants would be destroyed or
stunted; no springs polluted; no places of worship made inaccessible, or liturgy
modified. The Plaintiffs continue to have virtually unlimited access to the mountain,
including the ski area, for religious and cultural purposes. On the mountain, they
continue to pray, conduct their religious ceremonies, and collect plants for religious
use. 32
The Ninth Circuit concluded that the “sole effect of the artificial snow is on the Plaintiffs’
subjective spiritual experience.” 33 The implication of the court’s categorizing the effect as such
was that physical destruction or physical threats would’ve at least given rise to a colorable claim,
whereas categorically different harms – so-called subjective, spiritual ones – do not.
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Second, the court employed a similar slippery slope argument as Smith and Reynolds
(and, of course, Lyng), finding that if they were to rule otherwise, the following would be the
result:
Were it otherwise, any action the federal government were to take, including action on
its own land, would be subject to the personalized oversight of millions of citizens. Each
citizen would hold an individual veto to prohibit the government action solely because it
offends his religious beliefs, sensibilities, or tastes, or fails to satisfy his religious desires.
Further, giving one religious sect a veto over the use of public park land would deprive
others of the right to use what is, by definition, land that belongs to everyone. 34
In such a setting, the court continued, no government, let alone a religiously pluralistic one like
the United States, could function. As such, respecting religious beliefs absolutely must be
distinguished from “requiring the government to avoid any perceived slight to them,” 35 and it is
only the former that the Free Exercise clause protects. While the first feature of this case that I
highlighted is troubling, the majority’s comment regarding a “veto” over other public uses is a
well-taken objection from a Rawlsian standpoint. My critique and proposed jurisprudential
alternative, admittedly, struggles with an objection like this, i.e., how to distinguish a veto from
a reasonable land management request. I will address objections of this form after explicating
the features of the original position that reveal the undemocratic strand in these decisions.
B. Comprehensive Doctrines and the Attitudinal Status of the Representatives
With the central elements from each decision that will concern me in focus, I now turn
to the ostensible difficulty with making a case for or against the plaintiffs in view of the
strictures of public reason. What is central to the internal critique I intend to offer is the fact

Id. Such worries, a defender of Lyng might argue, are vindicated by the sorts of claims over sacred land
that other tribes sought in Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir.), cert. denied 449 U.S. 953 (1980)
and Wyoming Sawmills, Inc. v. U.S. Forest Service, 383 F.3d 1241 (10th Cir. 2004), cert denied 126 S. Ct.
330 (2005).
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that the deliberative language of the representatives in the original position is public reason. 36
Thus, examining the original position can help us determine the boundaries of public reason,
and public reason can help us clarify certain features of the original position. 37 As Brennan
keenly observes in his dissent in Lyng, it is far more foreseeable that someone in the original
position would be concerned with the harmful effect (i.e., the degree of harm) of a proposed
government action on the comprehensive doctrine at issue, incidental or not, rather than either
the sort of burden imposed or the motivation of the burden-imposer. A massive mitigating
factor in proposing a comprehensive “no harmful effects allowed (full stop)” sort of approach, of
course, is that the representatives are at once advocates for the government officials, secular
comprehensive doctrines, and the public. The representatives must occupy some middle ground
between the currently predominant judicial approach and a “no harmful effects allowed”
approach, or else make greater dialogical allowances during judicial proceedings for religious
minorities to make their concerns judicially cognizable, even if not dispositive.
To begin making this case, I must explain who the representatives are, what their
legislative task is, what knowledge they have and lack, and how they must behave in their
deliberations. The original position is a representational device in the social contract tradition, in
which we are purportedly stripped of our prejudices and other indicia of self-interest or
partiality to imagine what fair, self-legislated rules (by citizens insofar as they are reasonable

It must be noted, of course, that there are important and substantial differences between the parties to
the original position and flesh-and-blood citizens: the latter are fully autonomous, whereas the former are
rationally autonomous and limited in their motivations and sociohistorical knowledge. Moreover, I am
using the “original position” loosely to refer jointly to the original position itself together with the
successive stages of lawmaking in justice as fairness, especially the second stage (the “constitutional
convention”).
37
Though, as James Gordon Finlayson has observed, the original position is the focus of Theory and less so
in Political Liberalism, it is still the case (as evidenced in his Justice as Fairness: A Restatement) that (i) it
remains a representational device that Rawls favors, and (ii) even if it is not the only conception of justice
that coheres with political liberalism (a door that Rawls explicitly leaves open), it is nonetheless an
effective means of revealed shortcomings in a system of supposedly democratic, self-legislated rules. See
“On Rawls’s Criticism of Habermas’s Conception of Legitimacy,” Kantian Review 21, no. 2 (2016): 161-183.
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and rational) of social cooperation will look like. The wraith-like representatives 38 exist behind a
veil of ignorance, meaning that they are unaware of, among other things, the talent level,
wealth, physical health, social status, intelligence, gender and ethnicity of their citizen
counterparts. Perhaps most importantly for my purposes, they do not know their “final aims and
interests, or their particular psychological makeup” nor, consequently, the religious beliefs or
other comprehensive doctrine adherence of their flesh-and-blood counterparts. A
representative qua advocate cannot assume as true or controlling the evidence set of any one
citizen: an adherent to a secular worldview, Christian, Jewish, Hindu or a member of Native
American tribe and religion. Rules should therefore be fashioned in consideration of the
possibility that the citizen – whose interests the representative pursues – could be born into any
one of these worldviews. 39 The representative seeks to avoid her citizen counterpart
experiencing any disadvantages by accident of birth; the representatives are not gamblers with
heredity. Given the veil of ignorance, the basis the representative selects for the fair terms of
social cooperation will not depend on the truth of any worldview.
If the representatives lacked knowledge altogether regarding their possible citizen
counterparts or the nature of comprehensive doctrines, however, they wouldn’t do much good
as advocates; they must understand flesh-and-blood citizens and what matters to them. In this
vein, Rawls apparently intends that the representatives, even if they are unaware of their citizen
counterparts’ particular religious beliefs, are informed regarding (a) the attitudes that citizens
have towards their (moral and religious) worldviews, and (b) the sorts of interests that arise

I will interchangeably call them “parties” and “representatives.”
It is ambiguous here whether Rawls intends that the representatives would know any details regarding
what moral principles or metaphysical propositions Christianity or Hinduism, as specific and determinate
religious comprehensive doctrines, endorse, at least as some level of abstraction (i.e., what theism or
supernaturalism are). What is clear is that they will not disadvantage one conception of the good over
another and, in any event, they will know what theism or supernaturalism is at some further stage of
veiled rulemaking.
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from their having them. Most importantly, citizens will regard their comprehensive doctrines as
politically non-negotiable:
[T]he veil of ignorance combined with the parties’ responsibility to protect some
unknown but determinate and affirmed religious, philosophical or moral view gives the
parties the strongest reasons for securing this liberty. Here it is fundamental that
affirming such views and conceptions of the good to which they give rise is recognized
as non-negotiable, so to speak. They are understood to be forms of belief and conduct
the protection of which we cannot properly abandon or be persuaded to jeopardize for
the kinds of considerations covered by the second principle of justice. 40
If, and this is particularly germane here, the parties were to gamble with the possibility that they
belong to a minority religion, and permit rules that would cause them to suffer in that event,
then this would “show that they did not take the religious, philosophical, or moral convictions of
persons seriously, and, in effect, did not know what a religious, philosophical, or moral
conviction was.” 41 The parties also understand general principles of the social sciences, including
human psychology, sociology and economic theory, though the degree of specificity is unclear.
Finally, those items of propositional knowledge that are non-controversial, and do not prejudice
the deliberations, are allowable: conclusions of science, where not controversial as well as other
facts ascertainable from and open to public view.
One point of ambiguity in the parties’ knowledge concerns Rawls’s thick veil, wherein
the parties are unaware of determinate, social and historical facts about the society for which
they legislate. Rawls opts against a thin veil, in which we would “allow the parties to the original
position full historical information, including knowledge of everyone’s desires and interests, and
simply deprive them of knowledge of their identity in society.” 42 He considers specific historical

The second principle of justice includes the equality of opportunity principle and the difference
principle, and are not matters that affect a basic scheme of rights and liberties. Thus, the delegates to the
constitutional convention, who are the successors to the original position, only concern themselves with
the first principle of justice.
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or social facts morally irrelevant and potentially prejudicial in this setting, Freeman explains, in
part because a “thin” veil does not “remedy the problem of partiality towards dominant
interests… a thinly veiled initial position still leads them to play the odds in hopes that they are
among those who endorse the dominant majority position and values.” 43 Rawls stipulates that
the original position begins with “no information” and allows “just enough to make the
agreement rational, though still suitably independent from historical, natural, and social
happenstance.” 44 Thus, it would seem inappropriate to Rawls (or at least Freeman) to equip the
parties with knowledge regarding the Lyng claimants’ beliefs regarding the sanctity of land or
the threat of desecrating it, the rarity of this belief among comprehensive doctrines, the Lyng
claimants’ lack of political power, the religious history of the United States, the country’s
institutional features and demographics, etc.. What is less clear is at what point during veiled
rulemaking the parties understand more general features of religion, such as what theism is or
what rituals might demand of practitioners.
Though a thick veil seems to frustrate my analysis (I will soon presume that the
representatives understand the tribes’ predicaments with specificity), the original position is
only the first of four stages of veiled rulemaking. After the representatives decide upon the two
(very general) principles of justice, they move to the constitutional convention, wherein they
will further choose a scheme of basic rights of citizens and decide on the political forms of a just
regime, 45 with all those rights pertaining to freedom of conscience taking priority over the

Id. 12. Freeman further explains that the thin veil would provide no safeguard against, for example, the
initial position being structured in favor of those who would favor the status quo of any current nation of
flesh-and-blood citizens, or any other legislative bargaining advantage that currently exists in actual,
democratic institutions. The initial position should be designed such that it doesn’t especially favor any
conception of the good.
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others, and “weigh the justice of procedures for coping with diverse political views.” 46 At this
and each successive stage of the lawmaking process, the “[l]imitations on knowledge available
the parties are progressively relaxed,” 47 though the parties’ rational autonomy is constrained in
these successive stages (much as lower courts are constrained by higher courts). 48
While Rawls does not exhaustively describe the additional knowledge that the parties
gain as delegates to the constitutional convention, they know the “general relevant facts about
their society,” including its “natural circumstances and resources, its level of economic advance
and political culture, and so on.” 49 Any presumption of religiously specific knowledge in my
subsequent discussion can either be (i) presumed to take place at a later stage of veiled
rulemaking, or (ii) restated at a much higher level of abstraction to take place in the original
position. Such information, I submit, must inform veiled rulemaking at some early point in the
process, since withholding it would render the parties impotent in one of their central tasks:
maximizing their citizen counterparts’ opportunities to live out their conceptions of the good
and to safeguard their own, deepest normative commitments. 50 The details of the Lyng
claimants’ beliefs that are most germane here, when generalized among religions and described
at a much higher level of abstraction, would include facts like the following: (a) One of the most
important features of religious fulfillment is the observance of various religious duties variously
specified among comprehensive doctrines; and (b) Members of various comprehensive

Id.
Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 48
48
For a concise summary regarding how each successive stage is bound by the determinations of a prior
stage, see Political Liberalism, 339-41.
49
Theory of Justice, 196
50
While I need not make this case here, the rationale supporting a thick veil would not seem to demand
withholding from the parties’ knowledge base the content of the full range of comprehensive doctrines
throughout human history, where such information is not supplemented by any specific demographic
information. It seems this sort of information would only assist the representatives in their central tasks in
advocacy, without constituting one of the “contingencies that sets them in opposition.” Rawls, Theory of
Justice, 137.
46
47

21

doctrines perceive grave threats from within their respective worldviews, protection against
which is part and parcel of their well-being.
Armed with, and lacking, the various bits of knowledge that I have described, it is worth
saying a bit more about how the representatives (and subsequent delegates to the
constitutional convention) will behave in deciding such “constitutional essentials” as the scope
of religious freedom. While the original position is partly intended as an ideal for the Supreme
Court (and hence, as a guide for the language that the Court-as-exemplar-of-public-reason
should employ), 51 it is not intended as a guide for what Rawls refers to as the “background
culture,” which is “the culture of daily life, of its many associations: churches and universities,
learned scientific societies, and clubs and teams,” as well as the reasoning of these sorts of
associations regarding questions of political or public concern. Certain of these issues and
deliberations within these associational capacities are not the sort we are to imagine the
representatives hashing out, even if we are to impute to the representatives the knowledge that
their citizen counterparts will often wear both private, associational and public, political hats.
But it is clear that they do make determinations regarding the scope of other freedoms of
conscience, including the “freedom and integrity of the internal life of religious associations”
and the “liberty of persons to determine their religious affiliation in social conditions that are
free.” 52 The parties’ concerns involve not just setting up a basic structure that is just on its face
and at its inception, but one that fosters an environment in which citizens living under such a

The Supreme Court is best understood on Rawls’s terms as the fourth and final stage of veiled
rulemaking, whereby the veil has been lifted. As such, courts as we know them have access to the full
array of facts on record, as well as those publicly ascertainable facts that are appropriate in various
jurisdictions for judicial notice. Thus, the obligations pertaining to public reason and eschewing reliance
on the whole truth remain.
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political system will preserve these liberties over a complete life and make them effective. 53
Rawls largely subscribed to the Kantian insight that an enduring good society must cultivate
certain virtues, or “ways of thought and feeling,” that are conducive to such a society’s
endurance. Our social and political institutions, he thought, should be structured to fulfill this
role. 54
Given this knowledge and this set of tasks, what is most important for my assessment of
the sacred land cases is some characterization, even if it is mostly a negative one, of the parties’
attitudes, i.e., the way in which they must be disposed towards religions and comprehensive
doctrines in general, when deciding them. Because the representatives are to be “neutral” or
“impartial” among reasonable comprehensive doctrines, yet are also centrally tasked with
securing liberty for pursuing them, the specific dispositions underlying these quoted terms can
be easily misunderstood or overlooked; there are various other attitudes that this sort of
neutrality is not. Habermas and Talisse each provide examples of negative attitudes toward
religion that could not feasibly produce a fair set of rules.
As they both lack a determinate attitude regarding the whole truth and must consider
the possibility of their being among the religious ranks, the representatives cannot regard
themselves as cognitively backwards or foster an institutional structure or policy that will treat
the religious as such. What we cannot rely on in claiming secularity or neutrality among

It is also worth noting that many iterations of political liberalism, the full force of public reason
obligations only apply to coercive laws. Many, such as Colin Bird (see his “Coercion and Public
Justification,” Western Political Science Association Annual Conference (2011)), have argued that there is
no need to so starkly draw the line between coercive and non-coercive laws in discussing public reason
obligations. After all, as democratic participants, many sorts of political action involve our shaping (and
sharing in) the social conditions that will be “imposed” on each of us. In any event, what I will assume for
the purpose of this essay is that the Lyng and Navajo Nation cases do involve coercion, as they are tribal
attempts to ensure government (and in a sense, public) forbearance from action. That coercion is
sufficiently present to trigger public reason obligations is even clearer in the Bear Lodge case discussed
below, wherein tribes sought to enjoin private conduct of other citizens.
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comprehensive doctrines necessary to universal religious freedom is the sort of “condescending
indulgence of a secularized authority that comes to tolerate minorities who previously suffered
discrimination.” 55 The representatives are tasked with setting up the social milieu for
cooperation between citizens represented as free and equal. Habermas offers the following
description of a sort of a contemporary secularist who would not be up to this sort of
cooperative task:
As long as secular citizens are convinced that religious traditions and religious
communities are, as it were, archaic relics of premodern societies persisting into the
present, they can understand freedom of religion only as the cultural equivalent of the
conservation of species threatened with extinction…Even the principle of the separation
of church and state can have for them only the laicist meaning of benign indifference. In
the secularist reading, it can be anticipated that religious views will ultimately dissolve in
the acid of scientific criticism and that religious communities will not be able to
withstand the pressures of advancing cultural and social modernization. Clearly, citizens
who adopt such an epistemic stance toward religion can no longer be expected to take
religious contributions to contentious political issues seriously[.] 56
The representatives, though their obligations are distinct from citizens (particularly as Habermas
conceives them), at least have a higher-order interest in taking seriously the fact that their
religious counterparts will take their religious contributions to society seriously. To protect
religious citizens’ interests in a way that conceives their religious beliefs as an inherent burden
or disadvantage that requires remedying, like an economic or cognitive disadvantage, or like a
ward of the state, would be to see their interests from some other comprehensive doctrine, and
fail in their truth-eschewing, universal advocate role. What the representatives are deciding
amongst themselves are the “precarious demarcations between the positive liberty to practice a
religion of one’s own and the negative liberty to remain unencumbered by the religious
practices of others.” 57 An attitude that, even if it does not actively seek to exclude or eradicate
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religion, nonetheless views it primarily as an encumbrance or a rational defect, even if
somewhat benignly as something akin to religions being wards of the state, would overtly favor
one side of the balance.
There might be a temptation to regard the injunction again the whole truth as
encouraging a skeptical attitude towards the truth content of comprehensive doctrines but, as
Talisse observes, this rests on a misunderstanding of the political purpose of the epistemic
restraint proposed by both Rawls and Nagel 58 before Political Liberalism, and recently defended
more exhaustively by Jonathan Quong. It is a proffered political position’s acceptability and not
its degree of evidentiary support or likelihood of truth that determines whether it can be
consulted in rulemaking, at least according to Rawls; justification is a practical, as Talisse puts it,
rather than an epistemological, endeavor. 59 As such, the parochial reasons are to be excluded
from public lawmaking, and from the representatives own deliberative vocabulary, for the
purposes of conversation and not due to any evidentiary shortcoming or unfavorable
epistemological foundation. Opting for moral or religious skepticism is inappropriate because it
is a determinate view of those comprehensive doctrines that is just as “controversial and
contestable as any other moral doctrine.” 60 Put otherwise, the representatives can no more
fairly judge all comprehensive doctrines to be equally suspect, or even likely false, than they can
judge one or more to be more plausible or valuable than others, except, of course, where the
exclusion of unreasonable doctrines is involved.
Despite his probable disagreement with Habermas and Talisse regarding some of the
details of the appropriate place of religious reasons in politics, his later work indicates he is
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largely in agreement regarding those attitudes that are antithetical to a stable democracy (and
so antithetical to its imagined lawmakers too). First, he recognizes in Political Liberalism that a
political conception of justice that is skeptical of or indifferent to truth, would be “fatal to the
idea of a political conception” because it would “put political philosophy in opposition to
numerous comprehensive doctrines, and would thus defeat from the outset its aim of achieving
an overlapping consensus.” 61 What an overlapping consensus, an essential component of
achieving “stability for the right reasons,” involves is the affirmation of a political conception of
justice from within the perspectives of the various comprehensive doctrines that citizens may
adopt, and not simply from some observational point outside of (and purporting to be “above”)
all of them. That said, citizens are to avoid putting questions pertaining to the whole truth on
the political agenda to the greatest extent feasible, and the representatives are not to do so at
all.
We can also infer how the representatives are to be disposed from obligations and
attitudes that Rawls requires of flesh-and-blood citizens. Though the representatives are
understood differently than citizens, the representatives’ task includes setting up a system of
social cooperation wherein the civic virtues Rawls espouses can thrive. A citizen’s duty of civility
requires, among other things, “a willingness to listen to others and a fairmindedness in deciding
when accommodations to their views should reasonably be made.” 62 What a well-ordered
society includes at the outset, then, is a climate in which its citizens are inclined to honor this
“listening” side (I call the duty to provide accessible reasons the “speaking” side) of the duty of
civility. Habermas similarly explains that fair arrangements to determining what should or
should not be heard (i.e., tolerated) in democratic deliberation can only be found “if the parties
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involved also learn to adopt the perspectives of the others.” 63 In this vein, he encourages them
to keep an open mind to the truth content of their presentation and “enter into dialogues from
which religious reasons might well emerge in the transformed guise of generally accessible
arguments.” 64 Rawls similarly endorses citizen practices such as declarations, in which citizens
state their religious basis for endorsing a conception of justice, and reasoning from conjecture,
wherein others demonstrate to religious citizens how their own perspectives. As such, though it
would be nonsensical to impute a duty of civility to the representatives themselves, their aim of
creating a structure in which such a duty can be fulfilled would seem to require their choosing
legal principles and procedures that are conducive to receiving and taking seriously those
untranslated, yet reasonable, comprehensive doctrines (especially those issuing from the least
advantaged in society).
I concede that civility does not constitute only being mindful of the socially beneficial,
and not the harmful, tendencies of minority faiths and cultures. The representatives must
consider the opposing possibilities of being a religious citizen or a citizen who wishes to be free
from religion’s putative encumbrances, particularly from those advocated by moral or religious
majorities. As such, a perspective that only seeks to account for the positive influences of
religion in society – some might offer Nicholas Wolterstorff or Michael Perry as examples –
would clearly be one from within a different set of comprehensive doctrines than those
religiously hostile ones previously discussed. The notion of religious values must motivate the
parties, but so must the desire to be unencumbered by religious values. I will speak more of the
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impropriety of these sorts of attitudes (which I contend are not actually Perry’s or Wolterstorff’s
attitudes) in the following section.
What these features of the original position are to produce – the representatives’
knowledge, decisional scope and dispositions – is a procedurally just system that will ensure
“stability for the right reasons” and not a fragile modus vivendi. Rawls explains that a modus
vivendi is a term often used to “characterize a treaty between two states whose national aims
and interests put them at odds.” 65 Such a treaty is set up such that both parties recognize it is
against their respective interests to violate the agreement, but they remain ready to pursue
their own goals at the expense of the other party and may do so should the background social
conditions change. Sixteenth-century Catholics and Protestants in Europe, to borrow Rawls’s
example, each saw the ruler’s duty as including the upholding of the true religion and repressing
the spread of false doctrine. Should either of them gain a political foothold, there was little
reason to suspect that they would continue to abide by the principle of toleration of the other,
given that each of them possessed parochial values that outweighed political values, and the
political system was not set up to withstand the end of a political power stalemate. By analogy,
a central assumption in Political Liberalism is that a social unity founded on self- or group
interests is similarly dependent on social circumstances, and a dominant group might be ready
to pursue its goals, including its religious or secular moral doctrine’s goals, at the expense of all
other citizens and groups, should that become a political possibility. Should a law prove at all
costly in view of a dominant worldview’s hierarchy of values, or should its view of the social
good include a demand to implement a theocracy or else codify its values against others’
wishes, what reason would it have to avoid doing so?
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The question that I will be exploring for the remainder of the essay is whether the
representatives would have fulfilled their mission, or would be the sort of beings I have
described in this section, if they were to adopt the Supreme Court’s approach to Lyng and
Navajo Nation. Does the substance of this judicial approach depend, for instance, on similarly
situated minority religions’ lack of political currency, or on the moral majority’s rejection of such
religions’ values or metaphysics in favor of their own? Or alternatively, would the sort of ruling
that the Native American claimants urge, if they only were politically more powerful, result in
public policy that was disproportionately influenced by Native American beliefs, beliefs that
conflicted with those of the rest of the public? If either of these questions could be answered in
the affirmative, then the proposed approach could not be chosen by representatives, and those
adopting that approach would surely not be acting agnostically or impartially among reasonable
comprehensive doctrines.
Recall that in both cases, the Native American claimants urged the Court to weigh the
life-or-death (or “central”) import of the religious interests at issue against the marginal benefit
of the proposed governmental interest in a certain land use. Each court regarded this sort of
consideration improper in constitutional reasoning, not just as a matter of rote fulfillment of
stare decisis, but with affirmative, moral arguments as to why an alternate ruling would either
be unfair to the government or the public (or else would open the door in the future to such
inequities). What I will soon turn to are two different ways in which a prima facie case might be
urged in favor of the claimants. One insists on recognition of the truth of their beliefs or
hierarchy of values, and is thereby both violative of the original position’s contours and rightly
rejected by the Supreme Court qua exemplar of public reason, or qua human representation of
a party in the original position. The second depends on no such insistence, and I will argue that
it is not just permissible under, but is required by, the concepts of the original position and
29

public reason. The same reasoning extends, I submit, to the currently evolving disputes over the
Utah monuments at Bear Ears and Grand Staircase-Escalante.
C. Nonpublic Reasons and the Parochial, Inadmissible Case for the Tribes
The representatives must grapple with the possibility that they belong to a similarly
situated tribe that regards the destruction of a portion of the forest or shrines on a
mountainside as existential threats, beliefs that are not be subject to negotiation or
compromise. At the same time, they must do so without allowing the actual truth of such beliefs
or the relative weight of such values to be dispositive in determining First Amendment
boundaries. 66 They must not be indifferent to, or skeptical of, the life-or-death significance of
Court cases like Lyng to the claimants, and this valuation must matter to them in a higher-order
sense, while they ultimately remain agnostic or neutral about whether the government action at
issue is actually of life-or-death importance.
Something like the following claim, if it were employed as a justification for the
plaintiffs’ position, is a paradigmatic parochial, nonpublic reason that a court could not accord
weight:
(1)

The sacred site cannot be destroyed or desecrated because this will either destroy
the spirits that reside within or render inefficacious a ritual that protects people or
the world.

This formulation is just one example, as there are plenty more of greater or lesser specificity
that we can imagine which equally appear as an imposition of values or evidence sets. The
tribes’ insistence on (1) as a basis for government action, or in these cases government restraint,
is demanding that the government act in accordance with their beliefs notwithstanding the
public’s non-recognition of them, and the co-opting of government resources by an

What I will suggest and defend in a later essay, however, is that having no determinate opinion on truth
does not absolve the representatives of considering the possible truth of parochial religious or moral
propositions.
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infinitesimally small minority of citizens. A pre-social being who allowed this sort of reasoning to
be admissible (and dispositive) in an adjudicative or other political, deliberative proceeding
would be countenancing a reliance on the whole truth in political action, failing to serve as an
advocate for comprehensive doctrines substantially at odds with those who adhere to (1).
Suppose that I engage in a recreational or business activity on a part of public land that
others regard as sacred, and my religious or secular comprehensive doctrine includes in its
evidence set no statement regarding any obligation towards maintaining the serenity or
integrity of the land in question. Thus, I obtain enough of an economic, psychological or fitnessrelated benefit from the land use that my forbearing my land use would demand a reason (from
my perspective) for doing so. Without a translation of (1) into a statement of fact or value that
overlaps with mine, then, the offeror of (1) has provided me no more (from my perspective)
than a bare insistence that I refrain from my land use, supplemented by a false claim. I would
rightly wonder whether such a person regarded me as her equal, or whether my right to land
access mattered to her. To so insist on another’s compliance is not to treat the now-obligated
citizen with respect or even as a person, but (per Talisse) as a mere “subject of legislation.” 67
Another way to understand the unacceptability of (1) is that it casts doubt on or
completely dissolves the claimants’ ostensible commitment to the results of the
representatives’ deliberations. In view of the modus vivendi problem mentioned in the previous
section, Paul Weithman emphasizes the centrality of assurance to characterizing improper uses
of religious reasons in Political Liberalism, rather than prohibiting religious reasons per se. The
fact that each flesh-and-blood citizen has a conception of the good “opens the possibility that
she will think honoring the terms of cooperation…is not good for her… And so the rational thing
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for each individual to do may be to defect from the terms of cooperation.” 68 If citizens could
affirm a conception of justice from within their own doctrines, this would provide greater
assurance to their compatriots, since their compatriots would regard their affirmations as
sincere. This is so because it would be public knowledge that each citizen recognizes the
individual rationality of compliance with the political system. What this would require of
religious citizens is a willingness to translate initially parochial reasons into public ones, or else
be willing to take those positions unsupported by translatable reasons off the political agenda.
A member of the claimant-tribes in Lyng or Navajo Nation relying on something like (1),
given the threat that mountain shrine desecration poses to the tribe’s salvation and safety could
foreseeably claim that the import of insulating the shrines from threats outweighs most, and
more likely all, governmental concerns or rights claims from other citizens or citizen groups.
Should the tribe’s political capital or military might meteorically increase, what reason would we
have to suppose they would refrain from violating laws or rights in order to safeguard whatever
spiritual threats they perceive at any cost? Should this manner of thinking becoming sufficiently
common among interest groups, or should it even be frequently entertained as a live option in
society, it would be rational for all others to entertain or opt for preemptive defection of their
own.
It might not initially seem that tribes’ attempts to rely on (1) would necessarily erode
public assurance in their compliance, as shrine desecration is one of the greatest possible
preventable threats from their perspectives, and there is no reason to believe that they would
not otherwise (i.e., for all other issues) regard compliance as eminently rational. After all,
freedom of conscience is one of the central features of a politically liberal society in which

Paul Weithman, “Inclusivism, Stability and Assurance” in Rawls and Religion, 83. For an extended
exegesis along these lines, see his Why Political Liberalism? (Cambridge: Oxford University Press 2010).
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citizens are to be free and equal in the exercise of their moral powers. It might also seem
dubious that their insisting on recognition of this greatest of threats would not be browbeating
of their fellow citizens, especially if they were willing to abide by legal recognition of the
greatest of threats as perceived by other citizens’ comprehensive doctrines. If their marginal or
recreational land use elsewhere were contrary to a paramount spiritual value for another faith,
perhaps the same citizen who insists on (1) is receptive to similar insistences from other faiths.
Suppose that instead of a marginally profitable use of land, however, the countervailing
interest was something of greater or comparative worth from the public’s or another religious
group’s perspective. 69 These would become cases in which the tribe member would suddenly be
unwilling, for spiritual reasons, to reciprocate another citizen’s acquiescence to a spiritual
insistence like (1). Even if it did not sound so oppressive that a tribe member could not provide
me with a reason for my forbearing a recreationally or economically beneficial land use,
particularly given their minority status and their greater historical lineage in land use, an
unwillingness to listen would be more evident where my forbearance from a morally compelling
or physically necessary land use (from my perspective) was in play. A representative could not
allow a citizen to be subject to very costly forbearances, in the face of no cognizable reason
from the religious citizen insisting on the forbearance.
Rawls comes closest to addressing concerns like these where he recognizes the
possibility that it could become unavoidable that, in select cases, we must assert the truth of our
comprehensive doctrines in the political sphere. This may be so where “someone insists…that
certain questions are so fundamental that to insure their being rightly settled justifies civil

Alternatively, we might suppose, as was arguably the case in Badoni v. Higginson, that the tribe
demands a greater forbearance of land use (such as keeping off of it altogether, as the plaintiffs in that
case demanded of tourists near the Rainbow Bridge monument) than in Lyng or Navajo Nation.
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strife[,]” 70 such as in cases where, as in the sacred land cases, “the salvation of a whole people
may be said to depend on it.” At this point, Rawls asserts that we have little choice but to deny
the truth of that claim. The essential distinction Rawls makes is that we can generally consider
believers mistaken that an exceptional degree of civil strife is specially justified without also
denying the factual claims about salvation they make. Thus, it might be the case that a Rawlsian
who endorses this claim can accord some moral weight to the tribal claimants’ concerns (i.e., by
suggesting a court must consider them) without taking a stance on the truth of the matter.
What this quote surely reveals, however, is a tension between the representatives of duties of
maintaining “stability for the right reasons” and eschewing reliance on the whole truth, on the
one hand, and maximally inclusiveness and fairness, on the other.
Antonin Scalia’s majority opinion in Employment Division of Oregon v. Smith marks what
is arguably a controversial implementation of the assurance concern in American jurisprudence.
In Smith, the plaintiffs were members of a Native American Church whose sacramental practices
include ingesting peyote, an illegal substance under Oregon law. Following failed drug tests at
their place of employment (which, ironically as could be, was a drug rehabilitation center), the
plaintiffs applied for and were denied unemployment benefits because their firings resulted
from job-related misconduct (a legally recognized exception to unemployment compensation in
Oregon). Because the law criminalizing peyote that led to the sacramental practices was
ultimately the basis for the Employment Division’s decision, the plaintiffs argued that punishing
peyote use was identical with punishing their essential religious practices, a violation of their
Free Exercise rights.
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Scalia’s majority opinion, citing one of the Supreme Court’s earliest concerns regarding
Free Exercise (from Reynolds), declined to find what he referred to as “a private right to ignore
generally applicable laws,” as this would erode the sort of assurance described above:
The government’s ability to enforce generally applicable prohibitions of socially harmful
conduct, like its ability to carry out other aspects of public policy, ‘cannot depend on
measuring the effects of a government action on a religious objector’s spiritual
development.’ To make an individual’s obligation to obey such a law contingent upon
the law’s coincidence with his religious beliefs, except where the State’s interest is
‘compelling’ – permitting him, by virtue of his beliefs, ‘to become a law unto himself,’
[citing Reynolds] – contradicts both constitutional tradition and common sense. 71
The Court rejected the plaintiffs’ arguments in favor of a strict scrutiny standard, pursuant to
which the state of Oregon would have to show that its denial of unemployment benefits was
necessary to satisfy a compelling government interest. Instead, Scalia claimed that the Court has
always drawn a clear line between religious expression and the religious “performance of (or
abstention from) physical acts,” finding strict scrutiny to be the appropriate standard for laws
restricting conduct only where that conduct also implicates another fundamental right. 72
What ostensibly underlay the Court’s worry was this: If spiritual concerns and the
resultant conduct were to always or even often override legitimate and historically government
functions related to protecting the public against criminal harms, especially criminal laws, then
we’d have little reason to expect our compatriots to honor the system of rules that deliberations
behind the veil of ignorance produced. Recalling Waite’s concern that began this essay, the
natural extension of allowing this for small religious communities is allowing it for family units,
ad hoc religious communities and individuals. Such worries are not mere potentialities: In
Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 for instance (which Scalia cited in his opinion), tribal parents
protested a welfare program’s requirement that their daughter have a social security number to

71
72

494 U.S. at 885.
Id., 879-9.

35

receive its benefits, claiming that issuing a social security number would rob her of her spiritual
uniqueness, a belief whose connection to an existing religious doctrine was tenuous at best.
Kevin Seamus Hasson 73 describes a public controversy in which a religious group sought to block
state removal of a piece of concrete (which had been accidentally left there by a highway
construction crew nearby) from the Japanese Tea Garden in San Francisco, all because the group
thought the concrete resembled Shiva, and had consequently begun praying at and leaving gifts
before the concrete. It is foreseeable that small groups or families could continue to seek to
impede government functions or public interests on similarly ad hoc grounds to the point of
governmental impotence. All that keeps a similarly-minded religious group from coopting
government resources or the public will is the political currency or physical might to exercise
that degree of influence.
D.

What a Prima Facie Case for the Tribes Can, and Must, Look Like

Based on the foregoing analysis of claims like (1), it would seem that any litigant’s
mention of the sort of spiritual threat that the tribal claimants in Lyng perceive would require
reference to parochial claims. But this rests on a misunderstanding, an overbroad construal, of
where and when an impermissible reliance on religious reasons occurs. While the Supreme
Court’s reasoning in Smith is ostensibly concordant with Political Liberalism, in this same book
and especially in Rawls’s addendum, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 74 Rawls anticipates
various avenues by which one can discuss matters that implicate moral or religious values or
propositions, two of which I have briefly mentioned. What I will demonstrate after briefly
summarizing three of them is that there is ample room for a middle position between
impermissibly allowing (1) to carry political weight no matter what, on the one hand, and never
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allowing a concern like (1) (a central religious concern or spiritual threat) to count at all. Only
such a middle position is consummate with the representatives’ dispositions and duties.
First, Rawls calls attention to the misconception that making public reason the language
of the representatives and the Court “mistakenly tries to settle political questions in advance.” 75
Here, Rawls anticipates Eberle’s objection that, for public reason proponents, the temptation (or
inevitability) of question-begging in spelling out one’s conception of public reason (and what
makes for a “rational” citizen who can speak it) looms large. No conception of public reason that
excludes religious reasons through definitional fiat can claim to be neutral among
comprehensive doctrines or treat all citizens as equal moral agents. Rawls recalls the famous
debate between Patrick Henry and James Madison regarding the establishment of the Anglican
Church in Virginia and the presence of religion in schools, and remarks that “it was argued
almost entirely by reference to political values alone.” 76 Henry argued that the presence of
religion in moral education strengthened strictly (secular) political values and was a necessary
condition in doing so, whereas Madison denied that civic virtues needed any such foundation to
ensure their stability. The interests in producing good citizens and providing strong moral
education that would effectively do so are political concerns that can involve solutions with
religious content, so long as the basis for the argument is not the truth of one religion or the
possibility that any one religion could override political values. Rawls was similarly confident
that the debate regarding public support for church schools could include those from both sides
of a very divisive issue, yet operate within the bounds of public reason.
Second, what apparently troubled Rawls among the various criticisms of Political
Liberalism is that socially beneficial moments of political advocacy, such as many of Dr. Martin
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Luther King, Jr.’s speeches, were often dominated by and drew their widespread appeal from
religious language and imagery. In many cases, to once again employ Robert Audi’s verbiage,
there was in Dr. King’s religiously-inclined speeches, for many listeners, no secular reason to
support his proposed policies that was both motivationally sufficient and evidentially adequate,
at least at that moment the reason was given. One of the most significant contributions of IPRR
was the so-called in due course proviso (or simply the “proviso”):
[R]easonable comprehensive doctrines, religious or nonreligious, may be introduced in
public political discussion at any time, provided that in due course proper political
reasons—and not reasons given solely by comprehensive doctrines—are presented that
are sufficient to support whatever the comprehensive doctrines introduced are said to
support. 77
Rawls claims that the details of the proviso must be worked out in practice, and that it is
impractical to provide rule-like guidelines for its satisfaction in advance. Nonetheless, on my
reading, it is difficult to understand the proviso other than a claim that, for example, Dr. King’s
religious language was a politically effective stand-in for, supplement to or promissory note
regarding another, (secular) political value to follow: “The proviso was fulfilled in their [civil
rights advocates’ and Abolitionists’] cases, however much they emphasized the religious roots of
their doctrines, because these doctrines supported basic constitutional values—as they
themselves asserted—and so supported reasonable conceptions of justice.” 78 Thus, that the
religious roots were motivating was morally acceptable and in line with citizens’ moral
obligations insofar as constitutional, political values were still doing the work as the basis for
subsequent political action, such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 79
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Third, Rawls found certain statements or uses of religious reasons permissible even
absent later supplementation in two cases: Declarations and Reasoning from Conjecture
(“RFC”). 80 In instances of declaration, the citizen makes clear the comprehensive doctrine that
he occupies and how this doctrine supports shared political values, such as in the case of a
Christian who recounts the Good Samaritan parable and then explains that parable in terms of
political values. Such instances of declaring one’s comprehensive doctrine both add
transparency to political debate and show that the citizen has deeply internalized the social
contract. RFC involves discussing another citizen’s religious or other comprehensive doctrine to
show that citizen how her doctrine also supports political values.
With these dialogical allowances in mind, I now turn to the Lyng and Navajo Nation
claimants’ ability to not only disabuse the Court of the notion that any ruling in their favor is
tantamount to (1), but that the original position (and public reason) demands a significantly
different constitutional analysis than is prevalent in American jurisprudence. Recall that in
describing the two sacred land cases, from the tribes’ perspectives, nothing short of the death
of spirits, their cultures or even human souls or lives was at stake. Similarly, claimants like those
in Smith might well regard peyote ingestion as a necessary condition for connecting to the
spiritual realm, or to experiencing what Charles Taylor more generally calls the “fullness,” a goal
shared by a wide range of both religious and non-religious comprehensive doctrines. The
representatives have no position on the whole truth, but they must consider the possibility that
their flesh-and-blood counterparts will possess and act in accordance with such beliefs with
great intensity.

possible to capture the contributions that Dr. King or the Abolitionist Movement made to public discourse
by way of their publicly translated versions.
80
For a definition of reasoning from conjecture, see Political Liberalism, 461-2. For a defense of reasoning
from conjecture against common concerns about it, see Micah Schwartzman, “Reasoning from
Conjecture: A Reply to Three Objections” in Rawls and Religion, 152-69.
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The problem with (1) was not that it allowed a parochial belief or practice to carry the
day, but how it justified allowing a parochial belief or practice to do so: by presenting others
with no real reason for their forbearance from a contrary land use. A more appropriate basis for
land use forbearance than the extremely contestable belief about shrine desecration (and the
attendant threats of doing so) is the brute and presumptively undeniable fact of the claimant’s
beliefs about such desecration. While shrine desecration cannot directly matter to the
representatives, the possession of highest values by their citizen counterparts must, and their
deliberations must reflect that they matter. The representative must consider the (highly likely)
possibility that the representative’s counterpart is a citizen who occupies a different
comprehensive doctrine that in no way overlaps with the Navajo Nation or Lyng claimants. Such
a citizen cannot recognize the contestable “fact” (or belief) of shrine desecration, as it is not a
factually true part of their moral or metaphysical evidence sets, but such a citizen should
recognize the brute fact of a compatriot’s belief and pursuits in light of belief. Another way of
making the distinction between these two types of putative facts is this: The representatives are
not to take a position on the whole truth regarding facts about the world, 81 but they are to, and
must, consider the psychological reality of facts about beliefs and practices. What the federal
decisions in question risk doing is relying on contestable facts about the world, however
undeniable these facts might seem to many of us, while entirely denying others (i.e., those
belonging to the claimants).
Just as the representatives or Justices could not base a ruling on the recognition of a
contestable statement of fact (or “belief”) like (1), neither could they base their rulings on

Rawls anticipates an exception to this agnosticism regarding facts about the world where they stem
from scientific conclusions that are not controversial (which I take to mean such conclusions that are
universally shared or not rationally contested) and facts open to public view. I will discuss the implications
of this carve-out, and a consequent objection to my argument, below.
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contestable “facts” that are parts of other comprehensive doctrines, including secular ones.
Nicholas Wolterstorff argues that one of the chief difficulties with justificatory liberalism is that
certain comprehensive doctrines, often non-religious ones, have a much easier time of
disguising themselves as public reason than do many religious ones. How am I to tell,
Wolterstorff asks, whether someone arguing along utilitarian or nationalist lines (though I think
a metaphysical or ethical view clothed in scientific language might be a more apt example for
our times) is doing so as a part of her comprehensive doctrine? Habermas and Talisse similarly
recognize an asymmetrical burden on religious believers that might exist in certain iterations of
political liberalism. 82 Thus, the first stage of the claimants’ prima facie case, from the standpoint
of the original position, would involve exposing and rooting out those elements of the Court’s
decision (as it is now) that depend on secular comprehensive doctrines, however subtly, and the
contestable facts about the world that issue from these doctrines.
While it may not be feasible to neatly attribute an –ism to the Lyng line of decisions,
they are friendly to or constitutive of certain comprehensive doctrines and not others, and it is
this quality of this area of jurisprudence that makes it difficult to square with the original
position. There is some sort of tradition or paradigm to which they belong, and some features of
the general attitude underlying these decisions tempt me to call it something much like
“naturalism” or “positivism.” Recall that in Navajo Nation, the majority opinion found it
significant that the mountainside shrine would not be “physically affected” by the use of
artificial snow, nor would the tribes’ physical access to the shrine be impeded for ritualistic use.
From the tribes’ perspectives, the shrine was ultimately unavailable for ritualistic use, since it
had been desecrated, and numerous physical and spiritual threats to themselves and the world
were imminent. Per the majority opinion, however, the use of recycled wastewater would only
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affect the tribes’ “subjective spiritual fulfillment”, which could not possibly constitute a
substantial burden on the free exercise of religion. In Lyng, the majority opinion similarly had
dubbed the putative harms as no more than subjective “spiritual fulfillment” or individual
“spiritual development.”
The upshot of these decisions is that certain kinds of harms matter in the legal arena
and certain sorts of harms, conceived as such by their putative sufferers, do not (i.e., they
cannot be among the considerations that affect the outcome of the matter). The immediate
implications of the physical-effect-versus-diminished-spiritual-fulfillment dichotomy is that
harms must be legal, economically or empirically (and physically) describable in a relatively
direct way, or else they are meaningless for legal purposes. Instead of finding any harm, the
Lyng majority only saw a minority’s attempt at exaction from the government, ending up in a
more beneficial position than before. The court also found it instructive that the activities in
question included a safe zone around the specific ritual sites. The majority was willing to assume
arguendo that this would virtually destroy the tribe’s ability to practice its religion, and that
from the tribe’s perspective, an inability to perform efficacious rituals would bring catastrophic
harm on the earth and people who inhabit it. Underlying each court’s decision is not simply a
contestable metaphysical and epistemological standpoint, but a distinct notion of property
ownership or the personhood of natural resources. As Brennan observes, the majority’s
reasoning is rife with examples of forcing Indian concepts into non-Indian categories, reflecting
Mark Tushnet’s recognition (perhaps inspired by this then-recent case) that religious claims tend
to be interpreted through the lens of particular religions or attitudes toward religions:
The less familiar the claim is – that is, the less connected it is to the kinds of worship
that the Justices of the Supreme Court are accustomed to – the less likely it is that they
will regard infringements on those forms of worship as really serious. 83
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Constitutionally (and evidentially) cognizable harms arguably must be limited to specific
categories, at least in the lion’s share of cases, or else any ad hoc religion could simply claim that
any government action whatsoever causes an unspecifiable harm. 84 Otherwise, the notion of a
neutral and objective arbiter making final decisions on legal disputes in an impartial manner and
from impartial principles would be impracticable. Thus, it might seem perfectly fair that
evidence of a physical, economic or legally punitive consequence is required to show a
substantial burden (or various other, related harms in American constitutional law) on free
exercise. But simply possessing an attitude or clothing it in, say, scientific language does not
thereby render it impartial. This does not automatically invalidate naturalistic or positivistic
principles for use in the rules of evidence or constitutional law, as they may be stipulated as
procedurally fair or the most non-parochial or pareto-optimal ground available even if not
posited as true or better supported by (perhaps scientific) evidence. Recall Talisse’s observation
earlier that what matters to Rawls (and other justificatory liberals) for public admissibility is not
“likelihood of truth” but “accessibility,” often construed as that which all citizens could be
reasonably expected to accept or find acceptable. The question, then, is whether the
representatives would accept a free exercise jurisprudence in which a “substantial burden” is so

Court Review 1989 (1989): 373–402. Tushnet marshals this observation in favor of a dramatically different
jurisprudential conclusion than what I urge here.
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Recall the memorable example from Kevin Seamus Hasson’s Right to Be Wrong mentioned above, in
which he recounts a dispute between a new age religious group and the city of San Francisco. After a
construction worker had temporarily set aside a concrete parking barrier in San Francisco’s Japanese Tea
Garden at Golden Gate Park, the group objected to the city’s plans to remove it on the ground that it
resembled a Shiva Lingam (or manifestation of the Hindu deity Shiva) and that they had begun to pray and
worship at the barrier. The other frequenters of the park, however, demanded its removing because it
upset the aesthetic harmony of the park. The proliferation and judicial recognition of such idiosyncratic
complaints could foreseeably spiral into the sort of concerns about lawlessness or governmental
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construed, or whether it would leave some of their counterparts unacceptably exposed to and
unprotected against certain threats.
Whatever the proper interpretation of the veil of ignorance, the representatives have
must have sufficient knowledge to understand that (a) substantially all comprehensive doctrines
will have religious or moral interests (or “goods”) of paramount import to them, and (b) it would
be in each religious citizen’s interest (for maximal use of that citizen’s moral powers) to secure
the greatest guarantee feasible of the means to pursue, and not jeopardize, that central good. A
necessary corollary of this would involve each citizen being maximally interested in avoiding
obstacles to such pursuits. As Eberle puts this feature more succinctly, “a citizen’s moral identity
is constituted by his commitment to certain intrinsic goods and by his avoidance of certain
intrinsic evils.” 85
Rawls indicates that he likewise recognizes this feature of citizen’s moral identities 86 and
that, at some level of abstraction, the representatives in the original position are to as well. Two
concepts that help further specify this warrant special attention. First, Rawls identifies an “index
of primary goods” that are purportedly resources that are common to citizens’ pursuits of their
separate conceptions of intrinsic goods, and much of the representatives’ mission can be
understood in terms of their securing more, rather than fewer, primary goods for whatever
citizens they happen to represent. Among them are the “freedom of thought and liberty of
conscience, and the rest” and “the social bases of self-respect.” 87 Second, and relatedly, a

Eberle, Religious Conviction in Liberal Politics, 146.
The two senses in which citizens are understood as “free” in Justice as Fairness are imbued with this
notion of moral identity: (i) their conception of themselves and others as having the moral power to have
a conception of the good; and (ii) their regard for themselves as the self-authenticating sources of valid
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constraint on the original position’s deliberations that was first introduced in Theory is that the
representatives will refuse to “enter into agreements that have consequences they cannot
accept,” 88 which has been called his “strains of commitment” principle. Intolerable
consequences would be irrationally chosen at the time of the original position and would not be
feasible to abide by for the citizen offended by them. Combining these two concepts, the
representatives seek to maximize every citizen’s (no matter her doctrine) ability to pursue her
conception of the good without a sense of political estrangement and avoid arrangements that
they would find intolerable.
Given this knowledge, it is difficult to imagine that the representatives could have
satisfied their fiduciary duties without having set up a legal system in which some special regard
was paid for a comprehensive doctrine’s practices or beliefs, especially those of utmost concern
to its adherents. Because compliance with exceptionless laws (i.e., exceptionless as to their own
practices) might come at an unpalatable or entirely unbearable cost where issues of ultimate
concern are at stake, it would be unrealistic to suppose that the representatives could create a
constitutional framework in which there were exceptionless laws; indeed, no legal system in a
democratic nation is any such thing. The sorts of beings who permitted this could neither be
risk-averse nor rational, for they would commit to terms that could “require them to violate
their deepest and most important commitments.” 89 Alternatively, we might think of the
religious citizen looking backwards in time, as Rawls was fond of doing as a test of liberal
principles, long after the veil of ignorance has been lifted: it is dubious that she could see any
mark of herself among those primordial legislators.
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Consider how ordinary legal mechanisms operate differently in the United States in
cases of threats or emergencies to an individual or public safety, whether reasonably perceived,
ostensibly imminent or actual (and this is even truer in some European democracies, which are
substantially less rights-focused and more welfare-focused). This is especially true in the case of
existential threats. There are myriad exceptions (or rather, affirmative defenses) to actions that
would ordinarily be crimes or torts. The class of these exceptions are determined in the real
world, of course, from a particular point of view, or rather, by flesh-and-blood-citizens. Those
who occupy a different standpoint, or comprehensive doctrine, are sometimes excluded from or
marginalized in such determinations. We can commit what would ordinarily be battery against
an apparent aggressor, where we reasonably anticipate that apparent aggressor is about to
harm our own bodies or another person’s, even if it turns out that we were wrong about the
threat. We can trespass on and even damage another person’s property where it is foreseeably
necessary to secure our own safety (though this typically obligates us to pay for any damages).
The government can even abridge what are normally seen as fundamental rights in
exigent circumstances or operate outside the bounds of default separation of powers
constraints. Against a widely-perceived right to generally travel where we want (especially
domestically), the government may prevent us from traveling where a weather emergency
exists, or buckle our seatbelts under threat of penalty. The executive branch and law
enforcement have permission to take actions that would otherwise be described as violations of
the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendments in cases of emergency or imminent danger. Eminent
domain permits government officials to take private property where doing so serves a public
purpose, controversially in cases of emergencies. Even more subjectively, certain categories of
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offensive conduct in public are punishable, 90 without much of a principled distinction between
the categories that are not and those that are within our rights (and not punishable) beyond the
weight of public opinion. These are therefore determined, at least in many cases, on a cultural
level. While there is considerable controversy in various applications of each of these views and
how far they extend, I can safely assume that nearly all democratic citizens would agree that
some of them are permissible abridgements of freedom in certain cases.
Though the above examples are just a select few, they are all exceptions to laws justified
by the presence of actual or perceived existential threats. For many of these, it is well-settled
that we must make a psychological inquiry into whether the person perceiving the threat was
reasonable in so perceiving it at that moment; in these cases the threat was determined at the
time of action on an individual level. What is noticeably absent are exceptions for existential
threats or dangers perceived from the perspective of a comprehensive doctrine, or from a set or
type of comprehensive doctrines. What the claimants in Lyng and Navajo Nation each
perceived, if we take them at their word, were existential threats, albeit ones with spiritual
causes, as a result of the challenged government actions in those cases. The dissents in both
cases call attention to the tribes’ beliefs in their stewardship roles for humanity and the
catastrophic events that would befall the earth and its inhabitants if efficacious rituals were not
performed.
There is therefore a disparity in the treatment of existential threats that the Lyng line of
cases either itself caused or leaves open: those existential threats perceived or harms suffered
that are spiritual in nature do not enjoy carve-outs (at least in cases like Lyng) unless they are
coupled with a physical, economic or legal punishment or harm. It might even be appropriate to

For Joel Feinberg’s extended discussion of this issue and an attempt to model the distinction, see
Offense to Others (Cambridge: Oxford University Press 1984). J.S. Mill, as staunch a defender of broad
liberty as any, also defends a “defense principle” in On Liberty.
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call the threats at issue in those cases physical threats with spiritual causes, and this makes the
disparity even clearer. No matter the degree of the harm or imminence of the threat, both
courts were emphatic that a court shall accord such spiritual threats no weight in the case’s
disposition.
The representatives do not simply advocate the range of doctrines who happen to
require no legal exceptions (or at least not more than what is widely endorsed among citizens)
for ultimate spiritual or moral concerns, or those who object to them, including the sort at issue
in these sacred land cases: they also represent various theists, other minority religions and
secular comprehensive doctrines with special moral concerns that might require exceptions or
unique legal considerations in various circumstances. In Lyng, for instance, the over 5,000 tribe
members who lived near the Chimney Rock area possessed unique conceptions of land and land
ownership, mankind’s essential role in sustaining the created world, religious practices
inextricably tied to land use (rather than doxastic practices) and so on. While there is no single
spiritual or moral threat (or attendant duty) that these various comprehensive doctrines would
agree exists and warrants some special legal exceptions (certainly not the purportedly sacred
sites in Lyng or Navajo Nation), they would agree that there is such a thing and that its reflection
in the law is a priority. Accordingly, they would similarly wish for some mechanism by which
such concerns can be accorded some weight, since they all have such concerns, including some
degree of admissibility in legal forums. A being who sets the scope of free exercise to include no
such mechanism, then, is either: a flesh-and-blood citizen who adheres to the sorts of doctrines
I listed at the beginning of this paragraph, a being who represents a coalition of such
comprehensive doctrines and is either indifferent towards or disfavors others, or a being behind
the veil of ignorance who is a gambler. The representatives in the original position are no such
beings, as Section B explained at length. In short, this is an approach tolerable only from the
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standpoint of certain comprehensive doctrines and their advocates: it is endorsed from a limited
set of somewheres.
A well-placed objection, perhaps from Rawls or Charles Larmore, might argue that I have
misunderstood the sort of consensus that the representatives, as advocates for both coalitions
of worldviews I mentioned above, must seek regarding the sorts of burden that give rise to
religious exceptions to ordinary operations of laws. Those which they can neither agree on nor
defend based on values accessible to one another simply are not matters for public recognition
and treatment for they are, as Richard Rorty describes religious claims generally, “conversation
stoppers.” Accordingly, Larmore advocates the following dialogical procedure: “In the face of
disagreement, those who wish to continue the conversation should retreat to neutral ground,
with the hope of either resolving the dispute or bypassing it.” 91 Talisse explains that Larmore
and others who advocate similar procedures involving “restraint” or “retreat” therefore do not
forbid public restrictions out of any attitude like skepticism, but suggest this sort of publicprivate epistemological division “for the purposes of [political] conversation” and without any
“deeper epistemic ramifications.” 92
Rawls recognizes that there must be some fund of facts about the world from which the
representatives (or later, citizens as faithful adherents to public reason) must draw. His
description of what these facts can be is understandably limited, but they include the
“conclusions of science, where not controversial” and “ascertainable facts and evidence open to
public view.” Assuming a limited and non-controversial set of rudimentary scientific facts
regarding bodily security, threats to public safety of property or person, etc., are recognizable
from the array of evidence sets from which various citizens begin reasoning. There is therefore a
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common evidentiary ground from which deliberations about such threats can issue. In the case
of more contestable issues, where the most pertinent claims turn on unshared facts, the parties
to both sides of a deliberation will have trouble reaching a common deliberative ground.
Larmore and Rawls similarly observe, and Rawls especially focuses on regarding contentious
issues like abortion, that they will often reveal an impasse regarding facts about the personhood
or ensoulment of a fetus. Larmore’s “retreat” proposal here would move from the specific
battleground of an unrelentingly contestable fact to a more common ground, such as a shared
idea of freedom or human dignity. Using somewhat different vocabulary, Rawls claims that the
Roe v. Wade ruling is the product of just this sort of process. Wherever the institution of a legal
rule, or exception to a legal rule, can be settled only on the basis of facts that are the subject of
considerable, and rational, disagreement among comprehensive doctrines, that issue must
simply be removed from the political agenda, for it cannot be the product of universally
legislated rulemaking. Because there is no non-controversial basis for instituting protections for
sacred lands or spiritual threats, particularly where they involve inhibiting legitimate
government activities taken for a public purpose, neither the original position’s delineation of
constitutional essentials nor the Supreme Court qua exemplar of public reason can be the
morally appropriate place to deliberate over such matters.
While there is much that is right about this sort of objection regarding religion’s place in
politics generally, I will offer three replies that each suggest why it is misplaced in, at least,
substantial burden jurisprudence. The first two replies are to some misunderstandings
embedded in this kind of objection and the third claims that this objection overlooks some
features of the original position. First, and most importantly, the argument in favor of the
claimants that I have begun to lay out does not dictate the result in advance: the problem from
the standpoint of the original position with the ruling is not that the tribal claimants lost per se,
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but that their parochial concerns were inadmissible as a category. 93 It might well be the case
that the publicly cognizable import of certain or most government functions will win the day
over some notion of “spiritual, existential threats” or “significant dangers of spiritual concern”
or any other way of formulating the tribes’ concerns at a higher level of abstraction (such that
they are cognizable across comprehensive doctrines). What matters in the first place is that
these concerns factor into the court’s reasoning and that issues of ultimate concern to the tribes
matter in court, and matter as they would to an impartial being of maximum imaginative
flexibility. Put otherwise, constitutional legal doctrine must account for their concerns in
determining the scope of free exercise generally and what constitutes a substantial burden
specifically; after all, the liberal notion of legitimacy demands that constitutional essentials bear
their fingerprints.
Second, the tribal claimants’ call for courts to consider spiritual threats as potentially
dispositive factors is not an insistence that their beliefs must win out no matter what for them
to recognize the finality or binding nature of the ruling. One who insisted that the government
must recognize a spiritual threat or duty as more important than what others see as important
or essential government activities would not (in so insisting) fully recognize the moral agency of
others. To argue for their claim having weight, however, the tribes in Lyng, Navajo Nation, and
the pending Utah disputes need to offer no such insistences as these. The tribes may argue
quite forcefully for their views mattering in a public sense, even determinatively so, by insisting
on recognition not of the value of their beliefs or the fact of the dreaded spiritual threats at
issue, but on recognition of a certain conception of free exercise and the psychological fact of
their possessing their beliefs with great intensity. As a practical matter, it is within a tribe’s

Regarding the legality of abortion, Talisse analogously says of Political Liberalism that the difficulty lies
in not being able to recognize Thomist reasons as reasons, even in the case of a hypothetically irrefutable
proof of the doctrine of ensoulment as a basis for opposing abortion.
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range of options in many such cases to endorse or negotiate a solution that treats public and
other doctrines’ parochial values alongside their own.
This was the case, for instance, in a sacred land controversy near Devil’s Tower,
culminating in Bear Lodge Multiple Use Assn. v. Babbitt, 175 F.3d 814 (10th Cir. 1999). In this
case, much like in Lyng, ritualistic uses of the land in question demanded a degree of silence and
non-disturbance, during which the tribe requested a temporary cessation of recreational
activities at the top of Devil’s Tower by other visitors. Because Devil’s Tower is a popular and
frequented destination among climbing enthusiasts, the climbing group objected to the tribe’s
request for periodic, uninterrupted use of this area of Devil’s Tower. Outside of court, however,
the tribe participated in negotiations regarding and assented to a compromise land
management plan offered to both sides by the National Park Service, pursuant to which the
ritual site would be closed to climbers during part of the year and open to them during the rest.
This was no instance of the tribe’s baldly insisting on the truth or the value of its own worldview,
but an attempt to recognize the value of both. The tribe in this matter did not view its own claim
from within its comprehensive doctrine as that of an exclusive or higher priority owner or
possessor of the land, but as an interest more akin to a timeshare.
Third, identifying the appropriate scope of “substantial burdens” to free exercise by
determining which threats are universally recognized misunderstands the representatives’ task
and the veil of ignorance. Including only economic punishments, physical restraints, and the like,
as cognizable harms that can give rise to a claim is an approach that I have mentioned is
satisfying to one set of comprehensive doctrines and deeply unsatisfying to another set. This
sort of objection would take each sort of harm or accommodation and ask whether it is
cognizable by all parties, including only those that would yield an affirmative answer. The result
would be that those doctrines possessing minimalist ontologies would be inevitably and
52

automatically favored, and minority comprehensive doctrines would be automatically
disfavored.
By contrast, the question that I have posed more generally is how we could describe, in
the form of a rule together with any carve-outs, the scope of what can potentially be recognized
as a “substantial burden” to free exercise, where this scope is understood as a compromise
among comprehensive doctrines and one that treats the variously inclined citizens as equal
moral agents. In fact, assuming arguendo that Rawls’s account of Roe v. Wade as a compromise
between vigorously opposed comprehensive doctrines is correct, the land management plan
proposed by the National Park Service in Bear Lodge and assented to by the tribal claimants in
that case would be much more analogous to it than would the majority opinions in either Lyng
or Navajo Nation.
What I have argued so far is that the representatives’ features, particularly their
attitudes toward comprehensive doctrines, would not permit the scope of “substantial burdens”
that we find in the courts’ rulings in question. Because this might well be said of any alternative
judicial approach, my negative critique is of little value if I do not at least offer some
characteristics of an approach to sacred lands cases that would be more consistent with the
attitudes and duties of the representatives. When describing the sort of approach that the
original position could produce, we must keep in mind those from other comprehensive
doctrines and opposing interests, including those like the climbers in Bear Lodge. Rawls’s duty of
civility, as discussed in Section A, comes with both a speaking and a listening component: all
citizens ought to be willing to both offer others reasons they can foreseeably accept and willing
to consider the possibility that other speakers are contributing something of political and social
value. Those in the original position are tasked with making decisions regarding constitutional
essentials that will foster this sort of environment. This approach ends up being, I argue, similar
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to Brennan’s dissent, wherein he recommends that the Court employ strict scrutiny, 94 or (to a
lesser degree) Judith Jarvis Thomson’s proposal of rights’ varying in stringency with the degree
of a party’s interest in them. 95
Brennan’s charge that the majority “forces Indian concepts into non-Indian
categories,” 96 is construable as an attempt to highlight those additional factors that an impartial
observer, or universal advocate, would find important in determining the appropriate scope of
free exercise on sacred lands. In defense of its contention that the Government could not have
been more solicitous to the tribes’ interests, the majority notes (among other things) that “no
sites where specific rituals take place were to be disturbed.” 97 Brennan observes that
understanding the tribes’ beliefs about creation, land, the lack of a boundary between religious
and social existence, their ritualistic stewardship duties, and so on, is essential in understanding
their claims. More specifically and regarding the aforementioned notion of a “site” embedded in
the majority’s reasoning, the reality that Brennan highlighted is that the 25-mile area known as
the “high country” was regarded as being alive, and various forms of land use (including the
trails used and the precise sequence of sites visited) are necessary to harness the specific
spiritual properties of various areas of land. 98 Moreover, successful rituals and acts of medicine
making (which was often thought to cure ailments and save lives on an individual level) in the

As mentioned in Section A, in American constitutional law, strict scrutiny applies where the government
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high country require certain conditions, such as silence and privacy. These land uses are of
central importance in their religious beliefs, and their religious beliefs are inextricably
intertwined with their social or political existence. Thus, they are essential not only to their
religious survival, but social cohesion and moral identity.
On the other hand, the government’s interests in the land and the potential benefits
were marginal. The majority did not contest the lower courts’ findings that the G-O road would
not increase access to timber resources, the road would not significantly improve administration
of the surrounding forest, and the only (minimal) benefits to recreational use would also detract
from recreational use (by upsetting the pristineness of the countryside). Instead, as Brennan
notes, the majority simply claims that the government’s prerogative as landowner takes priority
over any contrary interests, based on a property regime (which treats land tracts as divisible and
subject to such forms of ownership) not cognizable to the tribes. The crux of the decisions was
that only legal sanctions and coerced violation of beliefs were recognizable injuries to religious
beliefs or practices for free exercise purposes.
An advocate behind the veil of ignorance, armed with the facts about the tribes’
religious and cultural beliefs and practices summarized above, would surely regard the above
value discrepancy (regarding the proposed land uses) as making some degree of a moral
difference that ought to be reflected in a legal or political action. Such a shift in perspective and
attitude would bring this case much closer to the sort of moral difference highlighted by
Thomson’s thought experiment involving the medicine-containing lockbox. 99 A being who

Thomson memorably considers the sorts of rights or rights violations that would be involved if it were
the case that I had a lockbox containing lifesaving medicine on my back porch, and a third party wished
enter my property, break the lock and take it if I am not home to give permission. Thomson submits that it
is intuitive to almost all of us that it would be morally impermissible of me to withhold permission if the
medicine did not matter very much to me, but that a different result would obtain if I was in just as dire a
need of the medicine as the child.
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decided on a regime in which all interests in a land use were treated identically, or without
regard to the differences that mattered to potential land users, would not be the sort of being
who would be sympathetic towards a variety of doctrines, nor would it be a being who
understood much, if anything, regarding human psychology or how human beings take up and
pursue conceptions of the good. To suggest that this set of religious and cultural practices would
always take priority is to forget that such an advocate also represents the public and those who
might wish to use the land on the basis of putatively comparable moral or religious values. But
neither contrary private land uses nor compelling government land uses are asserted here.
An advocate (i.e., representative) would not base protection of injuries approaching lifeor-death importance on the type or form of the burden imposed, but on the degree of the
burden imposed or, as Brennan puts it, the effect of the challenged land uses on the tribe’s
culture and the world’s safety. Why should a tribe member be more satisfied with what is from
her perspective a catastrophe, so long as it was imposed slightly more indirectly? The only
approach that could reflect the attitudes of the representatives, or rather, the only approach
that would be a rational choice for beings tasked with such a decision, is one in which: (i) the
fact that interests of the greatest value were involved in a proceeding, rather than those of
marginal important, would be accorded constitutionally cognizable weight in a balancing test;
and (ii) that degree of moral difference would be sufficient to be dispositive absent a
comparatively strong or important value from the other side, be that from a public welfare
standpoint or opposing private, parochial interest. Whether this must necessarily take the form
that strict scrutiny analyses ordinarily take in constitutional deliberations is not something I
need to settle here. But it is difficult to imagine that the representatives would not add some
third requirement like the following, in order to ensure that contrived, ad hoc religious claims do
not run amok and immobilize the government: (iii) the balancing act regarding (i) and (ii) is only
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required if some sort of demonstration of the import of the interest at issue is offered. Without
(iii), the representatives would forget their advocacy duties for those citizen counterparts who
had contrary interests in the land or government functions that benefitted them immensely. If
the interest in (i) were to no or very little extent translatable in terms of primary goods, or more
abstract and shared statements regarding conceptions of the good, then they would appear to
those outside of one’s doctrine as shrill assertions or bare insistences. What sort of form this
evidentiary showing must take is almost unavoidably problematic in practice, but such problems
would be preferable to the representatives to staying out of the inquiry altogether (which is the
route for which both Scalia in Smith and O’Connor in Lyng opt). This suggestion of some
evidentiary showing attending something like (iii), including some effort at translating parochial
concerns into a publicly coherent form, is similar to the sorts of epistemic constraints that
Talisse and Habermas wish to introduce as a middle option between exclusivists and inclusivists
in the public reason debate. If there were no such required showing, then the government (and
the public insofar as they bore the costs) would be potentially subject to accommodating
putatively central religious concerns as a matter of mere assertion by religious or cultural
groups.
What Brennan suggests along the lines of (iii) is that, to trigger the balancing test that
inheres in strict scrutiny, the claimant must show that the religious belief or practice is central or
indispensable in their religion. Because I believe “centrality” is a sufficiently close proxy to the
sort of showing the representatives must choose, I will consider O’Connor and Scalia’s common
objection to that proposal specifically. Scalia’s opinion in Smith details (perhaps sympathetically
and laudably) the Court’s long-standing recognition of its inadequacy in assessing the value of
certain religious beliefs or locating a specific belief or practice within a religion or culture. 100 The
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worry that both share is that inquiries into “centrality”, in addition to being unguided by reliable
principles, could result in the Court disagreeing with a religious adherent’s claims about which of
her beliefs were central or indispensable and, in effect, require the court to rule that “some
religious adherents misunderstand their own beliefs.” 101
As odious as this paternalistic eventuality may seem to some, we must consider the two
options before the representatives in deciding whether to accord special constitutional weight
to certain “central” values, especially those that I have described as existential spiritual threats.
In the first, the representatives can decide to avoid such epistemic arrogance or capriciousness
from judges and stay out of the “centrality” inquiry altogether. I have chosen Lyng and Navajo
Nation to demonstrate the potentially unbearable costs of this first approach: where a religious
group faces what its adherents regard as a grave or even catastrophic threat, they leave
themselves without any further protection than in cases implicating those duties (or threats to
them) that are of comparatively lesser concern. There is no immediately available principle to
make centrality determinations, but surely in every religion there are issues of greater and
lesser concern and, there are one or more normative commitments that are deepest to its
adherents. Nonetheless, this option (i.e., staying out of the centrality inquiry altogether) does
not risk the deep offense or blasphemy that the sorts of judicial or other political misstatements
of doctrine might visit on certain comprehensive doctrines. As reflected in the admission from
Tushnet that I marshalled in favor of my position, it might also be the case that the judiciary’s
greater epistemic access to so-called Western religions prevents them from regarding their
concerns as serious. Religious or cultural self-determination remains free from political or legal
corruption in whatever forms they might take.
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Notwithstanding the validity of this concern, it is difficult to imagine that
representatives would compromise their citizens’ deepest commitments to withstand some
potential paternalistic pronouncements or judicial misstatements. The ultimate disrespect or
harm would be an indifference to spiritual threats of the highest degree or to erecting an
impenetrable barrier to pursuing the ultimate good and avoiding the ultimate evil (i.e., an
impenetrable barrier to keeping themselves, their culture and others safe). This conclusion is
based on the representatives’ central task in maximizing their citizen counterparts’ share of the
index of primary goods, including a meaningful opportunity for freedom of conscience, rather
than a notion of it particular to select Western religious denominations or to the non-religious,
and (b) a simple notion of rational advantage from the perspectives of individual believers.
Brennan well-summarized the asymmetry between the majority’s concern for offending this sort
of sensibility regarding religious self-determination and its concern for what was, according to
the tribes themselves, an indispensable religious and cultural practice:
Ironically, the Court's apparent solicitude for the integrity of religious belief and its
desire to forestall the possibility that courts might second-guess the claims of religious
adherents leads to far greater inequities than those the Court postulates: today's ruling
sacrifices a religion at least as old as the Nation itself, along with the spiritual well-being
of its approximately 5,000 adherents, so that the Forest Service can build a 6-mile
segment of road that two lower courts found had only the most marginal and
speculative utility, both to the Government itself and to the private lumber interests
that might conceivably use it. 102
Based on these considerations, I will simply close by assuming that any religious believer
similarly situated to the tribe would prefer a jurisprudence that risked occasional paternalism in
order to leave open a dialogical opportunity for protection against graver threats. Any potential,
paternalistic threat (or other misunderstanding of their religion or culture) could be minimized
by this very dialogical opportunity: in situating their concerns within free exercise jurisprudence,
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they could take that opportunity to contribute substantial effort toward translating their specific
concerns and their broader cultural context to much differently disposed citizens or public
officials.
Finally, as I transition out of the internal critique of only those Rawlsians who endorse
Lyng or Smith, and to some closing reflections more directly critical of Rawls, there is evidence
implying that Rawls might well have been sympathetic to the majority opinions in these cases
and regarded the claimants as unreasonable. I alluded to this possibility at the beginning of this
essay, but think it appropriate at this juncture to recognize how great an assumption it might be
to suppose that those like the tribes would constitute full participants in the four-stage veiled
deliberation, beginning with the original position. There are two points in Political Liberalism
especially that suggest, for Rawls, similarly situated claimants ought not be so included, though
neither of the hypothetical comprehensive doctrines he discusses in these examples squares
precisely with the tribal claimants.
First, Rawls is emphatic that those who demand a special distribution of primary goods
as demanded by certain religious content (and somewhat similar religious content to the tribal
claimants’) are at odds with enduring social stability:
Some persons may count among their religious obligations going on pilgrimages to
distant places or building magnificent cathedrals or temples. To guarantee the equal
worth of religious liberty is now understood to require that such persons receive special
provision to enable them to meet these obligations. On this view, then, their religious
needs, as it were, are greater for the purposes of political justice, whereas those whose
religious beliefs oblige them to make but modest demands on material means do not
receive such provision; their religious needs are much less. Plainly, this kind of
guarantee is socially divisive, a receipt for religious controversy if not civil strife. Similar
consequences result, I believe, whenever the public conception of justice adjusts
citizens’ claims to social resources so that some receive more than others depending on
the determinate final ends and loyalties belonging to their conceptions of the good.…It
suffices to say that one main reason for using an index of primary goods in assessing the
strength of citizens’ claims in questions of political justice is precisely to eliminate the
socially divisive and irreconcilable conflicts which such principles would arouse. 103
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While the prima facie public reason argument I have presented is distinguishable from the
specific examples Rawls uses in this passage, it is also clear that the tribal claimants are, to some
extent, requesting some special (even if non-exclusive) claim or access over a stretch of public
land. The spirit of the above passage is reminiscent of at least some of the components of the
Lyng, Smith and Navajo Nation majority opinions. In Rawls’s thought, there is unmistakable
tension here between inclusiveness in the political arena and avoiding irreconcilable conflicts or
social division within it.
If the sacred lands cases I have considered and those that are now pending in federal
courts are not distinguishable, for Rawls, from the aforementioned passage, then we encounter
a difficulty that relates to the attitudinal states of the representatives (and delegates)
throughout this essay. The original position and its deliberations should not be set up in such a
way that they favor either a majoritarian coalition or those who are satisfied with the status
quo; the parties have no such disposition towards such positions. While it’s possible that the
index of primary goods can be construed and specified such that they are not demanding more
than others, in the passage above Rawls appears to include in his chastisement any of those who
demand any special provision of resources to accommodate a set of religious beliefs or
practices. How to handle property regimes or land-based religious practices that depart from
the mainstream, whatever that might be, is an unusual conundrum for Rawls. The sacred land
cases are also difficult ones in that they do not explicitly demand funding or affirmative conduct
from the government (at least here), but forbearance. In the contemporary Utah disputes,
however, the basis for objection does seem to demand affirmative protection (as it did in Bear
Lodge). Given this quandary, we might well wonder whether a comprehensive doctrine like this
can resist an “unreasonable” label according to Rawlsian political liberalism; it may be that their

61

abdicating any such claim to the land in court or the political arena is a condition of their being
full participants in the veiled rulemaking underlying the social contract.
Second, and relatedly, Rawls makes equally clear that we must deny any claim from a
comprehensive doctrine that there are certain ends or obligations so important that they justify
some degree of civil strife, 104 such as where the religious salvation of a whole people is said to
depend on an issue’s being settled properly. As with the first Rawlsian tension in the foregoing
analysis, this does not precisely describe the tribal claimants. Their beliefs did not expressly
justify civil strife, but they did claim that their salvation and the world’s security were both at
stake. While by a “denial” Rawls emphasizes not that this is not a claim that such religious
beliefs are false, but that they cannot be publicly justified, my discussion of existential, spiritual
threats indicates why this might also be a blurry distinction. To have cognizable interests, under
both of these two sources of tension that suggest Rawls might disagree with Brennan, it appears
that the tribal claimants would have to forego public claims regarding the gravity of their
interests in the sacred lands at issue. The analytical possibilities regarding how we can
understand the tribes in light of these concerns, and to what extent religious citizens can
“accept” public reason-based determinations that offend their deepest normative
commitments, are what I will explore in the following section.
E. Between Acceptability and Acquiescence: A Limitation of the Foregoing Analysis
There are at least two deeply unsatisfying features of viewing the sacred lands cases
through the lens of the original position, as I have tried to do here. Each of these, as I have just
said, reveals a tension between Rawls’s attempt to imagine a system of justice that
simultaneously maintains social stability, achieves fairness through equal access to primary
goods and eschews reference to the whole truth in politics. First, it is doubtful that, where a
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religious claimant’s beliefs are heard and considered (i.e., a judge or other decision-making
authority makes an effort to translate that claimant’s views into appropriately public concerns),
but another governmental or private interest is ruled to be overriding, the religious claimant
could meaningfully accept that ruling, particularly in cases involving something like “spiritual,
existential threats” or “deepest normative commitments.” This is why I have presented the
argument against the currently predominant judicial approach to sacred lands, and the case in
favor of a contrary approach, as a prima facie case: it doesn’t help settle cases of contrary,
compelling government interests or deepest normative commitments to contrary land uses by
other private citizen groups. Second, because the representatives do accept some propositions
as true and must have some attitudes related to the truth value of certain other categories of
claims, it is doubtful that a representational device like the original position can provide
comprehensive answers to constitutional essentials or matters of basic justice without
somewhat frequent reference to truth apt claims. I will outline several possible responses to
the first tension here and, because the second tension is closely related to my more thorough
critique of Rawls, I will save my discussion of that for my subsequent work.
As applied to the cases before us, and given that the tribes might well lose to
government or other parochial interests in a sacred lands case even under the free exercise
approach that Brennan and I endorse, one might well wonder how meaningfully the tribes could
see their own fingerprints in a system in which they could still possibly lose (and, if their beliefs
are sincere, this would be a catastrophic loss). After all, insofar as they are free and equal moral
agents, and insofar as their comprehensive doctrine is a reasonable one, the representatives are
their advocates too and a legal system could not be indifferent to them or their worldview. An
awfully convenient feature of several major sacred land cases is that the contrary governmental
use was clearly of less value (or at least stipulated to be) to the government than preventing
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that use was to the tribal claimants. But it might well be the case that a proposed land use was
supported by a putative compelling interest on the government’s or the public’s part. Or,
considering the Bear Lodge case briefly discussed above, it is not difficult to imagine a
competing moral or religious claim to land that is of the utmost importance to that other citizen
or citizen group and that is mutually exclusive with the tribal claim to it (perhaps because the
competing land use, from the tribe’s perspective, poses a spiritual threat). 105 I claimed in my
prima facie public reason-based argument against the Lyng and Navajo Nation majority
opinions, as the tribal claimants did, that they did not seek a superior or privileged use of the
land, but something more akin to a timeshare that allowed for other comprehensive doctrines
to make land use claims. I also claimed that their insistence was not that they win no matter
what, but that the paramount import of the land use made a difference or mattered in the
Court’s analysis, as a representative in the original position must require. If it did not matter,
then the Court’s attitude would resemble the sorts of attitudes that Habermas and Talisse
identified as non-neutral ones.
What if, in one of these more difficult cases (i.e., involving a competing use of
supposedly life-or-death or compelling import), the tribal claimants did lose? It would be
unrealistic to suppose that the tribes would say something less flip, but to the effect of, “thanks
for thinking of me, but now we must face our doom.” One of the principal bases for Brennan’s
proposed approach, and against the majority approach that I have spent this essay criticizing
from a Rawlsian perspective, was that the effect on the claimants’ religious practices and the

This sort of possibility is what centrally occupies Brian Leiter in his Why Tolerate Religion? (Princeton:
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their religious duty of carrying a ceremonial dagger called a kirpan with them at all times; and (ii) a
possible non-religious or moral claim involving an agricultural community in which receiving and carrying
a rifle is endemic to their conception of the duties surrounding manhood.
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spiritual threats they perceived were what they cared about, and not the form in which that
effect was first produced. One might well wonder how the situation would be any better or
different, from their perspectives, if the Court (in some other case) were to accord their
interests in the land use some (even a great amount of) weight, but nonetheless conclude that
the government had a compelling interest in the land that took priority over theirs. In such
cases, as for spiritual threats that arise for religious claimants from almost any faith, it is
doubtful that the Court’s analysis, in which the tribes’ concerns made some difference to the
Court, would make any difference to the tribes from the current one. In a losing case, the tribe
would face what the Lyng syllabus called a “virtual destruction” of their religion (and culture)
and would be exposed to all the threats that the Lyng and Navajo Nation claimants feared
would result from inefficacious rituals. So could this jurisprudence be any less foreign to them
and could they see any of their own authorship in it or view it as a legitimate exercise of
authority? Put still otherwise, could this alternate approach, in the event of a judicial loss,
survive under Rawls’s “strains of commitment” argument?
It seems to me that there are three analytic possibilities, for each of these types of
cases, that are foreseeable. First, we might agree with a tribal insistence that they must (i.e., as
justice requires) win in cases like Lyng above almost all other interests, though we would have
to tell an awfully compelling story as to why the original position and public reason necessarily
lead to automatic moral or legal priority for interests like theirs. This story would have to be
even more compelling in cases like Badoni or Wyoming Sawmill, which sought to enjoin citizens’
conduct, particularly if the tribes seek to enjoin the public from visiting or using large swaths of
land. Moreover, in the latter, two of the justifications underlying prior deforesting efforts on
some of the sacred land at issue were forest health (reducing the threat of pests to the rest of
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the forest) and public safety (reducing the risk of wildfires). 106 While Rawls suggests that these
concepts do lead to a prioritization of “fundamental interests connected with the exercise of
citizens’ two moral powers” 107 over all other interests (which presumably includes free
exercise), those cases I have asked us to imagine in this section involve competing interests of
these sorts. It is not clear what resources a doctrinally neutral being of total imaginative
flexibility, if “total imaginative flexibility” (language from Nagel and not Rawls) is applicable to
the representatives, could access in beginning to work out an answer. If it were claimed that
such a determination and the underlying guidelines for it were not a task for the
representatives, then we might well wonder whether, as Eberle does, whether the Rawlsian
conception of public reason can satisfy the sufficiency condition. What good is a framework that
cannot solve the hard cases involving constitutional essentials? Alternatively, if we were to treat
all “central” religious practices as dispositive in free exercise cases, then collectively one would
suspect such claims (or compelling cases supporting them) would proliferate, and frustrate a
number of public or government functions. It might also, as several courts in sacred land cases
have feared, lead to vetoes over much larger swaths of public (or private) land.
Second, we might simply dub the tribal claimants “unreasonable” if they were insistent
that the grave threats they perceive in sacred lands cases ought to always be dispositive. The
Rawlsian consequence of this label is that those so insisting are not granted a place at the table
in the original position, and their authorship is thereby excluded in determining constitutional
essential; or, at the very least, their authorship is not equal with those citizens or
comprehensive doctrines that are reasonable. One reason why this label might be warranted is
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because, once the tribe has offered, through labors of translation, a public reason-based
account of their concerns, and the Court has accorded them some moral weight but nonetheless
found other interests weightier, the tribe may have no public reasons left to offer as to why
theirs should be more controlling. At such a point, they might appear to shrilly and baldly insist
on their own, unshared views, and appear to the Court or other citizens to offer no reasons at
all. It might also be said that this position is tantamount to a claim for a greater share of the
“index of primary goods” than other citizens or the public, insofar as their religion is unique in
permitting greater land access or more space and resources in pursuing their conception of the
good than others can possibly enjoy. Such insistences, as we have said, are inconsistent with a
system of mutual cooperation among free and equal systems, especially one in which all parties
must (as is the central Hobbesian insight) feel bound.
While there is much support (beyond these) for the possibility that an insistent tribal
claimant would be “unreasonable” under Political Liberalism (two examples of which I
presented at the end of the last section), this label has many, potentially undemocratic
difficulties. Most straightforwardly, the optics of such a declaration regarding a minority faith or
cultural group for any putative, politically liberal democracy, are quite bad. What this
declaration would amount to, in essence, is that cultural groups who do not square well with
land uses or regimes of property ownership that were historically foisted on them in the first
place, violently so, are unreasonable for continuing their practices that predated such violence.
Who in the original position could choose such an oppressive property regime to victims of past
hegemonic violence? This case is obviously distinct from other instances where the imposition
of a liberal hegemony seems less problematic, such as in public schools or in prohibitions of hate
speech. The ritualistic practices at issue in the cases discussed here existed at a time before the
sacred lands were (repeating Justice O’Connor’s words) “after all, its [the government’s] land.”
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These historically specific considerations, however, are somewhat beside the point of an
application and critique of Rawls to minority faiths generally.
A greater difficulty with this second possibility is that the way the term “unreasonable”
is applied here would potentially implicate almost any religion with extremely deep normative
commitments, particularly those with commitments of a “life-or-death” nature or those whose
deepest normative commitments are performative (i.e., ritualistic). This might excuse some
denominations within major faiths whose deepest commitments are entirely doxastic, but it
could foreseeably extend across majority and minority faiths, and various demographic
divisions. For any sincere and committed believer (be it a religious system or a moral cause),
their religion would require them to continue to insist on recognition of, or their right to protect
against, a spiritual threat in the face of a competing private or government interest. As
Wolterstorff elegantly puts the matter for religious citizens:
They do not view it as an option whether or not to do it. It is their conviction that they
strive for wholeness, integrity, integration in their lives: that they ought to allow the
Word of God, the teachings of the Torah, the command and example of Jesus, or
whatever, 108 to shape their existence as a whole, including, then, their social and
political existence. Their religion is not, for them, about something other than their
social and political existence; it is also about their social and political existence.
The only senses of “religion” or “culture” that would not seem to require such behaviors are
those that, as Slavoj Zizek says, are used almost pejoratively these days to pick those things we
simply do in private. 109 The application of the term “unreasonable” here to the tribes would
therefore severely limit the scope of those included in the original position and whose interests
would be represented there and here, in the real, social world. Moreover, the way the concept
“unreasonable” is being used here, while admittedly a Rawlsian term of art, would put
extraordinary strain on our colloquial understanding of that term. As was clear of the claimants
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in Lyng, and even clearer in the Bear Lodge case, an insistence on a land use is often combinable
with an attitude that is eager to accommodate other citizen groups’ and the government’s
interests. The application of the term “unreasonable” here would therefore include those whose
attitudes are, at least in many cases, cooperative and imbued with a desire to peaceably coexist
in a democratic culture comprised of free and equal moral agents.
The third analytic option in squaring a tribal claimant’s foreseeable attitude toward a
contrary judicial decision with the Rawlsian principle of legitimacy is to allow that they are
reasonable notwithstanding their continued insistence on recognition of a grave threat, if not
their extension of the potential site of the threat to an entire region or state. This would
obviously be the case for any religious believer who, as I have suggested of certain tribal
claimants in sacred land cases, only demands a Court’s consideration of their deepest
commitments, such that they matter for constitutional purposes, rather than the outcome. Even
if we are reasonably skeptical about such believers’ willingness to lay down their arms (given the
right opportunity), or at least relegate their continued advocacy to the background, given how
much is at stake according to their worldview, we might then be forced to conclude that a
citizen need only be willing to grudgingly acquiesce in a contrary ruling to be reasonable. The
many versions of justificatory liberalism, as it stands, have the loftier goal of a system predicated
on reasons that everyone can be reasonably expected to find acceptable (though there are
various formulations of acceptability that have been proposed other than actual acceptance).
What this avenue would risk is the abandonment of a guaranteed social stability over a
complete life as the object of a system of public reason: the best that we can hope for, perhaps,
is a collective attitudinal state that is (at least to some degree) a modus vivendi. It remains
possible, however, that Rawls does wish to ultimately exclude any faith that feels a certain
degree of reluctance in abiding by a contrary ruling. After all, one function of political liberalism
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will be to expose and root out unreasonable comprehensive doctrines, which will decline in a
politically liberal society. Even so, and we find the “unreasonable” label both tenable and
palatable as applied to those like the tribal claimants, it is not clear that such a status should
mean no representation whatsoever, rather than less-than-full representation. 110
This avenue is also in tension with the greatest desideratum of political liberalism: social
stability. There is empirical support for the possibility that a political or legal system that tends
to underrepresent the deepest normative commitments of religious believers or other citizens
deeply committed to a comprehensive doctrine leads to their mass retreat into their own,
dialogical enclaves. 111 If this eventuality turns out to be well-supported, regardless of whether
or not we dub the tribal claimants or other believers “unreasonable,” and the representatives
purportedly are aware of this feature of human psychology, then it remains to be determined
whether this threat is adequately accounted for as political liberalism currently stands.
Because I will provide much greater detail elsewhere in considering these three
interpretations of a true believer (or so a secular liberal would call them) who loses in court, I
only to mention them here to underscore the limited scope of the preceding discussion and its
vulnerability beyond these sorts of cases. A consideration of the original position and the
consequent duties of the Supreme Court as exemplar of public reason might help decide cases
of clear value disparity between a religious claimant and the government, or demonstrate some
preliminary features of a just (in the Rawlsian sense) free exercise jurisprudence, but could be
impoverished as applied to other, hard cases. To summarize, a consideration of a tribal
claimant’s possible attitude following a judicial loss in a case like Lyng reveals a tension between
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accommodating religious believers with deep normative commitments (especially ones that are
less than entirely doxastic) and achieving “stability for the right reasons.”
F. Concluding Remarks on the Import of Test Cases for Justice as Fairness
Considering the amount of ink that has been spilled over Political Liberalism over the
last two decades, one well-versed in the dispute regarding religious reasons in the public sphere
might wonder why we need another essay on it. There are two reasons why I chose to explore
the application of core Rawlsian concepts to a specific line of judicial decisions involving a
unique religious minority. First, as David Golembeski has observed, there is a relative dearth of
literature putting jurisprudential debates about religious exemptions to generally applicable
laws and those from political philosophy about public reason into dialogue (though each of
these debates are themselves voluminous). 112 While the conversation has begun to move in this
direction, the proliferation of pressing matters like the Standing Rock protests and the Utah
monument lawsuits have demanded that the conversation regarding what is owed to minority
faith communities with special demands be sharpened. Commentators in ethics and political
philosophy have also noted the talkings-past between so-called inclusivists and exclusivists
regarding public reason. 113
Another source of this impasse is that much of the existing literature focuses on the
caricatured form that opposing sides of debates over big questions take in popular news media
and mass public fora. Even where a more detailed picture of dialogical combatants is provided,
it is at the legislative level. Litigated disputes involving competing, desired courses of conduct
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between two parties who occupy irreconcilable moral or religious positions (including those of
the religious versus the government), must be adjudicated and are cases in which a decision by a
neutral third party, a decision that will be deeply dissatisfying to at least one party, is both
urgent and unavoidable. The judicial record in such cases also typically involves a complete
statement of both parties’ interests and the degree to which one or the other will be
unavoidably offended by a judicial decision. In short, the application of Rawlsian concepts to
constitutional disputes tests the limits of a conception of justice to real, flesh-and-blood citizens
and disputes of paramount import. It brings out, for example, just how difficult neutrality can be
and just which groups we might be forced to exclude from first-class citizenship in our
deliberations if we adopt this or that judicial proposal. On the other hand, some legal
commentators who discuss appropriate approaches to religious exemptions and free exercise
jurisprudence often include less rigorous notions of “fairness” or “neutrality” than do those
from political philosophy.
Second, I chose cases involving sacred lands not just because they involve a historically
oppressed minority religion, whose moral and metaphysical beliefs significantly depart from
those that are mainstream, but also because of both the literal significance and metaphorical
power of the problem of shared living space. Much of the existing debate involves an ethic of
discourse while seated at the deliberating table, including how to accord respect in speaking or
listening to one’s opponents, and less on the background of conditions of the parties who
approach it and how space is shared when not reason-giving. Eberle and Marcuse, from very
different traditions and interests, each noted the profound effect that the social morass one
inhabits has on the breadth of one’s live psychological, moral, or religious possibilities and the
degree of one’s doxastic autonomy. How we make decisions about control over and sharing of
living space has as much to do with freedom of conscience as do the types of reasons that are
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admissible in passing or justifying positive items of legislation. As I will argue in my next essay on
this subject, it is not just the language of public reason that ought to be non-hostile to
reasonable comprehensive doctrines, but the structure of the surrounding, shared living space
insofar as constructing the latter is partly within the ambit of the state. The closer together we
get, as the recent Standing Rock and the Bear Ears controversies illustrate, the more intractable
land uses among putatively reasonable citizens pursuing their deepest commitments in shared
spaces become.
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II.

Liberalism Against Novelty: Containing Unreasonable Doctrines
and the Risk of One-Dimensionality

Many of those cultures or religions who differ most radically from mainstream
democratic dialogue are faced, per liberal democratic theory, with one of two fates: some
degree of absorption into the prevailing legal discourse, or a fading away from political existence
by virtue of their refusal or inability to so transform. 114 This phenomenon is present in all
contemporary, heterogenous democracies. Jeremy Waldron offers a particularly pessimistic
articulation of minority cultural or religious communities’ fates in modern, mainstream life: “We
know that a world in which deracinated cosmopolitanism flourishes is not a safe place for
minority communities. Our experience has been that they wither and die in the harsh glare of
modern life, and that the custodians of these dying traditions live out their lives in misery and
demoralization.” 115 John Rawls describes this kind of loss as an inevitable fact of “commonsense
political sociology”: the social environment will change in a way that makes it more or less
hospitable to one worldview or another; political gains in modern liberal society tend to entail
such costs. 116 The sort of religious neutrality that liberal theory typically expects of the state is
religious or moral neutrality regarding procedure rather than outcome, a duty that is discharged
wherever a law or other political action “can be justified without appealing to the presumed
intrinsic superiority of any particular conception of the good life.” 117 Rawls offers similar
admissions in Political Liberalism, concluding that “no society can handle within itself all forms
of life” and that “not all truths can fit into one social world.” 118 Were it the state’s responsibility
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to preserve all belief systems and lifeways as live, psychological options, it would find itself
without an operating principle, drained of resources, impotent, and nevertheless unable to
satisfy all worldviews. 119
The question that this commonsense fact of political sociology immediately invites is
how (or whether) we can fairly decide which or how many doctrines will have difficulty
persisting in each legal or political milieu. There is some limit on our ability to claim any
struggling doctrine or community as unavoidable collateral damage in instituting a state of just
and generally applicable laws; at what point does this sort of justification appear as little more
than state-sanctioned suppression of non-mainstream views (i.e., the very thing a democratic
republic supposedly isn’t)? A thoroughly democratic system of laws should not, without
compelling reasons, disfavor certain populations’ survival from the outset, either intentionally or
knowingly. Maximizing cultural or religious difference without limit, however, is putatively
undesirable for many political theorists. Stephen Macedo argues that we ought to celebrate the
decline of certain religions or cultures, since it is democratically legitimate for us to construct an
environment that imposes a “moderate hegemony” of liberal values on citizens in order to
render a democracy stable. 120 That certain cultural vanishings or declines should be celebrated
and catalyzed seems perfectly obvious in many cases: some state- or majority-imposed coercion
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or value impositions are aimed at preventing other coercion (i.e., harm to third parties). 121 As
one example, when developing a working constitutional definition of equal protection and its
applications, we don’t concern ourselves with accommodating a militant neo-Nazi group that
wishes to have a say in the matter, and don’t lose much sleep over forcing them to abide by our
conceptions of equal protection instead. Even more clearly, to adapt an example from Robert
Nozick, we ought not to be concerned that subcultures celebrating overt chauvinism and sexual
aggression will have a harder time thriving in an environment that effectively enforces laws
prohibiting and severely punishing rape.
But what political liberalism often means by the inevitability of cultural or religious
vanishings extends beyond persons so clearly odious and antithetical to democracy as these
examples. Some doomed lifeways might reject or live in tension with one or more liberal
democratic principles, yet have no clearly violent intentions or encourage their adherents to live
as cooperative citizens. Others might not explicitly reject any democratic principles at all, yet
have conceptions of property rights that are not legally recognized in the United States, or
adhere to epistemological principles that do not gel with the Federal Rules of Evidence. Are
these cultures not perfectly reasonable to be ultimately concerned with their own cultural
survival, and feel aggrieved when their efforts at cultural self-preservation seem futile? While
some doctrines will face inevitable decline, morally culpable or not, it is foreseeable that bare
recitations of this fact of so-called inevitable fact of “commonsense political sociology” can be
used to preserve a simply majoritarian framework or perpetuate stereotypes of non-
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mainstream communities. 122 The extent to which a legal and political environment’s
inhospitableness to a doctrine is (un)just, surely turns, at least to some degree, on the reason
why the community in question faces inevitable decline. Are we just in intentionally shaping the
political milieu to make the decline of (a) only hostile and violent communities highly likely or
inevitable, or (b) can we knowingly or intentionally do so in the case of somewhat
undemocratic, yet socially cooperative doctrines, or even (c) for non-mainstream, democratic
doctrines with merely unusual (but not necessarily undemocratic) beliefs or practices? To what
extent do each of these kinds of communities (i.e., (a) – (c) above) deserve a hearing regarding
their complaints, and in what circumstances is some corrective measure required by justice? The
answer is surely not “to no extent and in no circumstances.”
As a partial answer to this line of questioning, many versions of political liberalism offer
a distinction between reasonable and unreasonable comprehensive doctrines. This distinction is
commonly discussed in fleshing out a liberal public justification principle (PJP), pursuant to
which a legitimate law or policy need not be justifiable to every person or citizen, taken as they
are (i.e., with their moral or rational defects). Instead, according to most iterations of the PJP,
laws must be justifiable to all citizens only at some level of idealization, which includes an
assumption of their reasonableness. We are only concerned with reasonable citizens or
reasonable comprehensive doctrines seeing their interests reflected in a body of law;
reasonable parties are, as Erin Kelly and Lionel McPherson summarize the Rawlsian position, the
only parties to our social contract. 123 A doctrine or community is unreasonable when, among
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other characteristics, it lacks a conception of people as free and equal or is uninterested in
negotiating and abiding by fair terms of social cooperation. Because a social contract is an
agreement to live as equals in accordance with a binding social pact, we have little reason to
consider, weigh, or incorporate the interests of those who are unwilling to act as a mutually,
contractually bound party with all qualified others. 124 It therefore takes certain civic or
intellectual accomplishments for a citizen to deserve a voice, veto power, religious exemption
from a law, or other tangible form of inclusion, as we create the conditions of public life. Put
otherwise, those who can lay a claim to partial construction of the shared public environment
are only those who buy into the norms inherent in peaceably sharing public space; others are
purportedly excludable from this constructive process.
Beyond exclusion from political constituency, a consequence of a doctrine being
declared “unreasonable” is being subject to a social evolutionary process that militates against
it. Rawls famously, albeit briefly, suggests that it is the political constituency’s duty to “contain”
unreasonable doctrines and prevent their spread. 125 Jonathan Quong argues that “containment”
justifies affirmative measures that are specifically directed at making it difficult for an
unreasonable comprehensive doctrine to persist from one generation to the next, rather than
merely pursuing legitimate public purposes that are indifferent in their effects towards such
doctrines. Similarly, Rawls hopes that a politically liberal society fills in the gaps of partially
comprehensive doctrines, such that the adherent sees the benefits of living in a politically liberal
society over time and, consequently, adapts his or her doctrine (whether by transformation or

whose endorsement would confirm the legitimacy of Rawls’s political liberalism—or whose rejection
would confirm its illegitimacy” (The Idea of a Political Liberalism, p. 16).
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Similarly, Quong suggests that unreasonable persons, because they reject a premise of political
liberalism, which is a theory about the freedom and equality of citizens, their “views are simply of no
normative interest in the process of political justification” (“The Rights of Unreasonable Citizens,” The
Journal of Political Philosophy, Vol. 12, No. 3 (2004): 314-35, 315).
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addition) in deference to political liberalism. “A reasonable and effective political conception
may bend comprehensive doctrines toward itself,” Rawls similarly allows, “shaping them if need
be from unreasonable to reasonable.” 126
This proposal of identifying, transforming, and excluding certain doctrines from public
life has drawn the ire of numerous political theorists because such proposals (i) disrespect or
unfairly disadvantage those with religious beliefs, (ii) risk threatening the very sort of stability
that initially motivates such exclusions, or else (iii) restrict public life in a way that discourages
novelty. The first sort of criticism is more often levied at the public reason requirement (the
PJP), rather than the whole, guided evolutionary process I have just identified. This criticism
often claims that public reason liberalism (a) distinguishes public from non-public reasons in a
trivial way, 127 (b) distinguishes reasonable from unreasonable comprehensive doctrines in a way
that intentionally favors the views of nonreligious, progressive academics, or (c) as put forth
most forcefully by Nicholas Wolterstorff, misunderstands citizens’ religiosity by asking them to
perform an internal division of self that their deepest normative commitments forbid:
They do not view it as an option whether or not to do it. It is their conviction that they
strive for wholeness, integrity, integration in their lives: that they ought to allow the
Word of God, the teachings of the Torah, the command and example of Jesus, or
whatever, to shape their existence as a whole, including, then, their social and political
existence. Their religion is not, for them, about something other than their social and
political existence; it is also about their social and political existence. 128
Even assuming “unreasonableness” is the appropriate label for a non-hostile doctrine, Erin Kelly
and Lionel McPherson suggest that many such persons might still “be due a say in the
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Christopher Eberle offers the most thorough and sophisticated version of this argument in his Religious
Convictions in Liberal Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
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arrangement of institutions binding them,” 129 a principle that at least the early Rawls denies.
Michael Sandel offers an example of the second sort of criticism, which suspects that the
exclusion or non-engagement of unreasonable doctrines does not motivate universal social
cooperation, and instead generates instability by motivating unreasonable groups to retreat to
socially closed-off enclaves, 130 rather than liberalize. As an example of the third variety of
criticism, Jeremy Waldron has voiced a Millian concern that the closing of public, dialogical
possibilities, and the intended decline of non-mainstream voices from public, political life will be
to the detriment of all citizens. Under what Lawrence Solum calls Waldron’s “novelty
objection,” 131 Waldron worries that the closing of the public dialogical universe will exclude
those novel arguments that might provide inventive solutions to social malaises or, as Solum
frames it, that it will “impoverish political discourse by banishing novel arguments from the
public sphere.” 132 What the aforementioned disrespect and novelty-based arguments share is a
concern that Rawlsian liberalism will narrow the possibilities of lived public existence; the
former is concerned with the negative impact on the religious citizens themselves, and the latter
on the public, or at least its discourse.
While these criticisms and Rawlsian replies pertaining to public justification are now
legion, the literature on “containing” unreasonable doctrines is comparatively

See Kelly & McPherson, “On Tolerating the Unreasonable,” p. 39.
See Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (2d ed.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1998): p. 217. Interestingly, as I explain later, Rawls is quite concerned with this possibility in The
Law of Peoples, wherein he argues that a parallel concern on an international stage warrants the inclusion
of what he calls “decent [but unreasonable] peoples” in the international lawmaking constituency.
Whether Rawls would have incorporated certain of these realizations back into this domestic theory or
not, which is a move I would advocate, is a question about which we can only speculate, as he died shortly
after both this work and his Idea of Public Reason Revisited, both of which marked more inclusive trends
in his idea of a political constituency.
131
For Waldron’s own statement of this objection, see Jeremy Waldron “Religious Contributions in Public
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underdeveloped. 133 I concede that Rawlsians are correct that persons antagonistic to
democratic life cannot have an equal claim on others to cultural survival or political inclusion,
but I will argue that this principle’s overbroad specification in the Rawlsian tradition vindicate
critics’ concerns. Wherever an inhospitable political atmosphere exists, at least according to a
religion or culture that is not antagonistic to democratic cooperation, that religion or culture has
grounds for complaint. Moreover, Quong's conception of containment and Macedo's related
“transformative constitutionalism” each presume a specific, controversial principle of instabilitytoleration, i.e., a rule about the likelihood or magnitude of instability that a doctrine can visit on
society before it is deemed an unacceptable risk. These conceptions risk presuming much else
about which there is reasonable disagreement, such as a particularized conception of what
respecting one’s fellow citizens requires one to do or abstain from doing in public action or
discourse. Such presumptions are problematic for a political theory that at once claims to value
equal liberty for its citizens, social stability, and worldview neutrality.
Rawls ostensibly recognizes the internal tension between genuinely accepting pluralism
among flesh-and-blood persons and maintaining internal stability, conceding that it is
“unreasonable for us to use political power…to repress comprehensive views that are not
unreasonable.” 134 Wherever the state or public majority imposes more inhospitableness than is
necessary for cooperative democratic life among free and equal citizens, and I claim that the
strand of justificatory liberalism to which Rawls, Macedo, and Quong belong has this tendency,

There has been some recent work on the notion of “tolerating” unreasonable doctrines, which is
closely connected to “containment” in Rawls or “transformative constitutionalism” in Macedo. I take
“containment,” however, to be either a close cousin or variety of toleration, as it specifically implies (a)
the exclusion of the contained doctrine from the political constituency, and (b) policies that are aimed at
making it more difficult for certain doctrines to thrive, at least according to those varieties of it discussed
here. Bare “toleration” is not nearly so loaded as this. I summarize Rawls, Quong, and Macedo on this
topic below.
134
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it instantiates an undemocratic burden on non-mainstream adherents analogous to what
Herbert Marcuse calls “one-dimensionality.” This is far from a claim that all failures to grant a
right to either preserve one’s culture or ensure the neutrality of one’s social milieu are
undemocratic. Like some of my previous work, this is intended as an internal critique of political
liberalism, insofar as the practice of containment brings political liberalism into unavoidable
conflict with its other central values. Following my elaboration on the Rawlsian treatment of
unreasonableness, I will offer what I call the one-dimensionality objection to this guided,
sociopolitical evolutionary process. This is also not meant to be a primarily exegetical argument:
even if one believes my analysis to be an overstatement of Rawls, Quong, or Macedo, each of
whom admittedly recognize that such a process is to be construed and applied carefully and
narrowly, I hope that it will nonetheless serve as a cautionary tale for the sort of illegitimate
democratic aims that can easily be wrought, and I suspect nearly always will be, by the realworld applications of “unreasonableness” and “containment.”
A. Vignettes of Unreasonable Doctrines
I have suggested that even the most ardent inclusivist 135 would agree on the exclusion
from political constituency of a militant group that, for instance: encourages and plans for the
imminent, violent overthrow of the democratic state, reneges on its agreements with others,
and regards large swaths of the citizenry as so inferior that they are worthy of subjugation or
annihilation. But because the problems with “unreasonableness” and “containment” are made
manifest in the penumbral cases, I will begin by offering a composite sketch of the Rawlsian

An “inclusivist” is one who wishes for the kinds of reasons allowed in political discourse and action to
be quite broad, including parochial moral and religious rationales, whereas an “exclusivist” is a term that
is often used to describe those who wish to minimize or eradicate the use of parochial, religious reasons
from public debate and political action. John Rawls is often described as falling in between these
positions, such as in Tom Bailey & Valentina Gentille (eds.), Rawls & Religion (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2015).
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tradition’s “unreasonable” doctrines (which are the doctrines to be contained), and describe
two prominent rationales for these concepts’ ranges of application.
It is more often the myriad other groups who are less clearly threatening who make for
the hard cases and thereby are the locus of disagreement in political theory. Examples of groups
or worldviews I have in mind are those who share some or many of our core democratic
convictions, yet engage in some practice – such as requiring a religious exemption from a
generally applicable law – that insists on special recognition of its own values, or on legal
outcomes that otherwise rely on public recognition of the special truth or import of its beliefs.
Many such worldviews coexist quite well in American life, even where they reject certain tenets
of mainstream society or comprehensive liberalism; Jeff Spinner-Halev calls one subset of these
groups, like the Amish, who are not especially interested in political participation, “partial
citizens.” 136 While Rawls does not specially define any such “moderate” group in Political
Liberalism (i.e., a “minimally unreasonable” or “unreasonable but tolerable” doctrine) or
elsewhere in his domestic political theory, his international political theory features just such a
category: what he calls “decent peoples.” 137 Somewhat similar to his concept of “decent
peoples,” I will call such doctrines Cooperative but Insistent Doctrines (CIDs). My claim will be
that Rawlsian political liberalism risks democratic failures especially for CIDs, and that onedimensionality is manifest where the public arena, generally or in specific fora like public
schools, is inhospitable towards them or to other non-mainstream doctrines. This critique is not
dissimilar from Ryan Muldoon’s general concern about political liberalism that it presumes an

See Jeff Spinner-Halev, “Cultural Pluralism and Partial Citizenship,” Multicultural Questions, eds.
Christian Joppke and Steven Lukes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999): pp. 65-86. It is worth noting
that certain Rawlsians, such as Quong, consider containment measures unjustified or justifiable in only
limited circumstances when applied to “partial citizens.”
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environment of sameness, and is ill-equipped to account for genuine difference, 138 rather than
the degree of difference that Rawlsian idealization circumscribes in advance.
Though excluding certain unreasonable doctrines is justifiable on the grounds of their
direct and imminent threat to democracy, the exclusion of CIDs from political participation is
overbroad and not similarly justifiable on stability or other, moral grounds; it is only justifiable
based on a certain conception of stability, a specific and controversial political risk calculus, and
a certain degree of toleration for social dissension (i.e., a reasonably contestable comprehensive
view). For this reason, in reply to a suggestion from Larmore or Rawls that one must accept their
decline or their transformation as inevitable, a CID (unlike an unreasonable and hostile
comprehensive doctrine), might well reply: “why me rather than another?” In this case, it seems
that further explanation is owed that it seems the Rawlsian cannot provide the inquisitor: it is
not enough, at least from a Rawlsian standpoint of fairness, to say that some forms of life must
inevitably decline in a given milieu, and that by happenstance it is yours.
While I have framed this as a problem of the penumbra, the evolution of social
circumstances will change just who belongs in the core or penumbra of unreasonableness, and
even who constitutes a threat to the political institutions that now exist. My suspicion is that
most major or currently mainstream religions, particularly those with significant non-doxastic
elements or those with moral tenets that are inflexible, become CIDs in the right circumstance:
it is just that they don’t find themselves confronted with such conflict – given their social
circumstances or political currency – as often as non-mainstream religious, ethical, or
epistemological doctrines do. 139 I have chosen “CID” to describe them because it is simply the

See Ryan Muldoon, Social Contract Theory for a Diverse World: Beyond Tolerance (New York: Taylor &
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nature of a comprehensive doctrine to insist upon itself (i.e., as ultimate arbiter of truth or
goodness), or for its adherents to insist on its behalf, as the need arises. Certain CIDs are not illequipped for cooperative, democratic social life at all, but only for the Rawlsian model of it.
Excluding them therefore stretches the meaning of “unreasonable” to arbitrary, capricious, or
trivial status. Such processes as containment are rightly understood, at least in these cases, as
encroachments on the affected citizens from without and from an alien (albeit “public”) ethos.
Those participants who are putatively good citizens (i.e., are “reasonable”) are exposed largely
only to familiar elements, and Waldron and others (such as Michael Perry) suggest this is to their
(the “reasonable” citizens’) impoverishment as well; it might well be that it is the familiar
elements of mainstream culture that limit citizens' life opportunities. Before arguing my position
further, however, I need to say much more about the furniture of the system that I claim is
often guilty of such encroachments.
Based both on explicit indicia of “unreasonableness” in Rawls’s work and by negative
inference from that which makes one “reasonable,” unreasonable persons or doctrines possess
one or more of these general qualities, among others:
(1) An unwillingness to abide by the fair terms of cooperation (i.e., a willful intent to bide
one’s time and renege on the social contract where it is no longer individually rational);
(2) A refusal to recognize the burdens of judgment;
(3) A view contrary to the idea of citizens as politically free and equal;
(4) Rejection of the idea of public reason, or refusal to politically act in this language; and

behave in ways that made us appear unreasonable if the site of Jesus Christ’s crucifixion were located on
government-owned land (see his Religion and the Constitution, Vol. 1: Free Exercise and Fairness
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009).
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(5) An insistence on a greater share of the index of primary goods 140 than other citizens or
doctrines, including those with “expensive” or “unusual” tastes. 141
In Quong’s defense of Rawlsian reasonableness, he focuses on criteria (1) – (4) and argues,
following Rawls, that a citizen’s worldview or specific claim to the effect of (1) – (4) renders his
or her view unreasonable, and not deserving of political participation for want of interests in the
democratic project. 142 I suspect he would follow Rawls in adding (5) as an outgrowth of (1) – (4),
just as he regarded (4) as inferable from (1) – (3). 143
Many political liberals also assume that some degree of rationality inheres in
reasonableness, such as Joshua Cohen, for whom reasonableness means that a doctrine’s
adherents are “stably disposed to affirm it as they acquire new information and subject it to
critical reflection.” 144 What Rawls means by reasonableness, however, is a description of certain
moral qualities and is not derivable from the rational. As Quong puts the matter in responding
to a common misuse of Rawlsian “reasonableness,” 145 this is intended as a moral and not a

The “index of primary goods” refers to Rawls’s attempt to give a rough account of those provisions that
are necessary conditions to persons possessing a wide range of comprehensive doctrines being enabled to
pursue their separate conceptions of the good life. He identifies five general categories of primary
goods(see, for example, his Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, ed. Erin Kelly (Cambridge, MA: Belknap
Press, 2001): pp. 58-9): (a) basic liberties, including freedom of thought and conscience; (b) freedom of
movement and free choice of occupation against a background of diverse opportunities; (c) powers and
prerogatives of offices and positions of authority and responsibility; (d) income and wealth, understood as
all-purpose means (having an exchange value) generally needed to achieve a wide range of ends whatever
they may be; and (e) the social bases of self-respect.
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cognitive, epistemic requirement of a citizen or comprehensive doctrine. Rawls explains that
“there are no restrictions or requirements on how religious or secular doctrines are to be
expressed; these doctrines need not, for example, be by some standards logically correct, or
open to rational appraisal, or evidentially supportable.” 146
Even though Rawls presents “rationality” and “reasonableness” as conceptually distinct
characteristics a person might possess, the qualities of reasonableness that I listed above
presume some epistemic accomplishments or some threshold capability for rational
engagement. As Robert Talisse argues in Democracy and Moral Conflict, what inheres in our
possession and communication of beliefs, insofar as we are participants in public, political
dialogue, is a willingness to subject them to public criticism and competition with other
worldviews. 147 While very much the point of Talisse’s epistemological defense of public reason is
to provide a different basis for democracy than Rawls’s, it is difficult to imagine that terribly
many comprehensive doctrines can be judged “compatible” with political liberalism pursuant to
(2) or (4) without their also being judged as possessing a certain degree of rationality or certain
epistemic accomplishments. Accepting the burdens of judgment, for instance, is difficult to
understand as an entirely moral, and non-epistemological, achievement. So too is any
participation in public justification; the articulation and justification of a constitutional rights
regime, for instance, need only be made towards those who can engage with and respond to
such justificatory acts of deliberation. Moreover, though it is unclear how significant these terms
are, given that he only makes them in passing, Rawls states that containment extends to
“irrational” and “mad” doctrines. 148 What I will assume arguendo for the remainder of this
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discussion is that “reasonableness” only includes “rationality” qualifications within it insofar as
the latter sort are necessary to satisfy (1) – (5) and any other relevant criteria of reasonableness.
This might mean, for instance, that a faith community can express its doctrine however it
wishes, and its beliefs or its adherents’ reasons for believing them can be supported by
whatever logical defects they wish, without this leading to their being dubbed “unreasonable”
and thereby excludable from the democratic constituency. What would render them
unreasonable is if they only offered reasons in this logically defective way in the public sphere,
and expected their interlocutors to accept or understand these reasons. Thus, I will suppose as
criterion (6) that having a capacity for and willingness to debate in public matters rationally is
essential to reasonableness.
So far, these criteria might strike you as fair prerequisites to inclusion in public, political
life. But the category “unreasonableness” is, I submit, far from as barebones and inclusive as
Rawls or Quong sometimes make it appear, as becomes apparent when Rawls confronts specific
political controversies. Within the general criteria of “unreasonableness,” there is room for
significant perspectival diversity even within political liberalism, let alone other reasonable
conceptions of justice. This indeterminacy lays the groundwork for the objection against
Rawlsian unreasonableness I will offer in the following section. From those political liberals who
consider this idealization of citizens necessary to maintain “respect” among one’s fellow citizens
(or to inculcate some other democratically essential civic attitude), a detailed and universally
accessible narrative about just what “respect” requires of us is owed.
If the reason that each characteristic disqualifies a doctrine from political incorporation
is that those who possess them would undermine the very democracy in which they wish to
participate given the opportunity, then I recognize the arguable necessity of including (1) and
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(3), but not (2), (4) or (5). 149 Putting this disagreement aside for the moment, and assuming
arguendo the validity of (1) – (5), notions of “fair terms,” “free and equal” (including who
citizens are), an “idea of public reason,” the precise scope of the burdens of judgment, and
“greater share,” initially admit of multiple interpretations, almost as inexorably as do similar
phrases in the Bill of Rights. A full-throated democratic defense of excluding the unreasonable
from democratic constituency therefore requires reference to specific insistences or attitudes in
the public sphere, or rather, snapshots of unreasonable persons or groups.
Where comprehensive doctrines include truth claims, Rawls admits that we must deny
them in some circumstances, even though we are ordinarily to eschew statements about the
whole truth regarding the true or the good in politics, particularly where a religious group or
citizen demands that transcendent concerns override public, political ones. Privileging the
transcendent over the political, in fact, might be one of the greatest indicators of
unreasonableness to which nearly all others correspond. Such is the case, Rawls imagines,
where a person or doctrine claims that a transcendent value is so important that it justifies a
degree of civil strife, such as where the “salvation of a whole people may depend on” the true
and correct settling of a fundamental political matter. 150 Second and relatedly, those who claim
that their religious freedom requires special access to sacred lands or the provision of public
resources are said to be ill-suited for political liberalism:
Some persons may count among their religious obligations going on pilgrimages to
distant places or building magnificent cathedrals or temples. To guarantee the equal
worth of religious liberty is now understood to require that such persons receive special
My disagreement with this list, as I will explain later, is due to the possibility of those who regard
themselves as epistemically privileged or otherwise superior to fellow citizens, but (a) deeply care for the
other and value her autonomy; and (b) present no threat, by the terms of her worldview, to a stable
democracy.
150
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provision to enable them to meet these obligations. On this view, then, their religious
needs, as it were, are greater for the purposes of political justice, whereas those whose
religious beliefs oblige them to make but modest demands on material means do not
receive such provision; their religious needs are much less. Plainly, this kind of
guarantee is socially divisive, a receipt for religious controversy if not civil strife. Similar
consequences result, I believe, whenever the public conception of justice adjusts
citizens’ claims to social resources so that some receive more than others depending on
the determinate final ends and loyalties belonging to their conceptions of the good.…It
suffices to say that one main reason for using an index of primary goods in assessing the
strength of citizens’ claims in questions of political justice is precisely to eliminate the
socially divisive and irreconcilable conflicts which such principles would arouse. 151
I have discussed the cases of Lyng and Navajo Nation (as well as several current sacred land
cases involving Utah monuments) elsewhere, wherein Native American tribes claimed that their
free exercise rights demanded that the government cease activity on its own land. It is likely that
the litigants in these cases must be considered unreasonable as well. 152 Third, Rawls declares
unreasonable those comprehensive doctrines that “cannot support a reasonable balance of
political values,” including those who believe, or religious or other transcendent grounds, that
the balance of political values does not support a woman’s right to an abortion during the first
trimester. 153 Fourth, those whose community’s internal culture includes a division of labor or
political holdings along gendered lines, based on either natural differences between the sexes or
a deity’s command, cannot offer reasons in public to enforce this division, as such a division of
labor, on the basis of public reasons, must be voluntary for its participants.
As one final and particularly interesting example directly from Rawls, in Law of Peoples,
he introduces Kazanistan, a hypothetical society in which there is no separation of church and
state, Islam is the favored religion, and being Muslim generates a higher status and greater
opportunity, in certain ways, than does practicing another religion. Only Muslims can “hold the
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upper positions of political authority and influence the government’s main decisions and
policies, including foreign affairs.” 154 Kazanistan’s government, however, leaves numerous
opportunities available for non-Muslim citizens (including some political offices and the various
professions) and encourages the cultural survival of non-Muslim cultures within its state. Human
rights are otherwise recognized and guaranteed. 155 It appears that peoples like those in
Kazanistan would be unreasonable persons domestically, should they demand that their political
structure is implemented in the United States, but are decent peoples who warrant political
inclusion on the international stage as “equal participants in the Society of Peoples.” They also
come close to fitting the CID label, insofar as Kazanistan ostensibly values numerous liberal
democratic commitments, while rejecting or living in tension with one or more of them. By
analogy to Rawls’s domestic social contract, which is determined in the original position, a group
like Kazanistanians would perhaps be tolerated, but not included as participants in social
contract bargaining. Thus, they would be subject to containment.
Other political liberals who are largely Rawlsian, at least insofar as they incorporate
Rawlsian unreasonableness and the legitimacy of processes like containment, offer examples
that help fill in the unreasonableness picture further. The following, general description of
groups ill-suited to democratic life (from Larmore) is one with which Rawls would agree, and
which is particularly germane to my focus on an image of social cooperation as sharing space:
[W]ays of life that depend upon close and exclusive bonds of language and culture – the
French in Canada or the Bretons in France – may lose, within a liberal society also
tolerating quite different and more open ways of life, some of the authority and
cohesion that they would have if they formed complete societies unto themselves. 156
Rawls, Law of Peoples, 75.
Id.
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Combining this kind of interest – maintaining social cohesion through isolation – with the
lengthy passage on sacred lands above, we can conclude that Rawls and Larmore would regard
as unreasonable those who insist on some right or demand some privilege in their efforts to
preserve their cohesive, but independent, way of life. Quong offers an example of a religious
minority that chooses to educate its community’s children privately, providing excellent
academic instruction (and hence scoring especially well on standardized tests), yet teaching
principles that contradict parts of (1) – (5), such as that non-believers are of less moral value, or
that civil society is a sphere to be tolerated until the political situation becomes more
favorable. 157 This example is based on the oft-discussed Mozert v. Hawkins, 827 F.2d 1058 (6th
Cir. 1987) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), 158 both of which involved the conflict
between parental choice in childrearing versus public interests in the education of its future
citizens. In neither of these cases did the religious community involved intend to overtake
mainstream society should the political opportunity arise (the Amish in Yoder, after all, were
pacifists). In Mozert, however, the majority opinion was concerned with the civil dissension the
school would create if it entertained excusing children from portions of public school curriculum
that their parents found objectionable. Compulsory public education is a common issue among
political liberals and their critics. Such practices are also sometimes defended, including by
Rawls and Amy Gutmann, on the grounds that declining to expose children to other lifestyles or
other citizens deprive those children of a fair range of life opportunities, including any
meaningful right to exit their communities. It might also be the case, among other worries, that
the delivery of parochial education could have the effect of discriminating against women and

Quong, “Rights of Unreasonable Citizens,” 326.
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(M.D. Pa. 2005).
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girls, a practice which invokes several of the indicia of unreasonableness cited above. Regardless
of their precise rationales, what Rawls and likeminded political liberals have in common is a
conviction that the state has a sufficiently strong interest in educating children as future,
cooperative citizens (or preventing the proliferation of unreasonable views) to place limits on
parents’ rights to set the conditions of their children’s education.
To summarize and cull a general description from these examples, unreasonable
persons or doctrines reject one of the principles identified in (1) – (5), examples of which might
include: requiring excessive space or independence for religious reasons, demanding
exemptions from generally applicable laws on religious or non-public grounds, requesting
special access to or greater than the equal share of public resources, insistence on public
recognition of one’s own view of the whole truth, or insisting that the public adopt something
akin to Pascal’s wager regarding a spiritual threat that the religious claimant perceives. 159
Because these criteria and examples are not exhaustive, it will also be instructive to provide
background principles that might determine unreasonableness where a culture’s characteristic
in not specified as such in the existing canon of political liberalism. Political liberalism commonly
supplies at least one of two, interconnected justifications for labeling such practices and
attitudes “unreasonable” doctrines, aiming to transform or contain them, and excluding them
from the political constituency: one based on respect and another based on stability.

An example of this last possibility was the subject matter of my “Adjudicating Sacred Land from
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world and a loss of their culture.
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First, political theory is, for Rawls, a coherentist project, 160 as Political Liberalism
attempts to base its conception of justice on our considered convictions, such something like
“respect” or “dignity” being owed to all persons. Rawls summarizes this process as follows:
We collect such settled convictions as the belief in religious toleration and the rejection
of slavery and try to organize the basic ideas and principles implicit in these convictions
into a coherent political conception of justice. These convictions are provisional fixed
points that it seems any reasonable conception must account for…We express this by
saying that a political conception of justice, to be acceptable, must accord with our
considered convictions, at all levels of generality, on due reflection[.] 161
Among the considered convictions (which change with sociohistorical circumstance) with which
Rawls begins is a conceptions of persons as free and equal moral agents. If I aim to coerce or
otherwise impose my values on a compatriot, rather than attempt to persuade him of my view
or otherwise provide a reason to accept a coercive law, then I do not treat him as an agent with
a complete moral life of his own, but instead as an “object of coercion” or “subject of
legislation,” and thereby degrade him. If I am concerned with my compatriot’s autonomy, then,
this means that I am to generally refrain from coercing her except under conditions that she has
reason to accept; otherwise I impose an alien power on her and inhibit her autonomy. Going
further, Quong suggests that the person invoking a liberal right to carry out an illiberal purpose
is also self-contradictory, such as where I claim that my religion entitles me to steal your
laptop. 162 Just as in Jeremy Waldron’s example of a Nazi exercising his or her right to free speech
by advocating the suppression of another, nearby group’s free speech, the application of the
putative right is antithetical to the environment that allows it. Respect is therefore either a
stipulated moral value or one that, in a Kantian vein, necessarily follows from my seeking
recognition.
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Second, as Paul Weithman explains, Rawls is concerned with the central role that
mutual assurance plays in describing the sort of social stability (i.e., “inherent stability” in
Theory of Justice and “stability for the right reasons” in Political Liberalism) that is political
liberalism’s goal. Weithman recalls the Rawlsian psychological insight that we are creatures of
divided loyalties, most often between our government and our selfish, familial, or moral and
religious commitments. The Rawls of Theory sought what he called “congruence,” pursuant to
which his conception of justice and citizens’ conceptions of the good will align in a well-ordered
society. 163 If a religiously convicted citizen’s deepest normative commitments conflict with his
political duties, it is foreseeable that such a citizen will decide it is not individually rational for
him to follow the law, even if the law is collectively rational for the citizenry’s interest in, say,
social order; 164 it is individually rational for him to act on his religious or communal loyalties
instead. If this first defecting citizen so chooses, then other persons or communities in a similar
circumstance might well decide it is individually rational for them to defect from the terms of
social cooperation, either to the extent there is a conflict or entirely. Even those citizens whose
normative commitments are not so inconsistent with the terms of social cooperation might well
see these defectors as “free riders” on their law-abiding behavior, leading them to believe that
their compliance is not individually rational if they cannot be assured of the legal compliance of
others. Thus, there is only hope for a stable political system is if mutual assurance can be
provided to all parties that each will abide by negotiated terms of social cooperation, 165 or
rather, if each of us can be assured that no one has sufficient reason for preemptive
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defection. 166 Indeed, in Rawls’s last word on the matter, he expressly incorporates a willingness
to provide “mutual assurance” into his notion of reasonableness. 167
What Rawls seeks in ensuring stability is not the imposed stability of Hobbes’s
Leviathan; the aim in Theory was to ameliorate the tension between one’s parochial and
political loyalties, such that the political conception of justice can be embraced
“wholeheartedly.” Though the assumptions about citizens’ motivations differ in important ways
in Theory and Political Liberalism, Rawls consistently recognizes that a well-ordered society’s
institutions must help citizens develop a sense of justice that is motivating to citizens’ and
communities’ internal lives. In Political Liberalism, Rawls is particularly concerned with the fact
of reasonable pluralism, and hence the necessity of a political conception of justice being
affirmed by an “overlapping consensus” of the reasonable comprehensive doctrines that exist in
society. This might well require the evolution of various communities and doctrines, i.e., the
inculcation of both a sense of justice in a doctrine’s adherents and adequate motivation to live
up to the demands of political liberalism. Instilling the motivation to be just in reasonable
citizens and doctrines, and the evolution of such doctrines over time in favor of a public political
conception of justice, are each necessary for such citizens and doctrines to affirm a system of
laws in a way that is sincere and enduring.
Once again, the various categories of unreasonable doctrines I have described – both
the democratic principles they reject ((1) – (5) above) and some of the specific policy positions
they might take (such as the sacred lands example) – purportedly do not have a claim to
inclusion in the political constituency, particularly when it comes to constitutional essentials and
matters of basic justice. These groups are excluded because (on different accounts) (a) they
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disrespect fellow citizens by pursuing their parochial goals, either in a way that treats others as
unequal or treats their own truth claims as warranting special attention, or (b) they undermine
the inherent stability at which a democratic system aims. Yet the process of exclusion is
lamentable (to Rawls), or at least in tension with other democratic principles, and only in rare
circumstances can it mean abridging freedoms (such as free speech or freedom of movement) of
unreasonable communities. Nonetheless, the Rawlsian seeks to instantiate a public political
culture in which unreasonable groups such as these will disappear over time, and “containment”
is ostensibly a legitimate mechanism for ensuring that this happens. As such, I suggested in the
introduction that containment can be understood as an evolutionary process, and a morally
legitimate one to the Rawlsian, that purposely minimizes the presence of unreasonable
doctrines by altering the hospitableness of the social landscape. I will now turn to just how
Rawls, Quong, and Macedo describe this guided evolutionary process, before turning to my
critique of it.
B. Containment and Transformative Constitutionalism
Rawls is notoriously vague on just what democratically legitimate containment
measures are, other than that a containment measure is typically (but far from always) more
permissive than a more direct approach, like abridging free speech or other rights for those who
are unreasonable. 168 Rawls’s explicit discussion of containment is limited to the following
passages:
Of course, a society may also contain unreasonable and irrational, and even mad,
comprehensive doctrines. In their case the problem is to contain them so that they do
not undermine the unity and justice of society. 169
That there are doctrines that reject one or more democratic freedoms is itself a
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permanent fact of life, or seems so. This gives us the practical task of containing them —
like war and disease — so that they do not overturn political justice. 170
What is common to each of these passages is that containment is (a) an ongoing, practical task
for a public, political culture, and (b) it is justifiable on the grounds that certain doctrines (i.e.,
ones that are unreasonable, irrational, mad, or reject one or more democratic freedoms) will
undermine a central desideratum of political liberalism (such as inherent stability or an
overlapping consensus). This is because unreasonable doctrines are “a threat to democratic
institutions, since it is impossible for them to abide by a constitutional regime except as a modus
vivendi.” 171 The task of containing these threats (i.e., those doctrines that threaten democratic
institutions) includes a strategy of non-engagement: for those who view the political relation as
a “struggle to win the world for the whole truth” and carry a “zeal to embody the whole truth in
politics,” Rawls notes that political liberalism “does not engage those who think this way.” 172 As I
read Rawls here, this means that public reason is not designed to address itself to those for
whom transcendent values are greater than political values, nor is the determination of
constitutional essentials designed to responsive to those who hold out hope that the political
culture will eventually reflect a hegemony of their own comprehensive doctrines, nor those who
seek public recognition of the value or correctness of their views.
Though Rawls does not define what the affirmative components of containment
include, Quong argues that containment must mean something distinctive beyond “the regular
application of liberal principles of justice,” or else the definition of containment simply collapses
into “the protection of basic individual rights and freedoms.” 173 The police arresting members of
the Ku Klux Klan for attempting to lynch a black man cannot be what “containment” means (this
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is just to enforce laws against attempted murder); to constitute a containment measure, the
aim must be containment. Quong therefore proposes the following definition of containment:
“any policy whose primary intention is to undermine or restrict the spread of ideas that reject
the fundamental tenets of a liberal democracy, that is, (1) that political society should be a fair
system of social cooperation for mutual benefit, (2) that citizens are free and equal, and (3) the
fact of reasonable pluralism.” 174 Though Quong is careful to emphasize that there should be a
“strong presumption” in favor of non-containment, 175 its availability as a legitimate option is
essential to ensuring that basic liberal values become entrenched. This is legitimately
accomplished, for instance, through the liberal education of children. Because a politically liberal
state, though it has an obligation to be religion-neutral, is not entirely value neutral (it values
core democratic principles and social stability), it rightly has interests in ensuring that its future,
politically participatory citizens recognize the value of a democratic system of cooperation.
Consequently, it has an interest in limiting the spread of ideas – such as the moral superiority of
one’s own community members or the depravity of civil society – that are antithetical to this
goal, even if it may not stop this spread directly (e.g., through restrictions on free speech, such
as imprisoning those holding such views). After all, Quong observes, “history tells us that
regimes where these basic liberal ideals are not firmly entrenched have been vulnerable to gross
violations of human rights and other serious injustices.” 176
The other side of the containment coin is what I have said Macedo calls “transformative
constitutionalism.” Macedo agrees that making it more difficult for unreasonable doctrines to
persist or spread is necessary, since we cannot pursue any “shared civic ends without making it
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harder for the proponents of some moral and religious doctrines to perpetuate their views.” 177
Where Quong is focused on the moral legitimacy of this preventative component of
containment, Macedo’s focus is on the transformative component of containment, though each
seems to just be a corollary of the other. Macedo contends that many of us take the cultivation
and eventual prevalence of virtuous, democratically cooperative citizens for granted: such
citizens did not, he claims, “spring from the soil of private freedom.” A stable democracy plays
what Macedo calls a “radical educative function”:
Liberal constitutional institutions have a more deeply constitutive role, which is to work
at shaping or constituting all forms of diversity over the course of time, so that people
are satisfied leading lives of bounded individual freedom. Successful constitutional
institutions must do more than help order the freedom of individuals prefabricated for
life in a liberal political order: they must shape the way that people use their freedom
and shape people to help ensure that freedom is what they want. If a constitutional
regime is to succeed and thrive, it must constitute the private realm in its image, and it
must form citizens willing to observe its limits and able to pursue its aspirations. 178
Unless we are to intentionally intervene in, say, the education of future citizens (i.e., children),
Macedo contends that there is nothing to guarantee, other than by operation of magic, that
various communities and localities widely recognize “toleration” or other virtues, habits, and
practices necessary for social cooperation. I read Macedo as justifying transformative
constitutionalism with an empirical claim similar to Quong’s: our democracy has only thrived
because certain pivotal moments in American history centrally featured this process. Much of
Macedo’s work includes a detailed history of the evolution of common schools in the United
States during the middle of the 19th century, which is a successful instantiation of
transformative constitutionalism. 179 Though common school curriculum was initially justified on
religious grounds (i.e., on an idea of Christianity as tolerant and ecumenical, such as it appears in
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John Locke’s work), the mission and effect of the common schools was to promote, through
classroom instruction, ways of life and thinking that formed the basis of public, liberal morality,
in turn forming a more self-restrained, reasonable, and moderate populace. This process both
motivated greater civic engagement and caused many of those communities with inconsistent
ways of life or thinking to moderate themselves in the mainstream public’s direction.
As an example of a religion that underwent significant change, or an instance in which
political liberalism (as Rawls would phrase it) “bent a comprehensive doctrine toward itself,”
Macedo recounts the evolution of the American Catholic Church. This denomination was
liberalized over time, after purportedly having previously spent decades impeding democracy,
as it began to adopt the American notions of public authority and the relationship between
church and state, rather than the Vatican’s notions of each. Not only did Catholic attitudes shift
regarding common schooling, 180 but Macedo recalls Sanford Levinson’s observation that
Catholics seeking judicial appointments had to declare their religion “practically meaningless” as
a condition of service. This latter, declarative ritual and ones like it had the effect of “diminishing
the importance of some religious convictions in people’s lives,” particularly those with principles
in tension with democratic ones, a consequence that Macedo believes calls for neither regret
nor apology. This is so even if, as many like Wolterstorff contend, it might be said that religious
citizens bear an unequal and weighty psychological tax from performing this political-religious
compartmentalization, a social expectation that has the result of driving many ways of life out.
That an educative function which, “gently” and over time, affects and shifts citizens’ deeply held
beliefs, is inscribed in the self-supporting patterns of liberal democracies is, for him, perfectly
legitimate and even laudable.
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So described, containment and transformative constitutionalism appear troublesome,
as the processes can be read as justifying rights abridgements or other forms of oppression in
the name of either stability or the development of a tolerant public culture. 181 This concern has
been raised by numerous critics of the idea of public reason, like Wolterstorff, Christopher
Eberle, and Jurgen Habermas. Marilyn Friedman has levied it against “unreasonableness” and
“containment” specifically. Friedman claims that, because unreasonable persons or doctrines
are treated like “bearers of a pestilence,” 182 they are denied their political autonomy in two
ways:
First, they will be excluded from the legitimation pool [comprised of reasonable
persons], that collection of citizens whose consent to the political system confirms its
legitimacy. 183 Second, in daily life, they will be denied the full protection of the system’s
basic rights and liberties, particularly freedom of expression. 184
Since the consequences of being labeled “unreasonable” are quite serious and potentially
oppressive, Friedman emphasizes that we must be careful to only do so based on “good”
reasons and to ensure that the “application of good reasons is not over inclusive, that is, that it
does not exclude by mistake any persons who do belong in the legitimation pool.” 185
What especially troubles Friedman is the possibility that certain historically oppressed or
underrepresented groups might be excluded from the legitimation pool. The poor are often
depicted, whether deservedly or not, as being preoccupied with their own means of
subsistence, such that they are less able to occupy a mental attitude that “surmounts selfinterest,” and are instead inclined to adopt “self-serving and unfair terms of social
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cooperation.” 186 While the Rawlsian difference principle’s very purpose is to serve the best
interests of the least well off, Friedman suspects that the public hearing at which we determine
the poor’s “best interests” will often exclude the poor themselves. This is similar to Amartya
Sen’s worry that, by making the equal distribution of primary goods the barometer of equality,
Rawls ignores or minimizes the widely varying capabilities among citizens to actually convert
those primary goods into self-betterment or pursuit of one’s projects. 187 Rather than actual selfrespect, Sen claims Rawls is wrongheadedly concerned with the “social bases of self-respect,” or
with income rather than “what income does.” 188
The worry common to Friedman and Sen is that “unreasonableness,” particularly when
considered in conjunction with the Rawlsian index of primary goods, will often lead to a political
culture that is unresponsive and even tilted against those persons or groups who are most in
need of a just system’s protection. As Daniel Weinstock as put it, we ought to be wary of a
system that creates “permanent minorities or ‘losers’” at the outset. 189 Recall, for instance, that
one of the indicia of Rawlsian unreasonableness is expecting public recognition of one’s
“expensive” or “unusual” tastes. I have suggested that past tyrannies of the majority, or simply
historical accident, might create categories of property or privacy rights that contingently (i.e.,
not by necessary extension of democratic concepts) disfavor the lifeways of indigenous cultures
or non-mainstream religious communities. Thus, in many cases, the only factor that might
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render a certain taste “expensive” or “unusual” is a practice of historical injustice, or even a now
oligarchic institution that began innocently. 190
Though certain components of Friedman’s worry have centrally influenced my objection
to reasonableness and containment, her approach’s weakness lies in her disambiguating
containment’s oppressiveness into two distinct effects on unreasonable persons: exclusion from
the legitimation pool as well as the abridgement of a basic scheme of rights and liberties. The
heart of political liberalism’s rights-abridging tendency, I will argue, is or directly issues from its
over-exclusion of doctrines from the legitimation pool; these are not separable defects of
containment. The proponents of containment I have discussed, especially Quong, offer several,
closely related reasons why Friedman’s reading is partially incorrect and why her claim about
rights denials is consequently misguided. It will be useful to summarize these replies before then
turning to the residual portion of Friedman’s worry that I believe is sound, and to which the
containment-advocating Rawlsian lacks a forceful reply.
First, whatever principles justify a person’s exclusion from the legitimation pool do not,
according to each of Quong, Rawls, and Macedo, also justify denying that person the basic
scheme of rights and liberties enjoyed by reasonable citizens. “There is not one account of
toleration,” Rawls emphasizes in his last word on the matter, “for reasonable doctrines and
another for unreasonable ones. Both cases are settled by the appropriate political principles of
justice and the conduct those principles permit.” 191 My being declared “unreasonable” does not
mean that I lose constitutional protection for the same expressive acts that are protected for
reasonable persons, nor does it mean that I have any less of a Fourth Amendment protection
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against unreasonable searches and seizures. If I adhere to a doctrine that includes unreasonable
expectations about privacy, though my precise expectations will not be borne out in privacy law,
I still enjoy those same privacy protections that all reasonable persons enjoy (though it is true
that these protections will be more in line with their expectations). The purpose of the original
position is to be fair and impartial, Quong explains, such that the scheme of rights and liberties
derived within it “are going to hold for everyone, and not just those citizens who happen to
endorse their premises.” 192 In this vein, Rawls justifies a long-recognized exception to expressive
freedom: the government may proscribe speech that incites imminent lawless action. This rule
applies equally to reasonable and unreasonable persons, though momentarily engaging in the
proscribed conduct would render a person unreasonable at that moment. Importantly, Matthew
Clayton and David Stevens clarify that what all this means for political liberalism is that it doesn’t
legally proscribe or exclude unreasonable persons at all, strictly speaking, but only unreasonable
actions. 193 Friedman is therefore incorrect in supposing that the unreasonableness label triggers
a surrender of all civil rights. While this reply to Friedman is apt, a worry remains: certain
unreasonable persons’ lives or doctrines might be so permeated with unreasonable actions or
demands, as is precisely mine and (I think) Friedman’s suspicion, that the distinction between
excluding persons and actions is one without much practical difference. What I will argue in the
following section is that there must still be a constituency of persons that determines what
speech rises to the requisite “threat-to-social stability” level to forfeit First Amendment
protection, and that determining this threshold is always a parochial or majoritarian decision.
Second, Quong argues that a containment measure directed at an unreasonable
doctrine or community, in most cases, is not inconsistent with an asserted right at all, even if it
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is intended to diminish the asserted right’s impact. It is feasible to both respect a parental right
to choose a child’s conditions of education while also hoping that public school education will
transform that child’s beliefs and, in subsequent generations, either transform or eradicate that
child’s native community. Rawls often speaks in Political Liberalism of a fundamental
constitutional right’s “central range,” 194 emphasizing that it is primarily this component of an
asserted right that must be preserved. Where two rights conflict, as is arguably often the case in
the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, or where essential governmental functions and
unorthodox applications of constitutional rights conflict, it might well be that our duty is to
maximally preserve both of them. Thus, the recognition of parental freedom must always be
understood as running up against (a) the child’s right to choose his or her life path from among
those generally available to citizens, and (b) the state’s interest in educating future citizens.
Third, even where there is a de facto rights abridgment, this occurs only where the
asserted right or the doctrine asserting it is inconsistent with the very environment necessary
for such a right to exist. Quong argues that this might justify legal restrictions on hate speech,
insofar as such speech denies the very environment required for free exchanges of ideas among
citizens of diverse viewpoints. Both he and Rawls emphasize, at least nominally, that such
restrictions are to be pursued very cautiously. In a section of Theory that Rawls continued to cite
with approval in his later work, Rawls emphasizes that the tolerant in society should only restrict
the freedoms of “intolerant sects” where “only when the tolerant sincerely and with reason
believe that their own security and that of the institutions of liberty are in danger.” 195 Where
there is little reason to suspect that such a danger exists, however, Rawls argues that political
liberals have a strong interest in preserving intolerant sects’ freedoms. As Fuat Gursozlu
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explains, Rawls (at least in Theory) had faith that intolerant sects generally enjoying the same
freedoms as others would lead to their becoming more tolerant over time, and embracing
justice as fairness wholeheartedly. 196 For those intolerant sects that are not persuaded to
eventually embrace the political system, containment measures might well be justified to the
point of rights curtailment. In these circumstances, it is up to the tolerant citizens (which
appears to be a proxy for the “reasonable”) to decide where such abridgments are warranted. In
sum, the first two replies deny that various containment measures are rights abridgments at all,
while this third reply emphasizes the limited scope of rights abridgments to unreasonable
persons that are permissible within containment measures.
These replies successfully demonstrate that containment and unreasonableness should
not be understood as concepts depriving certain citizens or groups of an equal scheme of rights
and liberties, though the bundle of rights and liberties it does supply might not address certain
citizens’ deepest normative commitments. But I take Quong to argue that his coherently
distinguishing between “exclusion from the constituency” and “depriving rights and liberties” is
sufficiently exculpatory for containment that it ought to be considered morally (and
democratically) legitimate. Quong thereby undervalues what, even by political liberalism’s own
standards, are the very most substantial sticks in the citizens’ bundle of rights and liberties:
those involving freedom of conscience, autonomy, and political participation.
Most instantiations of political liberalism purport to refrain from making comprehensive
judgments about, for instance, what forms of privacy are required to accord one another
dignity, or the best means of cultivating friendship among the background’s various
associations. Thus, instead of being a judgment about the truth of the matter (i.e., what sorts of
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privacy are “good” for us), a democratically legitimate regime of privacy protections is one
arrived at through consensus. If a putatively unreasonable religious or cultural group is accorded
the same privacy protections as everyone else, but this regime of privacy protections does not
include a protection that is of vital importance to this community, then the privacy protections
that the group does receive are a very cold comfort to it; in fact, they might receive, as they see
it, no privacy protection at all.
Admittedly the political liberal thinks she has good, democratic reasons for not paying
any heed to what such a group thinks about the proper balance of privacy interests against
other social concerns. But there are many areas in which a group’s exclusion from the
constituency (and hence their authorship in determining their rights) is precisely, in its
members’ views, the same as being deprived of any meaningful rights whatsoever. This
observation alone, I submit, at least blunts the force of Quong’s replies to Friedman. In this
sense, it might be the case that the “plain incorrectness” of Friedman’s reading of political
liberalism is only superficial. The political liberal has not provided sufficiently strong reasons, or
at least reasons that are not sufficiently strong from the political liberal’s own standpoint, for
such a group’s view (of their rights deprivation) not counting at all against its political exclusion
or in its rebutting containment measures that militate against it. Kelly and McPherson are
correct, I will contend, in their supposition that some purportedly unreasonable persons still
might be “due a say.”
C. Containment as One-Dimensionality
This section will return to the intuition that an imposition of values is a basic moral
wrong in a democracy (which is a form of social life that is predicated on shared construction of
shared living space), and illustrate this wrong through an application of containment to two,
hypothetical CIDs. The alien imposition of values that is wrought by the operation of
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unreasonableness and containment is only democratically legitimate, by the political liberal’s
own criteria, if such measures are necessary in the sense that they inhere in the very idea of an
enduring democracy. The difficulty for the political liberal is that there are several values, often
in tension with one another, which inhere in the very idea of democracy. Recall that one of the
bases for containment is that it is necessary to ensure an enduring, wholeheartedly embraced
stability among the citizenry, rather than a grudging modus vivendi that might crumble with any
generation of non-rule-followers. This rationale, with its understanding of stability, creates two
sources of internal tension: one about the other conceptions of enduring stability that might
exist and another with the other values central to a liberal conception of democracy than
stability. By placing such a high value on the sort of stability that justifies containment, betrays
any sincere attempt at valuing diversity or respecting autonomy, principles that at other times
are supposedly of paramount political import. The tension between pluralism and autonomy (or
at least one species of autonomy) on the one hand, and a stability of social cooperation among
equals on the other, is one among several tensions I will explore in this section. It is also one of
several reasons why we are rightly suspicious of any variety of political liberalism that claims, as
Rawls often does, to be a-teleological. A containment measure that privileges the degree of
liberal sameness required for stability over respecting pluralism is, to those contained, an alien
imposition that cannot be justified on neutral grounds. Even assuming that containment
measures give appropriate due to another necessary desideratum of democracy called (to use
Rawls’s phrase) “stability for the right reasons,” numerous choices remain, such as how many
and what sorts of risks to stability are to be tolerated. If the answer were “none,” we would
have a state-sponsored enforcement of perspectival uniformity, which is not what any political
liberal favors. So we find ourselves, even if we assume politically liberal premises, in search of a
risk-toleration threshold that is democratically appropriate.
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Because of the doubt that I have just expressed that containment can count as a
justifiable imposition of alien values that logically necessary, my critique is structurally similar to
a Moorean shift. I have discussed two sets of premises that containment proponents commonly
employ in support of a conclusion about the moral legitimacy and desirability of containment.
Here are, in admittedly simplified and rough form, these two sets of premises:
(a) A just and stable democracy ought to ensure dignity (i.e., equal rights and liberties) for
all citizens.
(b) Unreasonable doctrines, in various ways, endanger such systems of equal rights and
liberties.
or
(i) A just and stable democracy requires mutual assurance from all its constituents that
they will abide by the fair terms of social cooperation (e.g., by not asserting
transcendent values over political ones).
(ii) Unreasonable doctrines, in various ways (especially (1) – (5) in the previous section),
cast suspicion on their willingness to fairly cooperate, thereby eroding mutual
assurance.
My one-dimensionality objection will respond to these containment justifications in two senses.
First, it will essentially deny (b) and (ii) by describing two, hypothetical CIDs that neither
imminently endanger a fair scheme of rights and liberties nor especially threaten stability.
Second, the four points that comprise my argument are predicated on three alternate premises,
which are just as supported by central liberal values as are (a), (b), (i), and (ii):
(c) A just democracy should respect the autonomy of its religiously and morally plural
citizens, reasonable or not.
(d) (From (c)) The state’s intentional imposition of alien values on a citizen or group is prima
facie impermissible, and only permissible where reasonably necessary to ensure
circumstances essential to a stable and just democracy.
(e) Rawlsian containment measures are not reasonably necessary in the sense mentioned
in (d).
I take these premises to establish the conclusion that Rawlsian containment is democratically
illegitimate, and below I will offer four justifications for (e). Because containment is not
ordinarily the same sort of values imposition that forced speech would be, and a Rawlsian might
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wonder just how it constitutes an imposition, I need to first characterize the sort of coercive
force that I take containment to have.
Recall that this essay began with the admission that it is unavoidable that the range of
possibilities for belief, lifeways, and living out one’s conception of the good are limited by one’s
social circumstances. I will interchangeably call this the social atmosphere or social environment
that one inhabits. There might be insufficient space to allow a worldview to persist as a live
option, and this is always and everywhere true of some worldview. This “space” can be
construed literally as living space necessary to the performative requirements of living out a
worldview (such as worshipping on sacred land or accessing an area to conduct a community’s
internal affairs without interference), psychologically by access to an environment nondismissive of or reaffirming one’s lifeway, or legally insofar as the structure of society’s
institutions allow sufficient freedoms or other mechanisms to carry out the central duties of a
lifeway. Where one or some other of these senses of adequate space, a rigorous account of
which I cannot pursue here, is absent, the worldview or lifeway might cease to be a live option
for most citizens, at least not without monumental efforts from those seeking to preserve it as
one. Depending on their often inherited and unchosen circumstances, some worldviews,
communities, or persons are in better positions than others to successfully undertake such
efforts. Some of those who are in poor positions to do so often include the classes of citizens
who worried Sen and Friedman, as explained in the previous section.
Notwithstanding this inevitability, it remains true by definition that a social environment
in which some worldviews cannot survive (and indeed in which many have already all but
vanished), lessens both the degree of pluralism a society contains and the range of options from
which an individual has to choose. Both liberals and their critics have recognized the latter as a
component of autonomy, which Stephen Aron defends in the public education context as
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freedom of “belief formation,” which goes well beyond freedom of belief profession. For specific
freedoms to be meaningful or effective, like those under the heading of freedom of conscience,
the ability to form beliefs beyond the prevailing public philosophy cannot be unduly
constrained. Where the Rawlsian’s advocacy of containment emphasizes some necessary limits
on this component of autonomy, my argument refocuses our attention on what is important
about this component. What makes a difference regarding whether this “inevitability” of social
decline creates a democratic problem is the extent to which the inhospitable social atmosphere
is incidental or necessary to an essential public purpose, on the one hand, or intentional and
overbroad, on the other.
Christopher Eberle captures an example of this phenomenon of a social atmosphere
quite well by having us imagine a society called Christendom, whose citizens are literal believers
in the fundamental tenets of Christianity at all times, and in which Christian buildings adorn the
countryside and proclaim Christianity’s truth, school curricula include the studying of Christian
doctrine, Christian symbols (and no others) are ubiquitous in official state institutions, and so
on. Eberle asks us to imagine the conditions under which an ordinary person of average
cognitive competence and inquisitiveness, Thomas, could come to disbelief in such a setting:
In what way should we expect Thomas’s immersion in a society so saturated with
Christianity to affect his perception of Christianity? We can be reasonably confident that
Thomas can resist deference to Christianity only with difficulty – if Thomas can muster
the strength and independence of thought to reject Christianity, he’ll succeed only with
effort and determination. Most likely, however, the massive social confirmation of
Christian creeds will have its counterpart in Thomas’s subjectivity: Christian tenets will
enjoy the maximum plausibility that naturally attends realities that one is fortunate
enough to be able to take for granted. As a ubiquitous and firmly entrenched feature of
his social environment, Christianity appears to Thomas as a massive reality that imposes
itself on his consciousness as ineluctably as do similarly massive features of his natural
environment. 197
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Eberle then asks us to slowly alter the environment, making it more religiously plural both in
population and in the living space, considering the effect on Thomas’s doxastic possibilities.
They will obviously change as what I have called Thomas’s social morass changes. If we were to
alter Thomas’s environment so fundamentally that either a competing religion or something like
the naturalism of Richard Dawkins (let’s uncreatively call it Dawkinsdom) defined the public
sphere so totally as Christianity had in Christendom, I suspect Eberle would agree that Thomas’s
maintaining Christian beliefs would become the option that would be difficult, and agreement
with Dawkins would come more easily. Charles Taylor’s A Secular Age is a comprehensive,
historical account of the connection between one’s social atmosphere and the possibilities of
belief within it. 198 Theologian and religious philosopher C.S. Lewis has written on the need for
“old books” for this very reason. 199
The phenomenon of our religious and other doxastic possibilities being limited by our
social atmosphere is not, conceptually at least, oppressive. But Rawls and various others
plausibly posit that the operation of free human reason in a free society will eventually produce
a multiplicity of worldviews, given what he calls the burdens of judgment, resulting the “fact of
reasonable pluralism” in all free societies. Conversely, Rawls suggests that any society in which
one comprehensive doctrine is ubiquitous, this is a clear indicator of the “fact of oppression,”
according to which doctrinal uniformity cannot be maintained without deception or political
oppression. This would seem to include Eberle’s hypothetical Christendom or my hypothetical
Dawkinsdom. Whether we agree with the strength of Rawls’s conclusions, I hope it is
uncontroversial to suggest that doctrinal uniformity is often (but not always) accomplished
throughout our post-Enlightenment history by coercive means, and that coercive environments

A Secular Age (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press, 2007).
I am indebted to David Bradshaw for this example. Lewis’s discussion is contained in his introduction to
a translation of St. Athanasius’s On the Incarnation.
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more easily maintain doctrinal uniformity among large swaths of the populace than democratic
ones. This therefore describes a skepticism about the process by which the social atmosphere
can come to be like Christendom or Dawkinsdom. Even Rawls would suggest that Thomas has
been oppressed because of a prior or ongoing political process, and not because a
hypothetically free state has failed to produce a maximum number of alternate worldviews for
Thomas’s cognitive menu.
What is important about Rawls’s own suppositions is essential in my critique of his and
other public reason liberals’ approaches of identifying, transforming and containing
unreasonable doctrines: the evolution of thick, ostensibly insurmountable social atmospheres of
determined possibilities can be oppressive even if they do not resemble paradigmatic, violent
political coercion. In One-Dimensional Man, Marcuse presents a powerful, Marxist account of
how twentieth-century American life had become so saturated with the values of its
technocratic capitalist system, across institutions and even in the academy, that its citizens had
lost the ability to posit genuine desires of their own, or imagine any possibilities of life being
different in any important way from the daily grind. Through a process he called repressive
desublimation, the control of one worldview and set of values was so total in social existence
that it was no longer possible for, say, subversive literature or other forms of social critique to
serve as a check on (or alternative to) existing social forces. Where Marx’s time was one in
which the factory worker’s private self was alienated from his working self, resulting in an
unhappily divided but two-dimensional person, Marcuse’s time was one of a more “progressive
stage of alienation” in which the alienated self had been swallowed by an imposed, alien, public
existence. The self had lost the ability to critique society and experience what was other than
society, and every iteration of the self’s “false [in the sense of being imposed] consciousness”
had become his or her true consciousness. To put it in the terms I have just introduced, Marcuse
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argued that the forms of “space” necessary for authentic and non-imposed living were absent,
making all other forms of life than the mainstream one psychologically dead options.
While Marcuse’s work is rife with proofs and illustrations of this phenomenon, there are
two that are particularly illustrative of my chosen image of our inhabiting a certain social
atmosphere and being limited in our tenable conceptions of the good. First, Marcuse claims that
part of the reason that our needs as consumers are uniform and “false” is because we cannot
feasibly escape public, commercial life: even after we leave the public sphere and enter our
homes, the putative psychological respite for our ownmost, private selves, cleverly and
nefariously designed advertisements work on our conscious and subconscious thoughts in such
a way that the totalizing force of the commercial world stays with us even at home. 200 This was
one tool among many, Marcuse claimed, that ended up encompassing the entirety of one’s daily
physical and mental space:
The means of mass transportation and communication, the commodities of lodging,
food, and clothing, the irresistible output of the entertainment and information industry
carry with them prescribed attitudes and habits, certain intellectual and emotional
reactions which bind the consumer more or less pleasantly to the producers and,
through the latter, to the whole. 201
A detail of central importance to Marcuse’s work is that this was so effective because it was
done, as are the processes described in the previous section, under the auspices of democracy
and with a putatively benign purpose; hence Marcuse’s famously beginning his book with a
description of a “comfortable, smooth, reasonable, democratic unfreedom” 202 prevailing in
advanced industrial civilization.

See, for example, Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man (Boston: Beacon Press, 1991), p. 92. Claims
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Another central part of the Marcusean narrative is the idea that such things as nature
and poetry once served as loci of critique or negation of all that was publicly given, though an
effect of one-dimensional society and thought is to have robbed citizens of even these spaces of
respite. Marcuse provides an evocative image as to how these pre-technological images of the
relation between man and nature have lost their power:
[T]he physical transformation of the world entails the mental transformation of its
symbols, images, and ideas. Obviously, when cities and highways and National Parks
replace the villages, valleys, and forests; when motorboats race over the lakes and
planes cut through the skies—then these areas lose their character as a qualitatively
different reality, as areas of contradiction. 203
Marcuse’s claim here is not simply that the absence of adequate physical or mental space in the
furthest corners of our lived world whittles down some worldviews that are just ill-suited for
social life, but that this is a process whereby our (all of us) very means for forming authentic,
autonomous worldviews is irretrievably whittled down. Such a concern is very much in line with
Lewis’s recommendation of reading old books (i.e., those of another reality) or what would
concern Rawls about Eberle’s hypothetical Christendom or Dawkinsdom. Far short of a
democracy that guarantees a complete menu of worldviews as tenable, which is neither
practical nor desirable in itself, the autonomous formation of worldviews comes with certain
preconditions that can be intentionally, and undemocratically, threatened or removed.
Though they professedly propose containment (or transformative constitutionalism) as
processes that intentionally alter the social atmosphere, Macedo and Quong would surely
object that the one-dimensionality description is apropos even if what Marcuse describes is
autonomy-inhibiting. Those cultures that are contained in political liberalism, in one way or

Id., p. 66. I have argued elsewhere that this is very much French phenomenologist Michel Henry’s
narrative regarding what 21st century scientism has done to art, education, and journalism (see J. Aaron
Simmons & David Scott, “Is There Life After Barbarism? Phenomenological Reflections on Science and the
Future of the University.” PLI: The Warwick Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 28 (2017)).
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another, are said to endanger the just environment that prevents one-dimensionality from
taking place. Containment therefore is not intended to inhibit autonomy, which is what onedimensionality does, even if it is said to prevent or make difficult certain choices or lifestyles.
More work needs to be done to show that, in response to the political liberal, the onedimensionality attribution is apt, as removing choices, or failing to maximize the range of
choices, from the cognitive menu does not one-dimensionality make.
To begin my defense of this one-dimensionality charge against containment, I introduce
two hypothetical cultures for whom the social atmosphere intended by the processes of
identification, containment, and transformation is inhibiting, and in such a way that the
democratic theorist has cause for concern insofar as these cultures are what I have called CIDs.
These hypothetical cultures are non-violent, and generally accept (1) and (3), but perhaps
interpret (3) differently than the Rawlsian, or else reject (2), (4), (5), or (6). 204 Each of the
following examples, in which I intend to include many of the putatively unreasonable doctrines
identified in the previous section, are either composites or near-copies of cultures involved in
legal disputes of great constitutional significance:
(A) Wolf’s Tower is a butte in the Great Bear Mountains that is both a popular destination
for climbing enthusiasts and a sacred site for the Tunuk tribe. The rituals the Tunuk
perform on Wolf’s Tower require quiet, non-disturbance and solitude for
efficaciousness, all of which is inconsistent with the climbers’ nearly constant presence.
It also happens that the climbers’ activities and the paths that are cleared to ease their
access to Wolf’s Tower have been destructive to the nearby forest and vegetative life
around the butte that the Tunuk hold sacred. Thus, the Tunuk have requested a
temporary or seasonal climbing ban during their rituals, to which various climbing
groups have objected, and a cessation of certain path-clearing activity; the Tunuk have
negotiated and agreed to a land management plan, in cooperation with the National
Park Service and some of the climbers, that would apportion time to both the climbers
and the tribe members for their respective land uses. 205 The Tunuk insist that their ritual
performance is sufficiently important to guard against natural disasters and to their
See supra, pp. 85-87.
This thought experiment is an amalgam of Bear Lodge Multiple Use Assn. v. Babbitt, 173 F.3d 814 (10th
Cir. 1999), Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association, 485 U.S. 439 (1988), and Navajo
Nation, 535 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2009)
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culture’s survival that it is worth restricting land access to others. They also insist that
the government cease any land-clearing activities nearby that disturb or destroy the
spirits that inhabit the surrounding land, thereby rendering the rituals ineffective. A
federal court has recently found that the land management plan violates the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, and has denied the tribe’s request to
preserve the surrounding vegetation, since the Free Exercise Clause does not permit a
religious believer to complain about the government’s use of its own land or foreclose
private activity on government land by others, especially others who have an equal
claim to such land.
(B) The Piedmont Amish (or simply the “Piedmont”) believe in and practice a strict division
of labor and social opportunity along gendered lines. While the roles assumed by each
gender are regarded with equal respect in the community and both genders have equal
votes in communal decisions, central to the community’s religion is a moral obligation to
respect gendered divisions of labor as instantiations of God’s will in creating men and
women with different properties and strengths. None of the ills that afflict some insular
religious communities of gendered divisions, such as physical or sexual abuse or
conversational norms that silence women, are present among the Piedmont.
Nonetheless, some examples of gendered divisions do reserve roles of political leader,
builder, and protector for men, and numerous other communal roles are open only to
women. While violations of these rules result in internal, nonviolent community
sanctions, and count as a sin against God in their eyes, members are also not restrained
from leaving the community. Beyond their gendered practices, essential to the
Piedmont is a belief that mainstream society is a source of moral and spiritual
corruption, particularly public schools. The Piedmont only send their children to public
school for as long as the state requires them, which is currently through the eighth
grade. While the children are in middle school, they are taught the theory of evolution
in biology and world religions in history, to which the Piedmont object and demand that
their children be withheld during the teaching of such subjects. Their epistemology
denies that the free exercise of human reason will lead anywhere other than God, and
that teachings such as evolution are nefarious tricks of the Devil that operate on the
consciousness more as a drug or other agent of deception than as a hypothesis to be
evaluated by the free exercise of human reason. Those in civil society (and their children
if they are left in school) who come around to such teachings are regarded not as
reasonable but mistaken, but as under some sort of cognitive spell, as intellectually or
spiritually corrupted, or otherwise benighted. The Piedmont nonetheless regard physical
coercion of those who are benighted in this manner as morally improper and contrary to
what is supposed to be a freely-chosen, voluntary relationship with God. 206
The Piedmont and Tunuk are both almost always pacifists, though they do regard their own
spiritual claims as having special priority and unique, privileged access to the truth or the good
life. Each culture participates somewhat minimally in political life, but does tend to vote on
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candidates for political office and on referenda or ballot initiatives. While they believe others
ought to recognize their moral and spiritual conclusions, they are loath to impose their wills by
physical force, and are in all relevant senses cooperative with laws, governmental authorities,
and their neighboring communities, where the need arises (though peaceful civil disobedience is
not out of the question for either community). They might nonetheless be said, at least in the
Piedmont’s case, to risk the sort of social dissension that the court in Mozert v. Hawkins found
sufficiently worrisome to refuse to allow parents to exclude their children from certain
segments of the curriculum.
What I will demonstrate is that the exclusion from the political constituency of
communities like the Tunuk and Piedmont, and even more so, their containment, is an alien
imposition of values that is similar to Marcuse’s illustrations of one-dimensionality society. The
political liberal thinks she has good grounds for such impositions, namely that they are only
impositions insofar as they prevent greater impositions of others by the Tunuk or Piedmont. But
the one-dimensionality charge sticks. While one-dimensionality describes a social situation, I will
speak of containment measures as one-dimensional in the sense that they instantiate a
condition of one-dimensionality. I will take any political measure to be one-dimensional where it
is intended to (a) make the social climate more difficult for a non-mainstream culture to persist,
by (b) imposing a mainstream conception of the true or the good on that non-mainstream
culture, except where (c) doing so is necessary to keep a democracy’s citizens free from
impositions by others. The sort of imposition that is a containment measure is broader and
more extensive than that which is necessary to prevent imminent harm to others or towards
democracy. I will provide four senses in which the political liberal, through unreasonableness
and containment, attempts (perhaps innocently) to fashion cultures in accordance with one
image among many of a well-ordered liberal society, thereby undermining autonomy and
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pluralism. Taken together, these four species of imposition suggest that containment aims at a
social circumstance much like Marcusean one-dimensionality.
First, suppose that containment measures, whether in the form of judicial rulings,
legislation, or other political acts, have been directed at both practices revolving around the
Piedmont’s gendered division of labor and its parents’ practices regarding their children in
public school. Recall that, regarding those political liberals who support compulsory public
education as a containment measure, there are two commonly provided justifications: ensuring
that children could function in civil society should they wish to leave their communities and
inculcating political virtues, such as tolerance, to ensure that they will be future, cooperative
citizens. Containment measures here are not instances of one-dimensionality, according to the
containment proponent, because they seek to dissipate social atmospheres that are inimical to
personal choice, not create them. If the child is unequipped to function outside of his or her
community, then the child lacks a meaningful right to leave the community, and somewhere like
a Piedmont community would consequently be one-dimensional. Moreover, if the child does
not learn political virtues, like developing tolerant attitudes towards others, then it is
foreseeable that they will be inclined to impose their views on or devalue others. Hence, so this
reply might go, all that containment removes from the cognitive menu for those like the
Piedmont is an opportunity to remove choices for the other person (whether that is another
within or outside one’s community).
While the case for containment’s heart is in the right place, in being worried about civil
rights within faith communities and the eventual evolution of an oppressive majoritarianism, it
presumes what it sets out to prove: that exposure to mainstream society is autonomy and civic
virtue-augmenting, at least relative to communal life among the Piedmont. The first reason why
the aforementioned reply fails to deflect a one-dimensionality charge is that containment
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proponents often treat the community to be contained and the mainstream public culture doing
the containment asymmetrically. A community like the Piedmont, the one to be contained, is
taken as it actually is, with its civic vices and virtues, or even with a focus on its vices. The public
institutions and mainstream culture, on the other hand, are construed at a high level of
idealization, as though they are primarily purveyors of widely shared democratic virtues, rather
than institutions that also contain destructive social or psychological effects of their own. 207 If
there are psychologically harmful or coercive elements in public culture as it is in lived reality, a
culture which is pervasive for American citizens, then the worry about lacking a “meaningful
right of exit” seems to apply just as much to those routinely affected by public institutions. Aside
from the relative value of these influences, it is also far from clear that exposure to the public
sphere, even if it involves encountering a diversity of influences, is the neutral ground for social
living in direct contrast to the Piedmont community’s paradigmatically parochial one.
Were we to actually compare like-with-like, i.e., actual public culture with actual
communal culture, the one-dimensionality picture is much different. In the passage above about
the distorting (and value-laden) psychological effect of advertising, including its tendency to
invasively follow us home, I take Marcuse to depict public culture in just this manner. SpinnerHalev similarly recognizes this non-neutral character of mainstream society and defends a
religious community like the Piedmont against the containment proponent, in two passages that
I believe worth quoting at length:
The main flaw in this argument is that it fails to recognize that in the consumer,
materialist societies of the West, the lure of exit [from insular religious communities] is
always present. It is partly because our societies are so materialist, including our public
schools in many ways, that some people retreat to religion. Some people complain
about the hold that certain groups have over their children, but the hold that popular
culture has over many people is not exactly uplifting…In the USA today public schools
For a similar argument, see Jeff Spinner-Halev, “Autonomy, Association, and Pluralism,” in Minorities
within Minorities, eds. Avigail Eisenberg & Jeff Spinner-Halev (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press,
2005): 157-71.
207

121

routinely make marketing deals with Pepsi or Coca Cola; where other private companies
are allowed to buy advertising within the schools; where private television networks are
shown for free in schools in return for the ability to show advertising to children; where
peer pressure is often intense and sometimes harmful. Are these the sorts of schools
that produce autonomous adults? Then, of course, there are the private media that
children in mainstream culture often find themselves immersed in...[S]uffice to say that
autonomy is not what much of popular culture is after. As William Galston remarks,
‘Children immersed in a culture defined by advertising, entertainment media, and peer
pressure are often dominated by influences they neither understand nor resist.’
While some object that religious groups may make exit difficult by sheltering their
children, this is hard to do in our society. Some religious groups do keep a tight grip on
their children, but the range of popular culture is farreaching, and extends to almost all
groups in our society. It is hard for traditional religious children not to see that other
kinds of life exist in our society. The streets are full of different kinds of people;
advertising is ubiquitous; computers allow people to virtually travel around the globe. 208
The sort of unchosen, autonomy-inhibiting psychological influence that a containment
proponent would claim is prevalent among the Piedmont is also prevalent in actual, non-ideal
public life; in either case, if Spinner-Halev and Marcuse are fair in characterizing the pervasive
influence of the public sphere, the child’s thought formation is shaped in some direction.
Observing the psychological pull or thought influence of one’s religious community, on its own,
does not provide the containment proponent with a sufficient rebuttal to my onedimensionality charge (i.e., that compulsory education of the Piedmont would be an imposition
of alien values on parents and children). The burden is on the containment proponent to
demonstrate that there is a sufficient degree of autonomy inhibition that is present in living
among the Piedmont, and absent in actual public life, that a public policy measure making the
social atmosphere more difficult or less hospitable to the Piedmont is something other than an
imposition of alien values on them. Moreover, the containment proponent must do so without
appealing to a controversial conception of autonomy about which those who can live peaceably
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in a democracy can disagree. What I hope I have initially demonstrated is that discharging this
burden requires comparing the Piedmont as they are with public life as it is.
While this point is less applicable to the Tunuk’s case, a similar observation can be made
regarding this asymmetry in non-ideal/ideal treatment of parochial and public communities. It
might be said that a law allowing the Tunuk to make special claims to areas of public land is
unreasonable because it is to insist on the special value of its truth claims and to require others
to forbear their desired land uses on grounds that only the Tunuk recognize as true or good. As
things stand, the Tunuk must deal with persons being on sacred land or sometimes being
permitted to engage in land uses the Tunuk find blasphemous or downright dangerous, such as
land uses that are disruptive and that make guaranteed solitude impossible. This is admittedly
somewhat disanalogous to the Piedmont, in that a law refusing special protection for the Tunuk
is not, under Quong’s definition, a containment measure (it is just the normal operation of law).
Nonetheless, it remains true that the disfigurement or transformation of natural features for
commercial and recreational purposes, the steady stream of visitors who might disturb the
rituals and disrupt the harmony of the area, and the potential desanctification of the site, all
make maintaining cultural cohesion and religious observance difficult for the Tunuk.
The assumption one might make here, analogous to the assumption a containment
proponent makes about public schools being an autonomy-maximizing location, is that the
Tunuk seek to abridge freedom of movement and government disposition with its own land as it
pleases, whereas others (the government and recreational visitors) wish to institute an ethos of
land use that is public and shareable. The non-ideal construction of the land ethos that the
government and recreational climbers (or other recreational visitors) likely includes a greater
likelihood of at least one of the following: a tendency to view the natural world as including
objects of appropriation, mastery, or transformation for suitability for convenience or
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accessibility; even with preservationist attitudes, a decreased emphasis on the interests of
future generations in preserved land, or on the present aesthetic value of undisrupted natural
spaces; and a conception of landowner sovereignty that permits a wide range of uses and bases
for exclusion of others, rather than a timeshare view. While the democratic value of each of
those elements of the government’s land ethos is debatable, so are the Tunuk’s (as I will further
explain regarding another axis of one-dimensionality). Another feature of the governmental land
ethos is its origin. The only reason that the Tunuk are in a position of making arguably
unreasonable requests (special access, temporary exclusion of others, creating a potential
Establishment Clause issue, and interfering in internal governmental affairs) is because
American Indian tribes, as is well known, were forcibly removed from or divested of many of
their claims to large stretches of land across the United States. The reasonableness of the
Tunuk’s and similarly situated communities’ land insistences could therefore turn on a historical
contingency, such as whether the lands in question are located on areas granted tribal
sovereignty or not. The relative democratic value of the government’s and the tribes’ land
claims must be judged according to the actual persons making both. Since containment appears
to reason with an ideal/non-ideal asymmetry, however, the criteria by which containment is
judged appropriate is already tilted against CIDs like the Piedmont and Tunuk.
A second, related respect in which containment measures institute one-dimensionality
is that containment measures are frequently directed at a whole community or, even if they are
narrowly tailored to a specific communal practice, at a practice integral to that community. This
is problematic because a doctrine and its community of adherents, even if it does contain some
antidemocratic or illiberal elements, also includes some democratically virtuous or
democratically friendly elements as well; the latter elements ought to cut against any case for
containment or the non-engagement approach that often comes with it. Beyond the asymmetry
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charge, which complains that only the side to be contained is treated in its actuality, it might be
the case that containment effectively reduces the contained doctrine to its illiberal elements.
But the Tunuk and Piedmont, as well as other hypothetical CIDs we could instead discuss here,
contain multitudes. I therefore call this the reduction problem with containment. While
Friedman’s and Sen’s concerns relate to each of these axes of one-dimensionality, I believe they
relate most closely to this problem, as the poor or disadvantaged are likely to be reduced in this
way based on their political behaviors.
Suppose we concede to the Rawlsian that certain of the Tunuk’s land claims in
themselves violate the duty of public reason, and evidence a preference for the transcendental
over the political, each of which arguably cause social strife and evidence some desire for
unequal treatment. These land claims and their underlying land uses, for many real-world
indigenous groups like the hypothetical Tunuk, are quite often of central (even life-or-death)
religious significance and are at the center of cultural cohesion, and hence, cultural survival.
Even if we were to concede, then, that such claims detract from certain political desiderata, we
ought to be mindful of the senses in which the same culture (like the Tunuk) might in other
senses further important political desiderata. Contrary to the possibly undesirable elements of
the public, political culture’s land ethos, what might be contained in the Tunuk’s land claims is a
kind of reverence for the natural world that is lacking among many of us, and a concern for
future generations’ use of land that is itself a concern of the original position. 209 Even for those
who do not share their beliefs, the Tunuk might provide moral motivation for what has proven
to be a market externality (pollution and related environmental issues) that mainstream society
struggles to appropriately manage. Finally, though surely some American Indian land use claims
have arguably been excessive or incredibly intolerant of others’ interests, several sacred land
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cases have included tribes who might ask a lot with a willingness to give a lot in return, or who
are at least eager to negotiate with other interested parties in the land at issue. Certain of these
negotiations have required the interested parties to gain a deeper understanding of the
transcendent basis for the other’s land claims and expanded the possibilities of peaceable,
tolerant bargaining between peoples. By admitting such arguments in public discourse, we
might develop better precedent (in court and elsewhere) for ameliorating conflicts between
mainstream society and minority religions whose beliefs are predominantly non-doxastic. While
such negotiations might deviate in some ways from the Rawlsian ideal of public reason, which is
the language that reasonable persons are willing to speak, they need not thereby be detrimental
to either respect of one’s fellow citizens or social stability.
The purportedly illiberal elements among the Piedmont, at least those likely to be
targets for containment measures, might similarly be bound up with a community that contains
other morally neutral or virtuous practices. I submit that this fact ought to require any
permissible political practice like containment to proceed much more cautiously than along the
lines that the Rawlsian has drawn them. The Piedmont, insofar as they interact with mainstream
culture, exemplify unique forms of social cooperation that might add to civic benevolence,
respectful treatment among citizens, or otherwise serve as a positive influence or source of
constructive insights for industry or family life. Amish communities, for example, manage little
social discord amongst themselves in our age of discord’s rampancy and are uncommonly
industrious, self-sustaining, and extraordinarily supportive of their community members.
Spinner-Halev makes a similar observation about groups that have an illiberal element of a
gendered division of labor:
The idea behind tax-exempt status for non-profit groups is to encourage the existence
of a vibrant civil society…It will surely be the case that liberals will not agree with the
goals or the institutional structure of someone of these non-profit groups. Yet many of
these non-profit organizations can still contribute to civil society: they can encourage
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people to interact, offer people a sense of community, and offer them opportunities to
engage in social and political activities. These are all important functions and they are
helped by many non-profit groups, even many of those that do not have a liberal
agenda or structure. It is probably the case that many non-profit organizations have a
mixed record from a liberal point of view. Many Baptist churches, for example, are
patriarchal, yet they give many women important opportunities to learn a variety of
skills, since women participate in church activities in larger numbers than men. If we
only look at their institutional structure[,] we may miss the liberal and democratic
opportunities that many non-profit groups offer their members. 210
Moreover, even if the Piedmont are not supportive of social unity or stability in a participatory
sense – recall that for Macedo and Gutmann especially this is crucial for a political system’s
health and survival – their spiritually-motivated pacifism results in their being far less likely to
have a hand in various other species of social discord, particularly those involving the vitriol or
potential for violence that are, in fact, unfortunately common among more mainstream political
participants.
Speaking more generally, CIDs might well contain inextricably intertwined, in Marcusean
parlance, disorderly and harmonious elements, just as do doctrines within mainstream society
that are not judged unreasonable by Rawlsian criteria. It seems that there are more paths than
those that containment and unreasonableness favor that are open to good citizenship, as there
is a wider array of vices and virtues that lead to non-coercion and stability in public, political life
than these concepts care to admit. Regarding the liberal virtue of tolerance, Kevin Vallier notes
that even Macedo admits both that the effectiveness of public schools in inculcating tolerant
attitudes in students is unclear and cites a study that purports to demonstrate that Catholic
schools are more effective in producing tolerant students who believe strongly in civil rights. 211
Admittedly, Catholic schools are not the first sort that come to mind in speaking of CIDs or nonmainstream doctrines; indeed, Catholicism is the very denomination that Macedo suggests was
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successfully transformed in favor of public, liberal politics. But this example both casts doubt on
the claim that public, non-parochial reasons are most effective at inculcating “ways of thought
and feeling” conducive to liberal democracy, and suggests that there might be varied and
parochial paths towards tolerance, respect, and so on. This can even be the case where, as it is
in the way I have described the Piedmont, the child’s home community views those in
mainstream society as benighted, depraved, etc., thus rejecting the burdens of judgment and
the fact of reasonable pluralism (recall that such attitudes are indicative of unreasonableness).
Certain senses of cooperation, tolerance, or respect might coexist with the latter sort of
attitudes where, for instance, that community practices pacifism, perhaps on spiritual grounds,
or aims to participate in public life only minimally.
The third respect in which containment measures represent an unjustifiable value
imposition, which I have mentioned in passing already, is that it presumes a conception of social
stability, and a specific, non-zero degree (and quality, in the sense of kinds of threats) of risk
tolerance to that stability. The following are examples of demands that are sufficiently socially
divisive that the Rawlsian commonly finds they should not be engaged in public, political life: a
demand for state support or access to a religious pilgrimage, an insistence on a greater share of
a primary good, and that getting our transcendent values right as a public body is worth some
civil strife. 212 Once again, the worry underlying this conception of stability is that assertions of
transcendent values of these and other varieties will result in defection from the social contract,
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would do away with our hope of uncovering a stable, overlapping consensus among various doctrines:
“This will happen whenever someone insists, for example, that certain questions are so fundamental that
to insure their being rightly settled justifies civil strife. The religious salvation of those holding a particular
religion, or indeed the salvation of a whole people, may be said to depend on it. At this point we may
have no alternative but to deny this, or to imply its denial and hence to maintain the kind of thing we had
hoped to avoid….imagine rationalist believers who contend that these beliefs are open to and can be fully
established by reason…we say of the rationalist believers that they are mistaken in denying [the fact of
reasonable pluralism].” (Political Liberalism 152-3)
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making it tantamount to a modus vivendi. This is a conception of stability, however, that anyone
who takes transcendent values to heart will have reason to reject. Therefore, if the Rawlsian
wishes to stick to the claim that this sense of stability is the only proper concern of political
theory (and hold that the decision to opt for transcendent values is simply not something
political theory addresses), and thereby justify non-engagement, this would so heavily
circumscribe the constituency in advance that we might rightly wonder what good such
conception is for our actual population of citizens.
I think it is not only clear that CIDs would operate under a substantially different notion
of stability, but that numerous stripes of comprehensive liberals would as well. This degree of
resistance to these kinds of risks of social strife evidence a rather weak faith in the liberal
project’s potential for winning hearts and minds; a more Millian liberalism, for instance, would
seem to think that it could bear the risk of dissension. Daniel Weinstock has argued that the
modus vivendi concern is now overblown in the United States, given our level of social and
institutional stability, as most citizens have sufficient reason to (eventually) come to a
compromise. Both Rawls and Quong, for instance, seem to believe that the only reliable
motivation people might have (absent political liberalism) for not imposing their view on others
is that they do not have sufficient political currency for doing so. As Weinstock puts the matter, I
think correctly, the view of human nature and social stability that is operative here is that
citizens in a liberal democracy will either achieve thin social consensus or completely devolve
into power politics, and that it is the liberal’s task to safeguard against the latter. 213 The Tunuk
would surely reject as overbroad the claim that a request for special provisions of access to
public land and requesting a partial veto power over uses of that land constitutes an
impermissible risk of civil strife; the strife at issue is well-controlled and the countervailing
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interest of theirs could not be of deeper normative significance to them. Likewise, the Piedmont
Amish (just like actual orders of Amish) would reject claims that their desire to avoid public
education presents a sufficiently high risk of mass defection from the democratic project that it
warrants “containment” measures like making at least public primary or secondary education
required for their children. They might well view school choice as a conflict between the law and
their children’s salvation, with the latter being an obvious choice for such convicted parents.
There are various threats to stability: actual and imminent threats, reasonably foreseeable ones,
and those that are to varying degrees further off into the future or only become threats where
myriad others mimicking the purportedly threatening behavior. CIDs like those I have picked out
certainly do not belong in the first of these categories. Moreover, the Tunuk and Piedmont, even
if they hold to beliefs or practices that make matters of political accommodation more difficult
than without their views, or even views that would become unwieldy to the state if
universalized, they are nonetheless socially cooperative, non-aggressive, and are presumably
willing to reciprocate accommodations granted them by honoring the parallel religious or moral
claims of others.
What further compounds this stability problem with containment is that it is not clear
that it best serves the political liberal’s goal of achieving a form of stability that can be
wholeheartedly embraced. Numerous critics have argued that we have every reason to believe
that drawing the political constituency narrowly, or at least construing the norms of public
dialogue narrowly, will motivate a retreat from or a mistrust of the public sphere. 214 Here, in
brief, is Robert Talisse’s statement of this problem with respect to the requirement of public
reason: “Consider now the predicament of those persons that the politics of omission
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epistemically excludes: believing, correctly, that there is no point in raising their arguments in
public, they will likely form small groups devoted to the advancement of their position; these
groups will meet regularly to discuss the group’s views and devise strategies for disseminating
their message. Conditions will be ripe for polarization.” 215 This would obviously occasion a
different sort of social strife than the one with which the containment proponent is principally
concerned, but it is an outcome that would be awfully threatening to stability nonetheless. An
alternate conception of stability therefore claims that moderate civil strife is necessary for
longer-term stability with a broader political constituency, which seems to be a proper end of a
democratic conception of justice. If citizens are differently motivated, we might instead propose
that civil strife over transcendent values is permissible so long as the combatants are, as
Weinstock puts it, stably disposed to compromise rather than engage in perpetual normative
warfare. 216 In any event, since certain of the containment measures and certain of the indicia of
unreasonableness are about a certain conception of democratic stability rather than democratic
stability per se, imposing this conception on others without justification is another indicator of
one-dimensionality.
Finally, even if containment were predicated on an agreeable conception of stability or
respect (of one’s fellow citizens), there remains a balance of political values problem. Where
compulsory education, claims about subsidized sacred land access, or an insistence on the right
to cultural survival are denied based on social stability, this justifiable only by favoring social
stability over a certain conception of individual or group autonomy. Spinner-Halev argues, in
discussing the aforementioned example about Baptist churches with “mixed records” in a liberal
sense, that we should not deny tax-exempt statuses to those religious groups that practice
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gender discrimination. Even if we find such practices morally repugnant, he claims, the need to
protect toleration and diversity is also of paramount democratic import:
If all groups adhere to robust liberal standards on individuality, equality and
discrimination, the pluralism within the liberal state would be reduced. This would
diminish the choices that people can exercise, undermining their autonomy. Pluralism
and autonomy are not very meaningful if the only pluralism that is available is
completely compatible with the ruling public philosophy. Meaningful choices means
having to choice to belong to a hierarchical religion. If all private groups are remade in
the image of the liberal state, then everyone’s choices are reduced. 217
Put otherwise, conditioning of tax-exempt status on acceptance of various liberal values
(especially those contained in reasonableness) is a containment measure that Spinner-Halev
finds unjustifiable given other commitments, and one that he finds to be awfully dangerous
territory. It might also be the case that a woman belonging to a hierarchical religion, like
Catholicism or the Piedmont community, can choose her faith community despite her misgivings
about its patriarchal structure, attempt to influence her community from within in a more
liberal direction, or might not feel demeaned by taking what she regards as a meaningful role.
Similarly, the Tunuk would likely claims that honoring the deepest normative commitments that
they hold, sustaining their culture, or (in their view) keeping the world safe, are political virtues
that are of greater import than minimally abridging recreational climbers’ equal access to public
land or causing social dissension. This would be to elevate something like cultural autonomy or
self-determination over other democratic values. The political liberal must be able to articulate
a publicly communicable balance of safeguarding stability, respect for autonomy, and sincerely
protecting pluralism in order to avoid the one-dimensionality charge regarding containment
measures.
To summarize, I began with the claim that the intentional creation of an inhospitable
social atmosphere, or a one-dimensional one, is a basic moral wrong in a democracy, or rather, it
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is an undemocratic imposition of alien values on others by the public, political mainstream. This
is distinct from guaranteeing minority cultures equality of outcome, since containment
measures (as I have construed them and Rawlsians describe them) are intentional rather than
what Rawls rightly said is an “inevitable fact of political sociology.” This presumption is
defeasible, however, if the impositions at issue are necessary to the idea of a democracy of free
and equal persons, such as a culture that is abusive of women or minorities, one that wishes to
impose a religious social hierarchy, and so on. A state ought not leave its citizens unprotected
against the force or threats of others, nor need it tolerate imminent threats to its being. But the
containment measures and the scope of unreasonableness that Rawlsian containment
advocates propose are much broader in application than that. If CIDs like the Piedmont and
Tunuk are non-hostile and capable of living cooperatively and peaceably, then some justification
is owed to them, per the Rawlsian’s notion of autonomy, regarding any measures that attempt
to crowd out or discourage their ways of life. There are at least four respects in which
containment and the concept of unreasonableness are guilty of attempting to fashion all
doctrines or communities in Rawlsian liberalism’s image – the asymmetry, reductive, stability,
and balance of political values problems – rather than merely taking the necessary steps to keep
its citizens secure and accord them equal rights. This problem is most acute for non-mainstream
minority and other disadvantaged groups, as they are more easily stereotyped and excluded in
the name of political values.
The mistake underlying each of these four instances of one-dimensionality inherent in
containment is the assumption of many political liberals that there is only one reliable source of
moral motivation to be perpetually peaceable and cooperative (and thus worthy of political
justification and inclusion), which justifies the creation of an inhospitable social atmosphere
against persons who do not hold that sort of motivation. Quong indicates as much in considering
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and rejecting Kelly and McPherson’s proposal to redraw the lines of unreasonableness,
distinguishing between philosophical reasonableness, which describes the metaphysical and
normative beliefs a citizen or doctrine holds, and political reasonableness, which relates to the
doctrine’s public, political behavior in light of its beliefs. A doctrine that is philosophically
unreasonable might reject the burdens of judgment, and hold (as I have said the Piedmont do),
that all who disagree with them are benighted, corrupted, etc. Kelly and McPherson suggest
that it is possible that there might be those who are philosophically unreasonable, yet politically
value toleration and equal citizenship (and therefore are politically reasonable), and that
justification of political measures is still due to such persons. 218 While Kelly and McPherson do
not substantially discuss containment, their position presumably also means that philosophically
unreasonable yet politically reasonable persons should not be subject to containment.
Quong wonders, in response to Kelly and McPherson, how there could be such people
or doctrines; regarding the requirement of public justification, Quong wonders what moral
motivation someone could have to accept it if they reject the burdens of judgment or the fact of
reasonable pluralism. 219 Such persons, and here Kelly and McPherson actually agree with Quong
to an extent, are far more likely to simply bide their time until political power shifts in their favor
(i.e., produce a modus vivendi). But I believe I have offered examples of precisely such persons
who cut against that assumption: the Tunuk and Piedmont might be illiberal in some Rawlsian
senses (wherever they value the transcendent over the political), but they are pacifists who are
both minimal participants in public life and as loathe as any doctrines to engage in hostile
takeovers. I believe the Rawlsian would reply that, even if it so happens that there are
motivations like spiritually-derived pacifism or some other motivator of non-coercion, we are
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after a reliable, enduring, and public motivator to ensure that stability is a lasting one. But this is
just what I have said is one conception of the path to social stability among others: it might be
that risking strife or allowing certain senses of illiberal tension with public life produce a
different sort of stability, or else doing so appropriately gives more weight to autonomy and
pluralism, on the one hand, and less to persistent stability, on the other. To ground the
containment of those who reject a certain conception of social stability or respect of others on
the ground that a certain conception of stability or respect is democratically essential is to beg
the question.
A worry that I share with containment proponents is the prospect of oppressive regimes
becoming prominent or, even more so, the prospect of leaving certain persons vulnerable to
abuse or without equal rights when they are born into a certain religious community. Put
otherwise, one might worry that criticizing unreasonableness and containment is to
countenance communities that are oppressive to some of their members. This has been called
the problem of “internal minorities” or “minorities within minorities.” This is not my position at
all. It is not as though a community can “make up” for its oppressive practices by being virtuous
elsewhere, though it might contain lesser severe illiberal elements and still count as a collection
of good citizens. Punishing communities that are abusive to women or children is not an
instance of containment, as Quong correctly observes, and democracies are right to disregard
various hostile communities’ inputs. A meaningful contrast can be drawn between a society like
the Piedmont, where there is a gendered division of labor, and, for instance, the numerous
polygamist Mormon sects that remain who practice polygamy. The important difference
between the two is that in the former, at least as I have depicted the Piedmont, there is a
provision of basic human rights and what is often called a meaningful “right to exit” the
community (should they disagree with its patriarchal practices) for women and older children,
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whereas in the latter denials of basic human rights are often coupled with physical intimidation
and physical and sexual abuse. I have suggested that the concepts of “unreasonableness” and
“containment” are overbroad by the political liberal’s own criteria, not that it is improper to
exclude anyone or make it more difficult for any doctrine to survive. Those that are committed
to violent aggression, for instance, are rightful targets of such processes. As mentioned
above, 220 criteria (1) and (3) of Rawlsian unreasonableness, or what Kelly and McPherson call
political unreasonableness, remain necessarily excludable in any democracy.
Because of the internal value conflicts in containment that I have identified through my
one-dimensionality charge, it seems that the political liberal has two choices regarding
containment: broaden the political constituency by significantly narrowing the label
“unreasonable” or double down and defend containment on comprehensively (i.e., non-political)
liberal grounds. The latter option might involve a claim that Rawls’s conception of social stability
is a more important moral end than for religious communities to have the autonomy to behave
somewhat illiberally, or some other such judgment about ultimate truth that the political liberal
purports to avoid on state neutrality grounds. Since the latter option is well outside the scope
of this essay, I will briefly discuss the former option, which is the one that I favor. What makes
the Piedmont a CID is that there is a meaningful right to exit their community, as well as a
conception of other citizens as benighted or corrupted yet worthy of non-coercion. What makes
the Tunuk a CID is that they insist on others’ forbearance from action for religious reasons only
the Tunuk recognize, and demand more than their share of a public good, but are peaceable and
willing to recognize the deep normative commitments of others in so insisting. Rawls laudably
recognized the need to account for such cultures, mentioning that his conception of justice
seeks to go as far as it can to consider the “claims of those who wish to withdraw from the
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modern world in accordance with the injunctions of their religion, provided only that they
acknowledge the principles of the political conception of justice[.]” 221 My suggestion has been
that it can, and must, bear going somewhat further.
The concept of a CID closely resembles Weinstock’s alternate proposal, according to
which someone is reasonable “if she is stably disposed to prefer compromise over conflict in
those situations in which she has to share social space with people whose views are quite
different from hers,” 222 to which I would only add a guarantee of basic human rights to the
minorities internal to a doctrine’s adherents. My criticism seeks (with Ryan Muldoon and Iris
Marion Young) to preserve the opportunity for genuine perspectival diversity against a Rawlsian
assumption of relative sameness. If we are to take the fact of reasonable pluralism seriously,
then the application of something like the categorical imperative to derive “reasonableness” is
inappropriate. Some doctrines demand more tribal sovereignty or religious exemptions in
certain areas than it would be practical to universalize, but less in others. The Tunuk might want
privileged public land access to perform its rituals, but not care much about tax exemptions, and
be willing to temporarily suspend one of its activities due to some other religious community’s
normative commitments. The reason some might appear “unreasonable” is that historical
injustices have rendered their lifeways unusual in the modern world. Even if it would not be
practical to honor all non-mainstream cultures’ claims, valuing all persons’ autonomy requires
that we construe any disqualifications from the political constituency awfully narrowly, and
construe still more narrowly any state-supported attempts to transform or extinguish an
existing way of life. This is not only for the sake of those being contained, but often for our own
sakes as well. What I will briefly argue in closing is the closely related point that these same
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processes that seek to disfavor CIDs also leave far less room for novel reasons or lifeways from
certain public environments, to the detriment of both CIDs and public discourse.
D. Containment as a Closing of the Dialogical Universe
I have argued that the processes associated with containment can be distinguished from
those features of a political environment that affect certain comprehensive doctrines’ vitality
and flourishing by happenstance or by simple operation of democratic processes. What I will
argue in closing is that this risk of overbroadly “containing” CIDs in certain settings is to the
detriment of discourse generally, just as one-dimensionality is to one-dimensional society.
Another way of understanding this charge involves a recasting of what Lawrence Solum calls
Jeremy Waldron’s “novelty objection,” which is well summarized in the following passage:
John Rawls offers what, in my opinion, is an overly narrow conception of the matrix of
public reason, suggesting that it must always proceed from some consensus-"from
premises that we and others recognize as true, or as reasonable for the purpose of
reaching a working agreement." He suggests that public deliberation be limited to "the
shared methods of, and the public knowledge available to, common sense, and the
procedures and conclusions of science when these are not controversial." What this
conception seems to rule out is the novel or disconcerting move in political
argumentation: the premise that no one has ever thought of before, but which, once
stated, sounds plausible or interesting. Rawls' conception seems to assume an inherent
limit in the human capacity for imagination and creativity in politics, implying as it does
that something counts as a legitimate move in public reasoning only to the extent that it
latches onto existing premises that everybody already shares. 223
The result of Rawls endorsing a public reason requirement for political participation (though I
must agree with Solum that Waldron’s exegesis here is questionable) and excluding “novel or
disconcerting” moves in political discourse is to its impoverishment:
[I]t is important for people to be acquainted with the views that others hold. Even more
important, however, is the possibility that my own view may be improved, in its subtlety
and depth, by exposure to a religion or a metaphysics that I am initially inclined to
reject.... I mean to draw attention to an experience we all have had at one time or
another, of having argued with someone whose world view was quite at odds with our
own, and of having come away thinking, "I'm sure he's wrong, and I can't follow much of
Jeremy Waldron, “Religious Contributions in Public Deliberation,” San Diego Law Review Vol. 30
(1997), 842.
223
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it, but, still, it makes you think ... " The prospect of losing that sort of effect in public
discourse is, frankly, frightening-terrifying, even, if we are to imagine it being replaced
by a form of "deliberation" that, in the name of "fairness" or "reasonableness" (or worse
still, "balance") consists of bland appeals to harmless nostrums that are accepted
without question on all sides. That is to imagine open-ended public debate reduced to
the formal trivia of American television networks. 224
Phillip Quinn, in embracing Waldron’s argument, 225 was particularly convinced by Waldron’s
suggestion certain moves might “be made in political argument that bear no relation to existing
conventions held opinions, but which nevertheless gain a foothold as soon as they are discussed
by persons with open minds.” 226 Much of Waldron’s objection brings to mind a proposal from
Rob Talisse, who provides what he calls a “folk epistemological” approach to public justification,
one of the principles of which is that our search for the truth necessarily involves an open
exchange of reasons that subject one’s view to scrutiny. 227
Against Waldron’s novelty objection to Rawlsian public reason, Solum offers many
replies, though I will only consider the one most pertinent here insofar it relates to my argument
in the previous section. Solum reminds us that the obligations of public reason are of limited
scope in Rawlsian thought and most other prominent approaches to public reason liberalism: it
applies only to public, political action regarding constitutional essentials and matters of basic
justice, leaving ample room both within the political sphere and especially outside of it, in the
life of culture and associations, for persons and cultural groups to employ whatever reasoning
they wish. By this process, non-public reasons employed in the background culture (i.e., the
culture outside of the public sphere) might prove sufficiently influential in nonpublic life that
they eventually find their way into the corpus of facts that the public generally accepts, and
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hence, into public reason. Solum suggests, for instance, that the novel argument might first be
introduced in “academic discourse or even in an opinion piece in a newspaper or journal of
public circulation, so long as the author did not advance the argument as an already sufficient
reason for political action.” 228 Indeed, Rawls’s later “wide view” of public reason seems to
anticipate a vehicle for what Solum has in mind, as under the proviso, nonpublic reasons can be
introduced in even political debate at any time, provided that an adequate, public reason will be
provided in due course. In one of his last words on the subject, Rawls described at length the
circumstances under which public reason can change over time, composed as public reason is by
a family of conceptions of justice that is constantly evolving. Social change in particular may give
rise to new questions on race, gender, ethnicity, and so on, thereby giving rise to new
components of public reason 229 or new conceptions of reasonableness.
It is unfortunate that Rawls was not with us longer to further develop his “wide view”
and square it with the remainder of Political Liberalism, as Solum is right to point out that Rawls
was clearly concerned to leave more room for novelty towards the end of his life. He became
preoccupied with, as I am now, the pivotal role that the various moral and religious
communities and associations of our society play in establishing a stable conception of justice.
But as his corpus stands, and as contemporary liberalisms influenced by Rawls develop, the
practical flexibility of life in political liberalism and its capacity for creative inclusiveness cannot
be understood by reference to the idea of public reason alone. In this essay I have concerned
myself with the process by which CIDs or other comprehensive doctrines are declared
unreasonable, and are sought to be transformed or contained. If the strictures of public reason
are widened, but the environment is rendered more inhospitable to those who might offer
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novel reasons (which is what I have said containment does), then Waldron’s worry regarding a
lack of or limited novelty persists, and Solum’s reply is not entirely responsive to it. While
Waldron’s argument focuses on public reason specifically, novel ideas are had not just by
participating in public deliberation, but by seeing other lifeways lived out in public or semipublic spheres. My argument has been directed at the risk of myriad sources of novelty fading
from public life, or from their own cultural life, through any number of public forces: perhaps by
the children’s parents’ authority or worldviews intentionally being undermined by politicians or
public-school administrators, or by threatening the conditions under which certain cultures stay
cohesive through performative religious rituals or otherwise attempting to maintain control
over their internal affairs.
Notwithstanding his rejection of how I have argued for the notion of an oppressive or
one-dimensional social atmosphere – to justify non-exclusion of CIDs and criticize the
aforementioned Rawlsian processes that do so exclude – Rawls was by no means unconcerned
with the problem of an intentionally inhospitable social atmosphere as to certain citizens (nor,
to their great credit, are Quong and Macedo). He emphasizes that it is not simply the letter or
direct aim of the law that must not advance certain conceptions of the good at the expense of
others, and not simply a market or electoral process that is free by its terms. His conception of
justice included a necessity of first ensuring that the background conditions existing beyond the
laws, markets, and elections do indeed instantiate such equal playing fields. 230 Regarding the
possibility that a conception of justice could be impermissibly inhospitable, Rawls found this to
be a much more narrowly drawn concern than I have begun to argue it is, but nonetheless
foresaw it as a possibility:
Political liberalism is unjustly biased against certain comprehensive conceptions only if,
say, individualistic ones alone can endure in a liberal society, or they so predominate
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that associations affirming values of religion or community cannot flourish, and
moreover the conditions leading to this outcome are themselves unjust, in view of
present and foreseeable circumstances. 231
What I take myself to have identified here are precisely types of CIDs that are analogous to the
“associations affirming values of religion or community” and unable to flourish in substantially
similar circumstances to the above passage. Those who are poor, historically oppressed, who
practice highly performative religions, and so on, often coincide with this group. Moreover, as I
have argued elsewhere, the kind of environment that the representatives in the original position
are to foster, according to Rawls, is one conducive to citizens’ fulfillment of the listening
component of the duty of civility, which states that citizens are to listen to the views of others
and decide whether reasonable accommodations ought to be made. Most of all, only by
embracing the narrow tailoring of unreasonableness and containment I have espoused here,
could a Rawlsian hope to make good on the claim that representatives in the original position,
when considering the optimal conception of justice for their own interests, would choose
political liberalism as the system that maximizes their opportunities to pursue their chosen
conceptions of the good, especially those that have fallen almost irretrievably out of public
favor. While political liberalism is not committed to ensuring equality of outcome, in the form of
cultural preservation, it is committed to the sort of evenhandedness that I have said
containment is not.
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III.

Shared Histories and Corporate Minds: A Framework for Group Rights
from Hopi to Hobby Lobby

Defenders of the recent, divisive decisions of Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573
U.S. ___ (2014) 232 and Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) might seem to have awfully
little in common with measures protecting indigenous populations, such as the United Nations
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. 233 Defenders of the former, in the reductive
language of North American politics, are deemed to have a conservative or libertarian agenda,
whereas pundits often consider the latter paradigmatically progressive. The moral case for the
latter also often includes historically contingent observations about unequal treatment of
minorities, or of rectifying past injustices that are unique to the indigenous peoples in question,
whereas the moral case for the former often leans more heavily on universal freedoms of
conscience. Yet defenders of each of these legal-political actions share a common
dissatisfaction with the traditional conception of moral rights in liberal democracies, i.e., that
the only appropriate subject of moral rights 234 is the individual human being (or possibly several
human beings within a collective). These are also both political measures whose defenders are
motivated by a claim about the import of culture, and a robust right to live in accordance with it.
Put otherwise, what Hobby Lobby and the UNDRI share is some form of advocacy of what I will
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call group rights of conscience. 235 This concept that implies that rights of conscience 236 can be
held by, and corresponding duties can be owed to, an organized entity with a decisional
structure of some sort, be it an Aboriginal tribe, 237 a place of worship, a political party, or a
business entity.
Attempts to radically distinguish Hobby Lobby and the UNDRI are understandable and,
in some respects, clearly correct. Conestoga Wood Specialties, Mardel and Hobby Lobby differ
substantially from most cultural groups insofar as they are: for-profit companies, which are
creations of the law that come with unique immunities and duties; voluntary (rather than socalled “ascriptive” or “primordial”) groups in the sense that one can only “join” at the statutory
working age in a given state; and are comprised of persons not belonging to the sorts of
historically marginalized cultural or ethnic minority groups that have concerned prominent
defenders of group rights like Vernon van Dyke and Will Kymlicka. 238 There are nonetheless
certain liberties, such as freedom of internal self-governance, or what Avia Pasternak calls
freedom from “moral subversion,” 239 that are commonly asserted by both (and all) sorts of
groups seeking group rights of conscience. As Kymlicka has framed the two major categories
more generally, group rights often seek protection against mainstream political society, which
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presents external threats, or against claims by their own members, which present internal
threats. 240 It is also a contingent matter that the closely-held corporations asserting these rights,
especially in Hobby Lobby’s case, were particularly large companies whose ownership practiced
a major religion; had it been a minority faith, then the overlap with the kinds of groups that
concern van Dyke and Kymlicka would be greater.
Religiously motivated, closely-held corporations and cultural minorities are also both, as
groups, not a set of persons like the following: “all persons currently standing in line at the
bookstore” or “all persons who have been improperly denied unemployment benefits.” 241 As I
will explain in the following section, understanding assertions by groups as a multiplicity of
individuals each asserting aggregated, identical rights will not always do: group rights are, as
Joseph Raz’s influential shared interest conception of rights explains, those that would not be
sufficient to justify a corresponding duty if claimed by individuals. 242 Even under this shared
interest conception, however, what still appears presumed is that only individuals are the rights
holders; it is just that the utilitarian calculus, where enough individual interests are involved,
favors the many over the one. If group rights are to be understood as a separate category of
morally grounded rights (as I submit they ought to be), then there must be more of a relation
between those individual interests and corresponding rights. 243
I hope to offer a conception of group rights that can explain some commonalities
underlying group rights of conscience as they might be asserted by all types of groups with
sufficient shared interests among its decision-making members to claim such rights. With some
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limited exceptions, relatively little attention has been paid to the possible interaction between
these two areas of group rights (i.e., those claimed by cultural minorities and those by other
corporate entities). My motivation for proposing some preliminary criteria for the boundaries of
group rights, which subsequent work will give a more comprehensive treatment, is not just its
timeliness (given ongoing controversies over Hobby Lobby, Citizens United, various other cases
for group-differentiated religious exemptions, and still-brewing sacred land disputes), but my
increasing dissatisfaction with some of the internal value tensions that arise in Rawlsian
liberalism, especially tensions between value pluralism, a guarantee of equal liberties, and social
stability.
To be fair to Rawls, he began to exhibit similar dissatisfactions towards the end of his
life and career. By Political Liberalism and his addendum, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,
Rawls recognized the vitality to social stability of what he called “the background,” which
includes "the culture of daily life, of its many associations: churches and universities, learned
and scientific societies, clubs and teams." 244 The Law of Peoples marks a further move in favor of
my sympathies, as it attempted to construct a picture of international justice that included a
doctrine of tolerance and a recognition of various subgroups as duty- and rights-bearing units. 245
Nonetheless, though I do not intend to defend communitarianism itself in making a preliminary
case for a group rights framework, I believe the greater willingness of certain communitarian
political theorists (especially Michael Walzer and Charles Taylor) to recognize the import of
identity-conferring (or, as Raz prefers, “encompassing”) groups holds more promise for a
genuine allowance of value pluralism than Rawlsian liberalism alone.
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Group rights for all group types have been met with a variety of overlapping moral,
conceptual, and pragmatic difficulties. 246 Many critics have argued that measures recognizing
such rights will have a strong tendency to abet oppression against a group's own members (this
is the oft-discussed "internal minorities" or "minorities within minorities" problem), such as
women and girls, 247 or against those who do not belong to religious and cultural groups, 248 since
group rights often involve relieving members of burdens that other members of society will
instead bear. Third, some claim that group rights involving cultural preservation invariably
fetishize such cultures as static units or as relics of the past, and in preserving them are either in
denial or suppress the dynamic nature of actual groups. One of those offering this variety of
criticism, Jeremy Waldron, advocates what he calls the "cosmopolitan alternative," wherein he
proposes that we pay adequate heed to the debt we owe to the development of an
international community, and the mosaic of cultural offerings we cosmopolitans enjoy without
inhabiting one, traditional culture all the time. 249 Fourth, there are pragmatic worries about the
proliferation of "groups" or "cultures" demanding recognition, especially those that are ad hoc
in the sense that they only form as a "group" or claim a "group right" in the wake of a legal
measure with which they disagree. Fifth, and often asserted in conjunction with one of the
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aforementioned objections, many believe that the concept of group rights itself is incoherent,
such that its incorporation into our legal systems or other platforms for public moral recognition
would bring more confusion than clarity.
To compound the difficulties further, there is an increasingly common meta-objection
that, where there is a proposal to grant (for instance) religious exemptions to a cultural group,
the issue of whether a group can be properly hold a right is said to be morally unimportant. As
Peter Jones observes, Kymlicka, who is often credited with bringing rights of minority cultures to
the forefront of political theory, has to a small extent gravitated in this direction himself, finding
the “real issue” to be “whether and why a right should be specific to a group, rather than by
whom the right would or should be held.” 250 Similarly, Steven Walt and Micah Schwartzman
argue that “questions about corporate rights turn on substantive, first-order moral
considerations” and not “ontological considerations about the existence of groups or the
requirements of personhood.” 251 Put otherwise, it seems that Kymlicka and Walt &
Schwartzman believe all that is significant about group rights is captured by the currently
growing conversation regarding the moral basis for religious exemptions, and that the nature of
the corporate conception of group rights is harmfully obscure or much ado about nothing. 252
While certain metaphysical details regarding the rights-holder might initially appear to be mere
quibbles, morally balancing the rights of minorities internal to groups, non-mainstream
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(especially historically marginalized) religious groups, and the public requires that we have a
doctrinal means of separating bona fide from ad hoc or otherwise spurious group interests.
Positing a group entity with structural prerequisites is one manner of doing so, which is what I
will aim for in Section B.
Though I cannot hope to respond to each of the above substantive objections to group
rights in this essay, I am convinced that Dwight Newman is correct that our recognizing the
individual right to freedom of religion presupposes the religious (and to this I would add
cultural) rights of various sorts of collectives. 253 Like Newman, I will propose a corporate (and
value-individualist) conception of group rights that nonetheless maintains a certain sort of
supervenience relationship (I will can this the “weak supervenience” condition) with members’
interests. I will depart from and supplement Newman’s account in two important ways: (1)
Given that the only sustainable conception of group rights require ex ante demonstrations of
sincere group practices or interests, I will present a group’s having a shared history as necessary
for a cognizable group right; and (2) There must be a coherent and recognized decision
procedure or ethos within the group for the group be properly conceptualized as a moral agent.
While (2) is far from unique in this conversation, and I will borrow largely from a concept in
Andrew Shorten’s account, I will emphasize what I take to be one significant departure in my
account from Shorten’s.
Though a more thorough defense of this conception demands book-length treatment,
my aim here is to demonstrate that a conception of this sort is generally justified by widelyrecognized democratic values, sufficiently determinate to avoid the aforementioned ad hoc
problems, and sufficiently flexible that it takes seriously the moral objections to group rights

253

See Dwight Newman, “Collective Interests and Collective Rights,” The American Journal of Jurisprudence,
Vol. 49 (2004): 127-63.

149

cited above. In the next section, I will describe the most common justifications given for group
rights and field those objections that rest on a conceptual misunderstanding. I will then develop
my account in Section B. In my concluding section, I will briefly explain a wider-reaching
practical use of my framework in political theory. The incorporation of group rights into a
bargaining social contract model, such as that proposed by Ryan Muldoon, 254 shores up certain
of the shortcomings of the Rawlsian model.
As a disclaimer before moving into my presentation of the scope of and case for
conscience-based group rights, I do not offer criteria that are potentially common to cultural
minorities and religiously-motivated business entities to suggest that these are absolute rights
(i.e., those that will always override individual ones): it is only to suggest that they are desirable
and cognizable as a category; my conception of a “right” in this sense still operates on the
principle of proportionality. 255 The application of my framework to Hobby Lobby should
therefore not be taken as a wholesale defense of the majority opinion, but merely a defense of
the majority's recognition of a prima facie corporate right to religious freedom. Just as one can
respect and advocate for the principal of tribal sovereignty without thereby allowing a denial of
basic human rights to women and girls within that tribe, I do not purport to provide a thorough
answer to the question of whether and what sort of governmental or third-party interests can
override a prima facie group right.
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A. The Inadequacy of Individual Interest Aggregation and Two Common Moral Bases
for Group Rights
Because the debates surrounding group rights are fraught with conceptual confusions, a
preliminary definitional distinction is in order to clarify the sorts of rights that are and are not
our subject matter, for this is a confusion to which even commentators in this area have fallen
prey. 256 A group-differentiated right is one that is held by virtue of one's membership in a group,
and is not held by non-members, whereas a group right is one that is held by a collective itself
and not severally by its individual members. My subject matter is primarily group rights. I will
not specifically concern myself with group-differentiated rights, even though there is very often
an overlap between these two categories, as attempting to sketch a defense of both would be
unwieldy. This is not to say that group-differentiated rights are any less morally important, but it
is less common that objections are levied at group-differentiated rights per se.
To illustrate this distinction, let us consider a frequently discussed example both
elsewhere in my work and throughout the literature on group rights: cases where an indigenous
group seeks a special right to use or preserve a (often government-owned) tract of land in a way
that is distinct from the general population’s land access. Where a tribe or band possesses or
merely claims a right to hunt on lands on which hunting is prohibited to others, or to hunt or kill
species that others are prohibited from hunting under the Endangered Species Act, this is a
group-differentiated right. Even if we might refer to the right by claiming that it is owed to "the
tribe" as a collective, it would ordinarily be exercised by individual members of a tribe as

256

For a summary of this confusion, see Peter Jones, “Cultures, Group Rights, and Group-Differentiated
Rights,” at 39-41.

151

individual hunters, such that we would say the individual tribe members hold or claim such a
right severally. 257
Land bequests to tribes or decisions granting legal spheres of tribal sovereignty,
however, are awfully difficult to understand as being exercisable by an individual tribe member.
Instead, they are only describable as being held and exercised jointly. This is equally true of the
related issue of repatriating sacred objects or ancestral remains, enshrined in the United States
in the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA), 258 to federallyrecognized tribes. Where ancestral remains are returned to federally recognized tribes, the
disposition of the remains is subsequently exercised by the authority structure of that tribe, or
at least by more than an individual member. I am also fond, for purposes of illustrating group vs.
group-differentiated rights, of Janna Thompson’s discussion of the island nation of Kiribati,
which involves a putative group right of cultural preservation. 259 Uninhabited portions of Kiribati
land have already disappeared underwater. Much of the habited nation will do so in the nottoo-distant future, making it (per Thompson) the first nation to be a victim of climate change. 260
Given that the Kiribati place an extremely high value on the political and cultural lifeway that
they have come to enjoy with one another on their traditional land, Thompson’s guiding
question is whether the Kiribati, as a nation, have a “human right” to a new tract of land so that
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they might preserve their cohesive culture. In answering this question in the affirmative,
Thompson suggests that various other nations of the world might be understood as holding a
corresponding joint-and-several duty to the Kiribati, since they contributed to global warming
and rising sea levels. 261 Putting aside the controversial nature of Thompson’s claim, it cannot, if
valid, be meaningfully exercised by a single Kiribati citizen or even an aggregated collection of
them; it is only cognizable as a right exercisable by the people themselves. 262 Put otherwise, as
will become significant in sketching my own criteria, the land bequest to the Kiribati is only
cognizable as a dispensation to whatever collective, internal decision structure (likely the Kiribati
government) exists for sharing or using the land.
As one more conceptual wrinkle to iron out before introducing some common
justifications for group rights, even those who appropriately make the distinction between
group and group-differentiated rights sometimes include in the former those rights that I would
classify as aggregated individual rights-claims (or simply “aggregated” or “collective” rights).
Raz’s aforementioned shared interests conception leads to his holding the following
prerequisites for a group right:
First, it exists because an aspect of the interest of human beings justifies holding some
person(s) to be subject to a duty. Second, the interests in question are the interests of
individuals as members of a group in a public good and the right is a right to that public
good because it serves their interest as members of the group. Thirdly, the interest of
no single member of that group in that public good is sufficient by itself to justify
holding another person to be subject to a duty. 263
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As an illustration of Raz’s conditions, Peter Jones asks us to imagine a circumstance in which a
factory puts out polluting fumes that have significant adverse effects on the quality of life of
those living in the factory’s vicinity, but presents no significant harm to an individual’s physical
health. 264 Because of the high costs of curtailing the pollution (including potential job loss for
factory workers), the interest of one individual in shutting the factory down or curtailing its
operations would likely be insufficient to justify doing so. We would be much more likely to find
a duty on the factory’s part, however, if a much larger number of individuals living near the park
made a similar claim. Because the larger group of individuals acts as a but-for cause of the
factory’s duty to curtail its polluting activities, Jones suggests that this is properly considered a
group right.
There are elements missing in the residents’ collective interests that must be present in
the conception of group rights that I will offer in the following section as my proposed
criteria. 265 Other than being subject to a similar harm and living in the same area, the residents
whose lives have been negatively affected by the factory are not stipulated to have anything
else in common; they much more closely resemble one of the examples that I offered of a set of
persons possessing a right. 266 In this way, even though it takes a larger number of residents to
give rise to a corresponding duty on the factory’s part, the reasons supporting the residents’
rights are markedly different than Hobby Lobby’s/Conestoga Wood Specialties’ or the
aforementioned societal cultures’ putative rights. Unless much more were added to this story,
the residents lack what I will refer to as a “shared history” and, additionally, an “internal
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decision procedure,” each of which the kinds of groups that are my primary concern must
possess (or so my framework will hold). 267
With this initial distinction in place, I can now tackle the question of why we ought to
bother incorporating such a concept, or family of concepts, as group rights into our legal and
moral framework. Presenting an entirely generalized case for group rights is difficult, due to the
confusion regarding group and group-differentiated rights, the conflation of the collectivist and
corporate understandings of group rights, the numerous sorts of groups claiming such rights,
and the different legal-political measures that might fall under this heading. 268 Recall, however,
that my focus is on conscience-based group rights, which include the equal opportunity to live in
accordance with communal (often religious) values, a category of rights that I am claiming can
be properly thought of as held by collective entities themselves. Thus, I will summarize two
common justifications for group rights that are most germane to this scope of rights, including
commonly discussed examples falling under each heading. These are justifications both in a
moral sense (that groups deserve either special provisions or noninterference) and in a
conceptual sense (that we can meaningfully think of certain putative rights, assuming they are
morally justifiable, as being held by groups).

1. Cultural Preservation and Equal Opportunity
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Many group rights are justified on the grounds that some associations of persons do not
have an equal opportunity to pursue their conception of the good as others do. This often
occurs where the community claiming such rights has been subject to some form of historical
injustice, particularly where such injustice includes a substantial element of cultural
suppression. Though there are several ways of framing just what liberty has been violated in this
case, it seems that such arguments are fundamentally equal opportunity concerns. It is
noteworthy that even those who are otherwise group rights skeptics often recognize such
measures as necessary insofar as they have a restorative role, only in the sense that they give
historically-deprived individuals the equal range of liberties enjoyed by the rest of the
population. My frequent interest in American federal court decisions like Lyng v. Northwest
Indian Cemetery Protective Association, 485 U.S. 439 (1988) and Bear Lodge Multiple Use Assn.
v. Babbitt, 175 F.3d 814 (10th Cir. 1999) stems largely from the fact they involve American
Indian populations whose beliefs and practices were centered on communal uses of their native
land, from which they were forcibly removed, making it impractical or incredibly difficult to
carry on their traditions. With much strain and hardship, various American Indian populations
attempted to carry on their traditional beliefs and practices in subsequent generations. The
package of rights underlying tribal sovereignty and land bequests for many American Indian
tribes are best understood as attempts to restore a meaningful opportunity to live in accordance
with their conceptions of the good. Darlene Johnson similarly presents the case for restoring
native lands to “Indian bands” in Canada, pursuant to the Indian Act:
History demonstrates that there is a strong correlation between the loss of their
traditional lands and the marginalization of native people. Displaced from the land
which provides both physical and spiritual sustenance, native communities are
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hopelessly vulnerable to the disintegrative pressures from the dominant culture.
Without land, native existence is deprived of its coherence and distinctiveness. 269

What is significant in much of Johnson’s analysis of similar cases in Canada is that the
deprivation of cultural cohesion is a collective good that was taken from them, rather than one
came about by happenstance. Jeff Spinner-Halev’s offers a similar account of some European
societies, claiming that their loss is an opportunity for institutional structures:
Groups that have their own culture and are oppressed often include minorities of the
“wrong” nation in nation states: Hungarians in Slovakia, Russians all over the former
Soviet Union, but also the Roma (gypsies) and Jews of the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries in parts of Europe, and many others. When groups are culturally
oppressed, members of the group are denied the opportunity to create and sustain their
own cultural institutions. Attempts to run their own schools, newspapers and cultural
institutions are often suppressed; sometimes speaking their own language in public is
illegal. 270

It cannot be said that any such cultures were given an equal chance in a proverbial marketplace
of cultures or worldviews, as the conditions for success were removed from the beginning.
In some circumstances, a right to cultural preservation is invoked in the absence of any
practice of historical injustice as blatant as colonization and expulsion. This is arguably the case
in Quebecois claims for independence or linguistic preservation. 271 In such circumstances,
however, groups might claim that the cultural atmosphere is tilted against their long-term
survival, which is what many Quebecois claim, given the increasing dominance of English
language use in Canada over time (a fact that, in fairness, it partly due to political action by the
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Canadian government). This is also the form that claims sometimes take from indigenous
populations seeking to protect what might be called cultural intellectual property, such as
American Indian rug patterns (behind which are an important tradition of hand-weaving) being
machine-produced overseas and resold in the United States, or other American Indian symbols
being used without a tribe’s consent. 272 In such cases, neither the rug patterns nor the symbol fit
within historically recognized forms of intellectual property, so what is sought is a special form
of group ownership of such IP. 273 In any of these cases, the claim is less that cultural
preservation is required by historical injustice, but more that the group interest is being
overwhelmed by historical or contemporary conditions, and therefore ought to be given a
chance at cultural survival.
While certain of these putative rights to cultural preservation could resemble groupdifferentiated rights, many of them are not exercisable alone; they are what Denise Reaume
calls participatory goods, i.e., those which “involve activities that not only require many in order
to produce the good, but are valuable only because of the joint involvement of many.” 274 While
often cultural goods include some end product, the good itself is nearly always the act of
participation. Cultural activities, Reaume argues, even for those of us much more cosmopolitan
than the cultural groups I have used as examples so far, are difficult to conceive unless we
coexist with other producers and enjoy them with others. In the case of those groups seeking to
worship together or preserve their traditional way of life, rituals, linguistic practices, etc., this
participatory element is even more prevalent. A potential future land bequest to the displaced
Kiribati or the 19th century bequests to tribes like the Navajo are, in many cases, granted to
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those peoples, such that the use and disposition of the land is in part either to the authority
structures or to present and future generations of that group. Moreover, to the extent that the
rationale of the bequests is not just land as a means of sustenance, but land as a focal point for
cultural cohesion and self-government, these putative goods are incoherent both as individuallyexercised rights and as aggregative rights in the sense of Jones’s factory example.
Jeremy Waldron is a critic of group rights (especially on cultural preservation grounds),
both because he: (1) questions that there is any intrinsic value in preserving a group, rather than
simply preserving its contributions to cosmopolitan life in a technological and globalized world
culture, and (2) believes that any attempts at cultural preservation are fetishizing or fossilizing
the form of a culture that is on its way out, often because of its incompatibility with the present
age. I will just address the latter claim, which Waldron provocatively summarizes in the
following passage:
From a cosmopolitan point of view, immersion in the traditions of a particular
community in the modern world is like living in Disneyland and thinking that one’s
surroundings epitomize what it is for a culture to really exist. Worse still, it is like
demanding the funds to live in Disneyland and the protection of modern society for the
boundaries of Disneyland, while still managing to convince oneself that what happens
inside Disneyland is all there is to an adequate and fulfilling life It is like thinking that
what every person most deeply needs is for one of the Magic Kingdoms to provide a
framework for her choices and her beliefs, completely neglecting the fact that the
framework of Disneyland depends on commitments, structures, and infrastructures that
far outstrip the character of any particular façade. It is to imagine that one could belong
to Disneyland while professing complete indifference towards, or even disdain for, Los
Angeles. 275

Admittedly Waldron does not seem to intend for this characterization to extend to those from
displaced cultures, and he certainly does not justify such historical practices as displacement.
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Yet Waldron believes that the contemporary “collapse of the Herderian argument based on
distinctively human need [for immersion in traditional cultural life] seriously undercuts any claim
that minority cultures might have to special support or assistance or to extraordinary provision
or forbearance.” 276 Other critics who are not as resistant to other aspects of group rights
nonetheless believe that many forms of support for aboriginal cultures, to stick with Waldron’s
example, preserve the “conservative” elements in the culture and do no such thing as preserve
its organic form; cultures have always changed with times (which is very much Waldron’s point)
and cultural groups have always had subversive elements within them that facilitate their
evolution. In addition to his making a case of this sort, Chandran Kukathas also argues that
group membership changes far too frequently for a group remedy to be either coherent or
desirable. 277 My account will indirectly respond to Kukathas’s argument.
I hope that, at least in the case of group cultures in decline due to historical injustices
and violence, it is clear why a portion of Waldron’s Disneyland analogy cannot support a general
claim that we ought not subsidize cultural preservation. Admittedly Waldron’s sense of “ought
not” is at least as much a claim about futility or fiscal responsibility as it is a claim about moral
obligations, but either way of understanding his metaphor invites a straightforward reply.
Insofar as it is a claim about what is or is not owed to traditional cultures, then, at least in the
case of forcibly displaced cultures like many American Indian tribes, whether or not the
remnants of that culture are unsustainably living against the grain of the modern world is
immaterial to whether there is a historical injustice that can or should be remedied. Insofar as it
is a claim about what is futile, this is what could rightly be called a truism or self-fulfilling
prophecy. For various displaced American Indian tribes, for example, there is an important
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difference from them and a religious community that is “dying out because its members are
drifting away, no longer convinced by its theology or attracted to its ceremonies[.]” 278
Traditional tribal cultures declined in the first instance not because their beliefs were rationally
unsustainable or unpopular in that age, but because the “way of the world” involved their
forcible removal, assimilation, and other acts of violence. The basis for recognizing group rights,
which might include some form of assistance, in these areas is the idea that such cultures ought
be given an equal opportunity for cultural survival as those who were not subject to the same
degree of wide-scale cultural violence.
The variety of objections from Waldron and Kukathas might be more apt, but still
contentious, for those who are somewhat disfavored in a given society, but were not oppressed
in the forcible and widespread manner that many of the indigenous populations of North
America were. This is arguably the case, for instance, where the Quebecois make their claims for
making French the compulsory language in courts, in the workplace, and in various other public
contexts. Because English is and has historically been dominant throughout the rest of Canada,
many Quebecois feel that they must and ought to have the opportunity to create a life
organized around the French language and Quebecois culture. The Canadian government has, in
many respects obliged, as evidenced in the numerous French Language Laws that attach to
language use in Quebecois workplaces and courts. Groups might similarly demand other acts of
public support or state-sanctioned measures aimed at preserving or expressing the value of
minority cultures. For my present purposes, however, I need not make a thorough case for this
latter category of equal opportunity claims.
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2. Group Rights as Extensions of Free Exercise and Self-Determination
The more fundamental moral basis for group rights – insofar as it doesn’t rely on a
showing of historical injustice and encompasses a wide array of groups – is that a recognition of
group rights is a natural extension of what can be framed as every person’s right to: free
exercise of religion, determination of one’s identity, or pursuing a conception of the good
(among numerous other possible formulations). For many cultural and religious traditions, one’s
deepest normative commitments are to a community, or involve goods that are only
participatory or inevitably bound up with the wellbeing of institutions or communal practices.
Pasternak’s account, which is also based on a corporate conception of group rights, begins from
a similar justification:
[M]any religions and religious practices have a collective nature: they revolve around
organized structures, or institutions, that have a distinct and autonomous identity over
time (e.g., the Church). Without those institutions, their followers’ individual right to
freedom of religion would become meaningless. It therefore follows that these
institutions are entitled to moral protections that would allow them to maintain their
autonomous identity (for example, protections from state interference). Thus, ‘the
individual right to freedom of religion presupposes the fulfillment of certain collective
interests of religious collectivities.’ 279

Making the right to free exercise or the right to self-determination of one’s identity meaningful,
whichever right or bundle of rights one takes to be at issue, requires the scope of rights to
extend to those who are committed to such groups or communal practices. 280 As the passage
from Pasternak above reflects, this collective dimension to free exercise or a more general right
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to self-determination, will often take a negative form, commonly as a religious exemption or a
right to self-governance (unless, as explained above, there is a reason of historical injustice or
equal opportunity that demands some affirmative provision). This importantly includes, for
group members, control over their “cultural integrity” and, particularly where the cultural or
religious life is intertwined with other spheres of the group’s life, the “right to control their
economic, cultural, and social development.” 281 While innumerable examples of this reasoning
can be offered, a commonly discussed example is a group’s right to educate its own children in
accordance with its own beliefs and practices, such as in the cases of various Amish community
schools or the Kiryas Joel Hasidium community’s separate school district in Brooklyn, New
York. 282
Justifications of group rights based on self-determination are more readily invoked by
groups of all sorts than the previous, equal opportunity-based arguments for group rights. This
should not be surprising, as individual freedoms of conscience have never been tempered by a
failure to show past injustice; prior privilege does not limit one’s claims to freedom, even if it
might limit one’s claims regarding state support pursuant for that freedom. 283 As with societal
cultures seeking to preserve their traditional ways of life, business entities often seek latitude to
pursue their conception of the good in accordance with a (typically) lawful purpose (recall
Kymlicka’s idea of external protection). They will also seek to enforce a code of conduct or
demand certain qualifications of their members (Kymlicka’s notion of internal protection).
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These self-determination interests have been highly contested in recent years by
religious corporate entities. First, in response to what they perceive as external threats,
businesses have sought religious exemptions to laws that purportedly prevent them from
conducting their affairs pursuant to their religion mission or religious principles. This was the
case in Hobby Lobby, where three companies (Hobby Lobby, Conestoga, and Mardel) that were
each closely-held by religiously devout families, sought an exemption under an HHS regulation
(pursuant to the Affordable Care Act) that required large employers to include twenty different
forms of contraception in their employees’ health insurance coverage. Each of these three
companies’ decision-makers had, since their inception and through various media, including in
their companies’ prior statements, the desire to conduct business according to their deeply-held
religious beliefs. The Evangelical Christianity of the Hobby Lobby and Mardel shareholders, and
the Mennonite faith of Conestoga owners, included beliefs that human life begins at conception
and that it is a sin to end it. Consequently, pursuant to what was also in essence (like the
previously described indigenous populations) a claimed right of self-determination regarding
their corporate ethos, they refused to cover four of the twenty forms of contraception included
in the HHS regulation. Second, various groups have hired or fired employees in such a way that
it would be considered discriminatory in other contexts. This might occur where, for instance, a
parochial school wishes to fire or discipline an instructor for behaving what it sees as unbiblically. Such cases involve what is often called the ministerial exemption for religious
organizations. 284
In short, those making these or numerous other free exercise or self-determination
claims might include companies like Hobby Lobby, Conestoga Wood Specialties, The Jewish
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Community Center, various religious schools, etc. But such a justificatory line need not even be
limited to religious entities: it is also common for non-religious, yet morally convicted entities,
such as politically active nonprofits, charities, and legal aid organizations to have a strong
interest in pursuing a determinate mission and to have all of its members support, or at least act
consistently, with that mission statement. That not all members of these entities agree with the
organization’s decision should not make the prospect of group-based conscience rights
incoherent. Just as indigenous groups are diversely structured, various voluntary organizations
might (e.g., in their Articles of Incorporation, advertising, or their public mission statement)
operate under varied decision procedures, pursuant to which specified agents are said to govern
or act on behalf of the corporate entity itself. By no means is this a claim that all corporate
assertions of self-determination are identical to those of indigenous populations or that all
assertions of self-determination are equally valid. Instead, I wish to simply make clear that this
putative ground for group rights gives a wide array of groups a stake in whether a conception of
group rights is desirable or coherent.
Notwithstanding my discussion of participatory goods, some critics of group rights levy
broad objections that (a) Denying that group rights are articulable as anything other than an
aggregation of individual rights of association or freedom of expression, 285 or that (b) Even if
they were conceptually distinct, they wouldn’t cohere with a system of individual rights like
ours. 286 I will respond to (b) after introducing my conception. Michael Hartney grounds much of
his argument in category (a) on the following observation about the nature of communities’
values, which he develops into a claim about their rights: “There may be collective dimensions
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to the value of communities—some of their benefits may be publicly available to their members
and some of these benefits may be participatory—but the community has no value other than
its contribution to the successful lives of its members.” 287 This is a variety of value individualism,
which generally provides that “only the lives of individual human beings have ultimate value,
and collective entities derive their value from their contribution to the lives of individual human
beings,” 288 as opposed to “value collectivism,” which holds that groups can have value
independent of their contribution to the well-being of individual human beings. 289 For example,
though surely enjoyment of an orchestra by its members is participatory (and perhaps nonparticipatory for, say, a spectator), participation does not change the fact that the continued
existence of the orchestra ceases to be a good for an individual musician once it no longer
contributes to his wellbeing, yet might well remain valuable to those who remain members.
Moreover, for an orchestra or any other group, Hartney claims that its existence ceases to have
any cognizable value once it is contrary to the wellbeing of the majority of its members.
Given his claim about the purportedly severable values a community holds for the
individual members of a community, Hartney concludes that any moral rights to participatory
goods (or any other goods that are said to be exercisable only in concert with others) are
themselves severable. Though we require others to exercise the freedom of association, it is an
individual that can be prevented from associating with others; even though its exercise requires
others, we would say in this case that an individual right is violated. 290 Just as the participatory
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nature of certain goods doesn’t prove that there exists an interest over and above those
individual interests of its members, so it is where rights pertaining to such goods are involved. 291
As I would characterize Hartney’s argument, he moves from a supervenience claim to a
reductive conclusion: because the flourishing of the group and any purported rights it could hold
depends on contributions to members’ wellbeing, and ceases wherever it no longer so
contributes, group rights are no more than the members’ interests. What I will offer
momentarily is a conception of group rights that can affirm some form of the supervenience
claim while rejecting the reductive conclusion.
Denise Reaume has responded to Hartney’s objection in part by wondering what
Hartney hopes to gain through our speaking of rights as being held by an aggregated or
severable collectivity of individual persons, rather than held by an entity itself. Reaume finds it
significant, as do I, that the group entity itself is understandable as “that which is constituted by
the rules that identify its members and determine what shall count as its actions.” 292 In other
words, rules of group agency and decision-making suffice to render speaking of a group as rights
holder, or as an entity that can flourish or not, as meaningful concepts. Suppose that the
individual who has left Hartney’s orchestra is Phil, a disgruntled flautist. Though Hartney is right
that we can easily see how Phil’s interest is severable from that of the orchestra, as is every
other musician-member’s, we might note what doesn’t change when Phil leaves: the conditions
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for the orchestra’s flourishing remain the same, the orchestra’s interest in having a competent
flautist still varies with the composition being performed, and the orchestra’s interest in keeping
its property from being damaged (perhaps by a now-trespassing Phil) is not any less than it was
before Phil left, even though it had one more member then. It will be those authorized to act on
behalf of the orchestra who will hire a new flautist. For similar reasons, Jones, despite favoring
the collective conception of group rights, recognizes that a corporate conception is much more
capable of explaining a group’s various domains of resilience to changes in membership. 293
What is (I think) the more fundamental flaw that Reaume identifies is Hartney’s unfounded
assumption that the same ambiguity he finds in notions of a collectivity’s distinct value (and
hence, its distinct rights) do not also inhere in his notions of individual interests; just as we have
rules for determining group rights, so too do we have rules for determining whether an exercise
of individual agency has taken place. As such, even if this supervenience relationship exists, it is
sensible and concrete to speak of group rights.
What I offer in the following section is more than a counterproposal about which
manner of speaking (i.e., aggregated individuals or groups themselves) about rights is more
conceptually precise or expedient, which is to some extent what the exchange between Hartney
and Reaume remains. I will now turn to my conception of group rights that, like Reaume’s
account, seeks to recognize a supervenience relationship (between group and member rights)
yet maintain that there is both concreteness and value in holding group rights separately.
Beyond a point of mere ontological navel-gazing (as Walt & Schwartzman would have it),
however, I believe the criteria I discuss are morally desirable, insofar as they give sufficient
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weight to those rights that are exercisable only through collectives, yet set sufficient guidelines
so as to not allow the group rights form to be manipulated.
B. Two Criteria for Supervenient Group Rights: A Corporate Moral Mind and a Shared
History
The framework for group rights I will describe in this section has three features:
supervenience without reduction, a corporate moral mind, and a shared history. Much like
frameworks proposed by Jeff Spinner-Halev and Avishai Margalit & Joseph Raz, 294 I do not
propose these criteria in a binary fashion (i.e., that a group need always clearly have them or
not), nor as the only relevant considerations in determining whether a valid group right exists. 295
Instead, I encourage them as indicators of the precedential coherence of an asserted group right
and as having important political value in giving the appropriate weight to the distinct claims of
collectives or, as others would frame it, to claims of individuals who derive central value or core
identity from their membership in collectives. In this sense, I hope to at least partially respond
to the meta-objection mentioned in the introduction regarding the import of discussing the
possibility and mechanics of rights-holding entities. I am also especially concerned here with
addressing what I described as ad hoc objections, which are those that worry about group rights
running amok over fundamental rights of individuals and the government.
1. Group Rights as Non-Reducible yet Supervenient
As mentioned in the previous section, one of the mistakes of arguments against group rights
like Hartney’s is to move too quickly from a claim about supervenience to one about reduction.
Much like Dwight Newman, I believe that a species of value-individualism is consistent with a
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corporate conception of group rights (i.e., one that does not reduce them to those individual
rights of their members). In making the concession of value-individualism to Hartney, however, I
am conceding supervenience in only a weak sense. If there were a group that either did not
contribute to the flourishing of any of its members, or whose members suddenly left, I concede
that it would no longer be sensible to speak of group possessing moral rights, 296 much less
asserting them against a corresponding duty holder. Hartney makes stronger supervenience
claims, however, that I am not prepared to concede, such as the claim that group rights
extinguish at the point that a majority of the group’s members would be better served by the
group’s no longer existing. While I am arguing against eliminitavism of any sort about groups, I
will remain agnostic for my present purposes between List & Petit’s realism about group agents
and fictionalism about such agents. In any event, group rights are consistent with a
supervenience condition in two senses: (1) Group flourishing and individual flourishing can have
separable conditions, and (2) Groups can be understood as having role provider rights for the
individuals they benefit.
First, as I briefly mentioned in responding to Hartney’s orchestra in the previous section, the
conditions for a group’s flourishing and an individual member’s flourishing are distinct, and can
either overlap or be at odds. If the group at issue is a corporate entity or a self-governing
people, then we would expect these conditions to be laid out in one or more founding
documents, such as articles of incorporation, a constitution, or a mission statement. The
flourishing conditions also might be simply intuitive, such as in Newman’s example of a hockey
team that belongs to a competitive hockey league comprised of other teams. Presumably the
goal of hockey teams (both in Newman’s example and elsewhere) is to simply win and, if there is
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through some other means an established company culture, there might be additional
flourishing conditions: maintaining ties to the community, behaving respectably on and off the
ice, or promoting a culture of camaraderie among its members. Newman’s analysis of the
relationship between the interests of a hockey team, the Iglooville Icewizards, and a
hypothetical team member, Bob, is worth quoting at length:
They eagerly await the freezing of the local pond, the only place they can play. Suppose
also that Bob has no other use for the frozen pond except insofar as it gives the
Iglooville Icewizards a chance to play. In the circumstances, in the absence of the other
team members, he would have nothing to do with a frozen pond but gaze at it
plaintively and wish he had a team with whom to play hockey. Yet the Iglooville
Icewizards, the collectivity composed of Bob and a number of others, does have a
collective interest in having a frozen pond available, because the frozen pond's
availability contributes toward the continued flourishing of this collectivity. We might
then speak of Bob having an interest in the pond freezing, but we would have to do so
only in a derivative sense. Bob has such an interest only insofar as it is mediated through
the community of the hockey team; he has no such interest individually without the
Iglooville Icewizards. In other words, the collective interest is primary. 297

Supposing that Bob would have no distinct, individual interest in skating on the pond absent the
opportunity to play for the Icewizards, Newman concludes that “Bob has an individual interest
in the flourishing of the hockey team, and the flourishing hockey team has a collective interest
in the availability of the ice rink.” 298 As with Hartney’s orchestra, I would add that Bob’s
throwing down his stick and gloves, suddenly stricken with hate for the game of hockey, would
do nothing to alter this team interest. Moreover, the hockey team’s collective interest would
not change in nature if it lost and acquired a fundamentally new roster and new coaching staff
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overnight. Most importantly, all that has been said regarding a collective interest would be
equally true of the Icewizards’ collective right to access the ice rink if the ice rink’s owner had a
corresponding duty (such as a prior promise) to provide it.
As a further illustration of the analytic precision that speaking of a group’s distinct
flourishing conditions might afford us, it is meaningful and helpful (when making difficult moral
choices) to speak of the group’s interests in the face of various conflicts with individual
members. Phil the Flautist might have an individual interest in becoming an oboist, and Bob
(supposing he plays left wing) might have an individual interest in playing goalie. But the hockey
team and orchestra each have the optimal group members in those positions based on their
collective flourishing conditions (that is to say, they already have top-notch oboists and goalies).
Leaving aside the possibility that Phil and Bob are mistaken about their own well-being (perhaps
acting for the best of the group contributes to their own interests), the collective interests of the
orchestra and the Icewizards can remain unscathed by these conflicts. This distinction is even
meaningful if each of the members has an individual interest that is contrary to the collective
flourishing conditions; suppose another Icewizard, Fred, is fine with his assigned position on the
team, but wants the team to hold fewer weekly practices, and that the oboist, Maria, is
interested in the orchestra’s playing progressive rock rather than what she considers that tired
old stuff. It is perfectly meaningful, and morally appropriate, for us to conclude that the hockey
team or orchestra that hired or is otherwise counting on Fred or Maria have a morally-grounded
right to their fulfilling their duties. Finally, Fred and Maria could also each get over their
grievances by changing their minds or deciding that the group’s flourishing are of greater value
to them than their conflicting, individual interests. What I intend these various interest conflicts
to illustrate is that both groups, like tribes or corporations, can and do possess meaningful,
static flourishing conditions in the face of fluid individual interests (or individual flourishing
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conditions). 299 Denying a corporate interest, and any corresponding corporate right, in such
cases would render the duties and rights that attach to hockey or orchestral activities
unmanageably fluid, such that doing so would frustrate the value that any individuals obtain
from collectivizing (some of which were summarized in the preceding section).
As mentioned earlier, even my weak supervenience condition must admit of some limit
on the distinct flourishing (or perhaps wellbeing) conditions for individual members and the
group. If there is no one left like Bob, i.e., no one at all who has an interest or corresponding
right in the hockey team’s flourishing, we might wonder what the group flourishing conditions
are (at that point) other than an intellectual curiosity. Put more succinctly, we might well
wonder in what sense they remain moral. It is on this point that I am in partial agreement with
Hartney, as I would place the burden on the value-collectivist (of which Miodrag Jovanovic and
van Dyke are examples 300) to articulate the intrinsic value of a group without members. While
Newman’s most complete statement on the subject embraces a more resolute form of valueindividualism, 301 the same work in which he discusses the Icewizards includes a claim that a
church without members would retain some collective interests. This would seem to be an
outright denial of any supervenience relationship without some clarification. More precisely,
Newman claims that a church which lost all of its members would still be morally wronged if the
government were to come in and begin rewriting all of the church’s doctrine or appropriated
the now-memberless church’s name; the church would retain some residual rights, which
Newman recognizes “might” extinguish them.
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There is something deeply intuitive about Newman’s claim that either of the
government’s actions are a violation of some interest beyond simply being a waste of
government resources. Nonetheless, while it is not clear whether this is already what Newman
had in mind, I submit that any individual right is only articulable only insofar as it supervenes on
some other agent. Even in a church without members, this remains possible. It might be said
that prospective or future members of the church have sufficient interests to explain why the
government’s actions are unsettling. It might also be the case that, as is true of the hockey team
or orchestra, non-members have some rights pertaining to the church. Religious (and possibly
non-religious) citizens who belong to religious groups, or who might wish to, have an interest
(on something like Establishment Clause grounds) in the government not denigrating
collectivities or religious convictions. Absent either of these or similar categories of interests,
however, it is not at all clear that a residual right remains. Even within these examples, it is not
clear that this would constitute a right belonging to the church itself. Thus, at least for the
flourishing conditions of a church to give rise to a group right of conscience, it must contribute
to at least some person’s flourishing.
Second, in addition to this idea of distinct flourishing conditions, a group whose
interests and rights are supervenient on those of its members are nonetheless distinct insofar as
the group is properly considered a role provider. As an illustration, Pasternak gives an example
of various parental rights: a parent’s right to make choices regarding her child’s education is one
that she has the capacity to exercise, and that the child does not, but it is also one that is
grounded in the child’s own interests. 302 If it is correct that corporate entities fulfill some role to
members, non-members, or both – and both Hartney and I would agree that they do – then it
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(as role provider) has a capacity as role provider, an interest in fulfilling this role, and,
oftentimes, a valid claim of non-interference with its role fulfillment. Such a right might also
arise where a social worker or other government official is obstructed in providing a public
service. But consistent with the weak supervenience condition I have allowed, the collective
does not grant itself a role sua sponte, nor does it persist in this role (at least insofar as it has a
right to do so) without any reference to present or potential human interests. To describe how a
group can be understood as acquiring a role or flourishing conditions, I turn to the two criteria
for coherent group rights that I endorse.
2. A Corporate Mind as Authorized Alignment-Agency
Some of the more publicly visible objections to the notion that a group can claim rights
of conscience (such as a right to free exercise or culture) are essentially denials that groups can
possess the requisite moral agency to do so. 303 This is often because, so such positions go,
groups lack the requisite capacities for moral agency of the kind demanded for freedoms of
conscience. Given the weak supervenience condition, however, I will explain why a group’s not
possessing such capacities is not a defeater to its meaningfully exercising rights of conscience,
and why such rights (where valid) ought to be honored, so long as a group can be said to speak
on behalf of its members. As Pasternak summarizes List & Petit’s influential position, there is a
meaningful sense in which individuals who decide to collectivize can imbue the group with
“beliefs” and “desires” that can be different from “what some or even all group members desire
and believe.” 304 Thus, the group with the requisite decision procedure has a “mind of its own,”
which “supervenes upon, but is autonomous to, the mind of its individual members.” 305 I will
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largely adopt elements of Shorten’s 306 and Pasternak’s criteria for such a decision procedure,
but offer one significant point of departure.
The first of the capacities that is arguably necessary for moral agency, which corporate
entities are said to lack, is something like sentience, for rights violations are wrong insofar as
they make an individual suffer, feel disrespect, or otherwise harm his or her interests. The
second of these capacities involve those qualities that attend means-end reasoning, including
the capacity for deliberating, forming desires, and making consistent decisions pursuant to
those desires. Justice Ginsburg, in her dissenting opinion in Hobby Lobby, levied such an
objection, echoing Justice Stevens’s claim that corporations “have no consciences, no beliefs, no
feelings, no thoughts, no desires.” 307 Though Ginsburg emphasized the distinction between nonprofit religious organizations, on the one hand, and Hobby Lobby and Conestoga, on the other,
the (possibly unintended) implication was either that (a) a lack of sentience or motivations is a
disqualifying feature of conscience-based group rights, or (b) given this distinction, that
conscience-based group rights are only coherent on an aggregative conception of group rights,
where all of the members share the same, pertinent conviction. If any such implications were
intended, Justices Ginsburg and Stevens would find plenty of company in the group rights
literature. Walt & Schwartzman, for instance, criticize the corporate agency component of the
majority in Hobby Lobby on substantially similar grounds. 308
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Some types of groups, various commentators (including realists about group agency)
admit, do sometimes have difficulty satisfying these conditions, 309 particularly under an
aggregative conception of group agency. Several of them, the most influential of which are List
& Petit, demonstrate at length how aggregated preferences of group agents fall prey to
inconsistencies that are analogous to Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem. List & Petit call such
problems the “discursive dilemma.” 310 Though a complete exposition of this problem would be
unwieldy for my limited purpose here (to demonstrate paradigmatic group irrationality),
Shorten provides a succinct demonstration of this phenomenon that is worth reciting because of
its proximity to my subject matter. Shorten asks us to imagine that three employees of an
adoption agency are asked the three following questions: (a) Is the ethos of our adoption agency
Catholic? (b) Should Catholic adoption agencies place children with homosexual couples?, and
(c) Should our adoption agency place children with homosexual couples? If we were to impute
to the adoption agency the aggregated majority opinions of the three employees on each
question, each of whom offered differing yet internally coherent responses, the following could
be the plainly irrational result: The ethos of our adoption agency is Catholic, Catholic adoption
agencies should not place children with homosexual couples, but our adoption agency should
place children with homosexual couples. 311 Thus, as this and various other examples can
illustrate, a group with a democratic decision procedure and some disagreement about its ethos
can disqualify it as a moral agent and, consequently, disqualify it as a potential rights-bearer
(including in Pasternak’s role-holder conception of rights).We can easily imagine factors that
contribute to other, perhaps greater forms of decisional inconsistency or irrationality. This is
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often the case where there is disagreement about decision-making authority, such as who or
what determines the group’s ethos, or where a group’s membership is diffuse (as might be the
case for globally distributed religious, ethnic, or linguistic groups, or certain multinational
organizations).
Notwithstanding these obstacles, varied organizations can satisfy the conditions of
moral agency, provided that a group’s authorized decision-makers consistently articulate its
judgments, preferences, goals, etc. 312 Since articulating moral judgments requires judgments
about what is “good” or “bad” for the group, a group with the proper decision-making authority
can possess what Pasternak analogizes to the “two moral powers” that Rawls imputes to
individual citizens: “First, they have a capacity for normative reasoning, and they are able to
regulate their conduct in accordance with good moral reasons. Second, they have a capacity to
conceive their own good and pursue it.” 313 In order to properly exhibit these two moral powers,
as we have seen, a group would have to avoid the degree of inconsistency that Shorten’s
example illustrates. As such, since we ought not presume intentionality in a group as easily as
we do an individual citizen, a group must possess both (a) alignment agency, pursuant to which
the group can be said to have a view about its ethos and the connection of that ethos to its
structure or purpose; and (b) decision agency, pursuant to which an authorized representative
adopts a policy that ensures that its ethos, structure, and purpose are in alignment. 314 Suppose
that in a private school, for example, instead of an aggregation of individual interests, there are
representatives authorized (by the members’ consent) to exercise both of these forms of agency
on the entity’s behalf. Such representatives can stipulate that the ethos of the school is Catholic,
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that its purpose is to provide students with an education that honors the principles of the
Catholic faith, and that hiring atheist teachers would run contrary to its purpose and ethos. In
such a case, pursuant to Pasternak’s and Shorten’s overlapping criteria, the Catholic school can
be said to “have an interest” in not hiring atheist teachers, even if other officials or the majority
of parents at the school would have it otherwise.
Though I largely subscribe to Shorten’s criteria for what counts as an adequate decisionmaking procedure to give rise to group agency, my point of departure from his otherwise
elegant and widely applicable account arises from a qualification on alignment agency that
arises in his discussion of Hobby Lobby. A group no longer possesses the requisite consistency in
moral reasoning to communicate a group interest, and hence the possibility of claiming a group
right, Shorten appears to argue, where they “achieve alignment agency by unreasonably
excluding some potential members.” 315 Shorten contends that this is just what happened when
Hobby Lobby (and presumably Conestoga and Mardel) based its alignment agency claim on the
Green family’s religious views:
Certainly, they were capable of exercising alignment-agency, since they were able to
convince the court that the Affordable Care Act would disrupt the alignment of the
structure and ethos of their firm. However, another group also has interests in the
structure of Hobby Lobby, namely its employees, considered collectively. Had this group
shared the views of the Green family about the alignment of structure and ethos, then
the normative grounds for extending an exemption would have been stronger than a
claim based solely on the views of the Green family. Correspondingly, the exclusion of
the employees from alignment-agency would arguably undermine the normative force
of the exemption claim, despite the firm being owned by the Green family. 316

There are several features of this view that are puzzling, such as the unelaborated claim that the
employees are a separate “group” with an interest in the company’s “structure.” What is
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significant for my purposes is Shorten’s unexplained presumption that a hierarchical alignmentagency would deprive the corporate entity of adequate rational capacity for group agency, or at
least would undermine it. Up until this point, Shorten’s discussion of group agency is analogous
to what Lon Fuller calls the “internal morality of law,” or rather, the procedural requirements
that permit us to recognize a body of rulemaking as law. 317 Morally objectionable laws (such as
those in Nazi Germany) failed to be laws in this “internal morality” sense by their ad hoc,
inconsistent nature and their not being posted publicly, rather than by their substantive moral
repugnance. Similarly, Shorten’s conception of alignment- and decision-agency did not suggest
that some democracy in either form of agency was a prerequisite (or even material) to a group’s
rational consistency. It is entirely coherent to suggest that the Green family (perhaps together
with likeminded executives), pursuant to their founding corporate documents, act as the
alignment- and decision-agents for Hobby Lobby’s policies. We can extend this claim to groups
generally; people (including numerous religious, ethnic, and cultural minorities), as I have
argued elsewhere, freely choose to join groups that operate hierarchical or pursuant to decision
procedures (or even more clearly, substantive moral values) with which we disagree. That they
do so, however, is immaterial to whether they have satisfied the rational agency conditions for a
cognizable group interest. Stated succinctly, my point of departure is to include no requirement
of a democratic decision procedure regarding the group’s ethos to render the entity itself a
moral agent.
On this conception, were we to deny that Hobby Lobby or Conestoga had a group right,
it could not be because, supposing that the Greens and the Hahns were (as founders) the
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authorized decision-makers for their respective companies’ ethos, either company failed to
satisfy the rationality condition of group agency. But, as I stated in the introduction, satisfying
the conditions for group agency and a prima facie group interest need not work as an automatic
trump on an individual right or a compelling government interest. Thus, while the statement of
corporate rights-bearing set forth in Hobby Lobby is consistent with my conception of group
rights, this does not foreclose the possibility that certain moral side-constraints 318 (such as the
necessity of making contraceptives widely available to employees of large companies) outweigh
the assertion of a prima facie cognizable group interest in self-determination. Given that there
are many different sorts of groups, however, and our limitations on the notion of group agency
might have unintended consequences regarding other groups, we ought to be careful with
confusing the moral validity with structural prerequisites.
3. The Idea of a Shared History
The second of the two criteria that I propose as necessary for group rights of
conscience, which is complementary to the first, is that its members must have what I will call a
shared history. This concept will remain somewhat vague in my brief description of it here and
will vary in its evidentiary requirements depending on the type of group (e.g., voluntary or
ascriptive) at issue. By a shared history, I mean that, prior to the group’s rights assertion, there is
a preexisting period (how long will depend on the nature of the group right) during which: (a) all
of those group members that give it what Shorten calls alignment agency and decision agency
share a common moral or religious conviction, (b) all group members either recognized or did
not publicly act inconsistently with that conviction without group censure, and (c) all members

318

Here I intend the Nozickian use of “side-constraints” as set forth in Anarchy, State and Utopia (reprint
ed.) (New York: Basic Books, 2013).

181

of the group bear some means of mutual recognition towards one another. 319 The purpose of
this criterion, like the first, is to give adequate space in our moral and legal framework to those
who collectivize, but to avoid tilting the rights-distribution balance too far in favor of religious,
moral, or cultural collectives, as might be the case in a conception of group rights with a lower
evidentiary bar.
My motivation for including shared history as a second criterion for group rights harkens
back to anthropologist Michael Brown’s summary of an Australian case involving an indigenous
group, the Ngarrindjeri, that sought to enjoin the government’s construction of a bridge
connecting a small island (Hindmarsh Island) to the Australian mainland, each of which were
proximate to lands that they had purportedly inhabited throughout their long history. 320 Though
the Ngarrindjeri had not lived on Hindmarsh since 1910, and there was no evidence of
Hindmarsh religious activities there, they and Aboriginal rights advocacy groups claimed that
there was secret ritual knowledge, known only to select senior women within the group, in
which Hindmarsh played a central role. Thus, their advocates argued that “construction of the
bridge would so thoroughly violate the religious principles of Ngarrindjeri women that it
endangered the foundations of their cosmology and values.” 321 Notwithstanding a report by one
anthropologist that detailed, among other things, certain fertility rituals that purportedly took
place at Hindmarsh, prior ethnographies and even reports of numerous respected Ngarrindjeri
women themselves indicated that the purported ritualistic role of Hindmarsh was either a
fabrication or supported by no evidence whatsoever.
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The position that Brown takes regarding the Hindmarsh controversy, as I will
characterize it, explains what I am after in my shared history criterion. Assuming away the
contradicting evidence from the culture itself (which would fail as a group right under my first
criterion), Brown’s position is that a group right such as that involving the Hindmarsh cannot
exist where: (1) there is an absence of evidence of prior conduct supporting the religious or
cultural right, and (2) the supporting evidence adduced in support of a group right to sacred land
preservation relies excessively on the radical alterity and secretive nature of the purported
group interest. 322 Brown generalizes his position regarding group rights (without specifically
mentioning this concept), proposing that we give “actual practice” or “demonstrable social
behavior” greater evidentiary credence than mere assertion of belief, particularly where the
presence or absence of an attendant practice contradicts a mere assertion or third-party report
of a belief. 323 There is no such evidentiary gap between belief and practice in numerous other
sacred land cases, including in Lyng, Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2009), Wyoming
Sawmills, Inc. v. U.S. Forest Service, 383 F.3d 1241 (10th Cir. 2004), cert denied 126 S. Ct. 330
(2005), and the Zuni Pueblo pilgrimage controversy that Brown also discusses. An idea of shared
history that is generalizable across group types need not include a demonstration of so deep a
historical lineage as indigenous cases involving sacred land do. What is revelatory about these
cases is that some ex ante “demonstrable social behavior” or something like “joint conduct
pursuant to belief” is cross-culturally meaningful and a reasonable mechanism for rooting out ad
hoc claims. After all, as Brown explains with regard to Hindmarsh and another dubious sacred
land case he discusses, there are often ample material or other, ulterior incentives (than
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religious or cultural beliefs) for those seeking group rights in the form of exemptions or
support. 324
While the idea of a “shared history” is more readily cognizable in the case of a religious,
ethnic, or linguistic minority groups, we might locate numerous analogues in the case of
business entities. I have already suggested one possible source of ex ante “demonstrable social
behavior”: founding documents, mission or value statements, press releases, position
statements, or other initial documentation of company values. It might also be demonstrable
through a series of more informal mechanisms, such as a history of managerial conduct or, more
broadly, prior exercise of what Shorten calls decision-agency. In the case of a non-profit, this
might include a demonstrable history of the particular causes (or cases) to which it devotes its
time, and those that it avoids. Finally, at least insofar as we are speaking strictly of moral rights,
inquiries into shared history might require corporate veil piercing: in the case of closely-held
corporations, it might be helpful to supplement a vague statement of an underlying religious or
cultural mission to what the entity’s authorized agents intended (though this by itself would be
insufficient evidence of shared history).
The necessity of both criteria to be sufficiently responsive to ad hoc worries can be seen
in reference to Hobby Lobby and other cases similarly involving a claim for a religious exemption
from a generally applicable law. If our conception of group rights did not include the alignmentagency prerequisite to a group’s having the requisite corporate mind, then various agents of a
group could assert (for instance) religious exemptions on an as-needed basis. 325 Moreover,
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asserted group interests and attendant group rights within the same group would be more
frequently contradictory with one another. If any meaningful group rights can arise from
participatory goods, such as self-governance, an authorized agent must exist to render them
coherent. Even if the Green or Hahn family satisfied the rationality criterion for group rights,
such that they could make a prima facie case for a corporate religious exemption, however, the
shared history criterion is aimed at preventing assertions of group rights as cost-saving
measures. This is admittedly as much a criterion concerning practice as it is about the
conceptual coherence of group rights. In the wake of Hobby Lobby, critics might worry that
numerous other employers might wish to avoid ACA regulations, or that non-employers groups
might similarly wish to invoke religious exemptions as soon as it suits their interests. The shared
history criterion is meant to temper such concerns, pursuant to what is a cross-cultural inquiry
into a group’s sincerely-held normative commitments.
C. Conclusion and a Future Direction: Considering Groups as Bargaining Units
What I hope to have offered in the foregoing is a preliminary (in the sense that its
application requires further development) framework for group rights that makes two
contributions to the expansive, but increasingly relevant literature on the topic. First, it
supplements or clarifies some of the existing accounts of the corporate understanding of group
rights insofar as such conceptions are thought to be unwieldy or necessarily divorced from real
persons who deserve our moral concern. Second, it brings much-needed attention to the
potential impact on our moral understanding or consequent legal framework of our conclusions
about the rights of one group type on others. I must also reemphasize that the latter point is not
meant to imply that a monolithic conception or an identical conceptual treatment of various
types of groups or collectives is feasible or desirable. Yet, if Dworkin was at least partially correct
that lawmaking is an interpretive task, i.e., that our task is to cull from our framework internally
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consistent principles, then we have some interest in further developing theories of agency and
rights that can cohere across group types. This is particularly true for those who, like me, wish to
ensure that the balance of principles accord equal weight between those whose deepest
normative commitments demand collectivization and those who live in accordance with more
individualist worldviews. Aside from this interest, however, I will close by briefly describing how
the treatment of groups as I have defined them can contribute to political theory in a broader
sense.
Beyond my providing a conception of group rights that is both fair to those whose lives
are more oriented towards life in and with a community and less vulnerable to ad hoc concerns
about collectives, I also submit that groups are worth exploring as bargaining units within social
contract theory. Elsewhere, I have expressed doubts about Rawlsian liberalism’s ability to
account for the actual (not circumscribed by ideal theory) religious and moral pluralism among
autonomous and cooperative citizens. If the original position truly is meant to provide a
democratic framework that is inclusive and worldview-neutral, then it must be maximally
responsive to the deepest normative commitments of its constituents. I have argued that
certain segments of free exercise jurisprudence in the United States, which have much in
common with public reason liberalism, cast doubt on whether it can. Moreover, I have argued
that a many iterations of Rawlsian social contract theory, in attempts to ensure respect for all
individual citizens and maintain social stability, unjustifiably exclude and attempt to root out
various comprehensive doctrines (and, obviously, the citizens who live by them) over time. My
interest in pursuing a conception of group rights is because a treatment of groups as rightsholders might help shore up certain of these shortcomings, as there remains much to admire
and salvage in Rawlsian liberalism.
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Bargaining theories of social contract, particularly the version Ryan Muldoon has
recently proposed, might do the sort of inclusive work to which I am referring. 326 A bargaining
theory, unlike a consensus theory of political legitimacy, does not require that the bargainers
share terribly many perspectival elements in common. The essence of Muldoon’s proposal is
well-summarized by his analogy to how transactions proceed in a Chinese market:
When I negotiate the price of a shirt…I do not have to share many political values with
my counterpart: we just have to find a price such that she finds it to be at least equal to
her valuation of the shirt, and I find it no more than equal to my valuation of the shirt. In
fact, my counterpart and I barely need to have a common language beyond the
numeracy and some display of agreement or disagreement…Most importantly, we do
not have a to have a common system of justification, even though we are typically able
to find an agreement…I can seek to better understand the needs of my counterpart so I
might be able to better determine her reserve price, and she likewise can do the same
with me, but in these cases we aren’t finding an outside standard, but instead we are
attempting to better understand each other’s standards. Each party must be convinced
on his or her own terms. 327

Much of the appeal that Muldoon sees in such a shift closely aligns with the two vulnerabilities
of Rawlsian liberalism that I have argued for elsewhere; once a public, political perspective is
chosen, it might deprive religious or cultural minorities of a publicly admissible vocabulary to
even articulate the nature of their complaint. 328
What I have explored in this essay is a conception of group rights that might head off
this sort of problem, as the Rawlsian liberal’s rights conception is better suited to those who live
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in Waldron’s cosmopolitan life than those who collectivize in non-mainstream ways. While
Muldoon’s work does not explicitly address the group rights/interests/agency conversation to
which this discussion largely belongs, one of his illustrations of his bargaining model at work in
the real world involves just the sorts of groups I have in mind. In Belgium, what I have called
group-differentiated rights are more prevalent on the grounds that “cultural groups have
interests in different sets of rights.” 329 Muldoon accounts for this difference, as his bargaining
model would suggest, in economic terms: “If a right is such that there are costs incurred for
providing it to the marginal individual, then it is reasonable to only supply the right to those that
want it at least as much as the marginal cost.” 330 In my prior discussions of American Indian
tribes seeking special permissions or temporary exclusion rights on lands they consider sacred, I
have suggested a similar solution: Those tribes wishing to exclude others from (publicly owned)
sacred lands during their ritual uses of it must, in some other domain, be willing to engage in
forbearances of their own where other groups’ or individuals’ deep normative commitments are
at stake. 331 It might also have some applicability in the numerous and proliferating debates
concerning religious exemptions to generally applicable laws, such as in cases like Hobby
Lobby. 332 According to some, of course, bargaining is just how the contours of various rights are
produced anyway, but this is not the predominant understanding of constitutional political
theory.
Two of the obvious, overlapping difficulties with a bargaining approach to rights are the
high transaction costs that come with institutional applications of such a proposal and the

329

Id., 75
Id.
331
Here I must express my indebtedness to Paul Salamanca for a similar suggestion, putting the matter
(much like Muldoon) in Coasean terms, and suggesting that tribes seeking special privileges or powers
might “pay” for it as proof of the land use’s value to them.
332
Some would argue this sort of bargain is already present in the HHS regulation, since it allows employers
who do not wish to cover the contraceptives at issue to instead simply pay employees higher wages.
330

188

consequent risk of making various public, political measures almost prohibitively difficult. 333 This
would be especially true if, on a broad scale for a wide array of issues, any individual or ad hoc
group were to be the bargaining unit. 334 Thus, one potential advantage of the group rights
framework I have outlined here is that, if one found the inclusivity of a bargaining model morally
or democratically laudable, but pragmatically unworkable in light of other public values, then
using groups as bargaining units (wherever bargaining turns out to be desirable) might help
alleviate such pragmatic concerns. This would, of course, need to be supplemented by accounts
of moral constraints on the possible menu of group rights and the conditions of bargaining. 335 I
hope it will suffice to reiterate for now, however, my suspicion that Rawls was headed in this
direction as he increasingly recognized the need, in order to attain the well-ordered society that
he and countless other political theorists are after, to engage the myriad subgroups within each
society. This is far from an impractical quibble about entities some have called metaphysically
spooky or ontologically irrelevant. Instead, parsing the structure and capacities of groups and
communities is a necessary step in determining just how the state ought to balance its
obligations to individual citizens, who live as such, and to the nearly countless others who live
and deeply identify with their encompassing collectives.
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